The goal of a single operating system mechanism capable of supporting a wide range of security policies is not a new goal. The Hydra operating system developed in the 1970's separated its access control mechanisms from the definition of its security policy [29,52]. Hydra was a capability-based system, although the developers of the system recognized the limitations of a simple capability model and introduced several enhancements to the basic capability mechanisms. The Hydra approach was taken even further by the KeyKOS  and EROS  systems. Though popular, capability mechanisms are poorly suited to providing policy flexibility, because they allow the holder of a capability to control the direct propagation of that capability, whereas a critical requirement for supporting security policies is the ability to control the propagation of access rights in accordance with the policy. The enhancements introduced by Hydra and KeyKOS are intended to limit such propagation, but the resulting systems still generally only support the specific policies they were designed to satisfy, at the cost of significant complexity that diminishes the attraction of the capability model in the first place.
Primarily with an interest in solving the problem of supporting a multilevel security policy within a capability-based system, a few capability-based systems (e.g., SCAP , ICAP , Trusted Mach ) introduced mechanisms that validated every propagation or use of a capability against the security policy. Kain and Landwehr  developed a taxonomy to characterize such systems. In these systems, the simplicity of the capability mechanism is retained, but capabilities serve only as a least privilege mechanism rather than a mechanism for recording and propagating the security policy. This is a potentially valuable use of capabilities. However, the designs for these systems do not define the mechanisms by which the security policy is queried to validate capabilities, and those mechanisms are essential to providing policy flexibility. The Flask architecture described in this paper could be employed to provide the security decisions needed to validate the capabilities in these systems. In the Flask prototype, the architecture is used in exactly this way.