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SELinux Mailing ListRe: SELinux as a desktop / workstation?
From: Bede McCall <bede_at_mitre.org>
Date: Fri, 11 May 2001 20:51:10 -0400 (EDT)
The popularity of simple, stateless clients comes and goes. For example, we've seen IBM 3270s, X terminals, diskless workstations (e.g., Sun's early systems running ND) and now SunRay, which bears a family resemblance to X terminals and 3270s. The history stretches back to the glory days of Big Iron about 25 years ago, as punch cards and batch systems were (finally) on their way out and decent multiuser OS's were starting to show up (and many users thought the Lear ADM-3A terminal was really hot stuff). Securing simple, stateless clients is essentially a no-brainer, letting you can focus all your energy on securing the server(s). On the down side, when someone finally breaks into a server, everyone's instantly in deep trouble. Of course, if someone gets into a stateful client (an easier job, overall) they can gain access to anything that client had stored locally, which might include keys, passwords, etc. allowing access to one or more servers. It's also a lot harder to detect such intrusions, mainly because users aren't as attuned to such things as sysadmins. You can mitigate some of the server access-control problems (e.g., by using "smart cards"). I think there's a good compromise design, though. I think the facts argue in favor of distributed systems where *most* of the executable applications reside on clients and *most* of the raw data resides on servers. A secure client with enough local stable storage to hold at least a working set of raw data, a little non-global information (e.g., local static configuration data) plus swap space for its applications seems like a reasonable compromise. Ob. selinux: something like the SELinux-based kernel could be a very good choice of OS on both client and server, given such a configuration. While they will always have their place, simple-client schemes generally haven't had a good survival rate, primarily because of the non-security aspects of what you're doing. For one thing, if the server(s) for some group of clients crashes or becomes unavailable for any reason, the users can't get any work done. As Sun discovered with ND, if you try to emulate stable storage on the client but locate it physically on the ND server, you can congest the network very quickly with swapping traffic (...and thereby make the application server(s) unavailable). Some folks will argue that there is easily enough bandwidth in contemporary networks to overcome the congestion problems we saw in early systems like ND, so they see ASPs and "ultra-thin" clients as a very credible future. I think that in the case of hardware networks they're probably right, but the problem of server robustness is as yet unsolved. -- Bede McCall <bede@mitre.org> MITRE Corporation Tel: (781) 271-2839 202 Burlington Road FAX: (781) 271-2423 Bedford, Massachusetts 01730-1420 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.Received on Fri 11 May 2001 - 21:03:54 EDT |
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Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009 |











