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The fact of White Hourse cognizance of, and interest in, SIGINT was quite apparent by the time of the 2nd GTK incident in Sept. During that incident a highly significant SPOT Intelligence item was issued by the sup det which did not include CIA in its list of addess. As a result the WH SIT Room did not receive the item aas CIA(DCI) is charged with the responsibility for servicing the WH on all SIGINT product. This incident led to an examination of the problem by the Pres's Foreign Intell Advisory Baord which concluded that remedial action was required and directed NSA to take those actions needed to assure the preceipt in Washington by all interested recipients of all SIGINT reprts as well as the timely receipt by NSA of the tehcnical info required for NSA to provide an evaluation of the develoment being reportd on.

The nsa sutdy provided tc the board showed the NSA involvement in the Sept DS patrol ffom the initial states - the nature of which ahas already been discussed. After notification from NSG of the Setpember patrol planning NSA had commenced planning and by 13 Septeber completed two-phase rpreparations for the DS patrol... The first dealkng with the patrol under routine circumstances - providing relevant SIGINT tasking instructions and necessary procedures for continued technical suppor tof the period when the patrol would be in progress. the second phase regarding

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the patrol as a potential tartet for hostile NVN of [redacted] actions, to coer which ontingency, instructions werd issued which specified the intecept, forwaridng, nd reporting prodcedures to be implemented in the event of an incident.

In answer to the PFIAB inquiry NSA could point out hthat within 3Ø minutes of receipt of the COMNAVFORJAP CRITIC showein the MORTON had takne unid radar targets under fire, it had implemented these special instructions at land-based collection sites which had responsibility for the NVN problem and for certain areas of [redacted] These instructions had icluded additional collection emphaiss, special reporting procedurees (both with regard to the frequency of reports and to the dissemination of retorts and to the dissemination of reports to a wider audience). and equally important, special input to NSA of the Technical basis for these reports.

Regarding the PFIAVs particular concern for the non-forwarding of full encode text to CIA and the WH, it was pointed out that though this did happen, it had applied only to those messages which were intercepted by the MADDOXs SIGINT Det and that NSA had compesated for the nonØforewarding by placing collection amphsis emphasis at shore-based facilities i.e., targets covered by the Det were also monitored by shoeØbased facilities, which also accomlished relevant tedhnicsl input. It was emphasized to PFIAB that the foregoing procedure had been oll wed followed in the interest of keping the operationl requirements of the detachment at a minimum sconsistent with its limited resources and communications capability.

PFIAB was zassured that the NSA was aware that the above procedures, while adequate during previous patrols, had not been sttisfactory during the patrols in question... the inadequacy having been oaccasioned by the non-routine develometn which had occurred during this particular patrol, and by the unusula commsk difficulties (atmospherics)s experienced by the shore-based SIGINT facilities. Although the required technical data had been collectes and forwarded to NSA, the delays encountered were acknowledge by NSA to have been unacceptable and as so remedial action was taken on 21 October 1964. From that time on, all special dets were required to forward significant technical data in the same manner as

shore based facilities. In addition, SIGINT reports issued by special detachments would be forwarded to an appropriate shore-baed faclitiy for direct dissemination to all interested members of the intelligence community, including Washington area consumers.

PFIAB was als informed of NSA actions already planned for the general improvement of the overall SEA SIGINT production problems, i.e., actions were unde wway to relocate the reminder of the DRV NAVAL collections, processing, and reporting effort from San Miguel, R. P. to Phu Bai, SVN -- a move calculated to result in a concentration of analytic talents in an area of macimum hearability and further enhance the field apability to produce accurate and timely translations and other SIGINT rpoduct. In terminating the report to PFIAB NSA did not fail to point out htat relevant to the comms difficulties experienced by certain shore-based SIGINT units in September - the DOD communications im prover improvements including the installation of hard wire systems expected to be operational in January 1965, should improve all comms services form and to SEA

Currently available COMINT indicates that throughout the patrol DRVN entities were keenly aware and accurately informed of the presence of the DS vewsels. Fearing a south vietnamese incursion and expecting U.S. attack if provoked, the DRVN was geared to prepulse the intruders. Towad this end naval autorities continually admonisthed subordinate units to effect ah hifh level of defensive preparedness, to isitute alert condiiton one, to camouflage their locations and above al to avoid spurious provocation. That any DRVN eneity was directed otherwise if not reflected.

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At 170045Z the preseence of american ships in the GTK area was initally refelcted when norther fleet HWS, Port Hallut, reported the U.S 7th fleet's intentions were to more into the area close to the shore for the prupose of provokig the DRV. Subsequently, the radar station at Deio Ngang reprted presence of DDs. All stations were directed to effect alert condition one and acknowledge moilization orders. At 17042Z Port Hallut informed the T146 that the enemy intende to provoke and possibly attack from both the sea and air especially on 17 and 18 Septmeber. DRV vessels were ordred to camouflage anc prepare for apossible attack but to await furthrer order. at 0830Z an unid southern fleet acty reported sub unit 6 had acknowledged the orders which possibly "postponed" the battle. Inasmuch as there were no other offensive intentions indicated in DRVN comms on this date the significane of the above order in ink. DRV shipping comms

indicate ~~[illegible]~~ thatsubsequntly all units were ordered to be alert and in particular to reinforce the border in order to defend aginst enemy acty. "be prepared to fight" Sub unit 7 was ordrred to proceed and remain at Xuan Zoung approximately 30 miles west N W of point delts, the scheduled DS vessel entry point for 19 September. Port Wallut then reported the 07/30Z posit of the DS.

Through probably fishing craft visual sightings passed to shipping net control Hai pong at 180247Z, the DS patrol vessels were id'd as the 946 and 950. At 180630Z the DRVN had located the ships 15 miles east of Hon Matt Island. The T120 reported that precsutions were being made probably againstu. SVN raiders. The DRV reportedly feared that SVN vessel would attack the DRV coast using the DS pat as a decoy. Subseuqnetly Port Wallut 1038Z admonisthed all stas to do their best in avoiding provocations and to disperse during the anticipatded enemy air attakcs. An unid sta later reprted uinsufficient foliage for camouflage while another unit on 20 Sept reported they were ancohored and well cmouflaged.

Thru the present, it has not been possible to isolate in COMINT any reflection of an attack by NVN forces on the DS or of the DS attack on any NVN vesses; However, at 1719/18 Port Wallu reported to all stas that personnel on the Gianh river had heard the sounds of the explosionns. Ben thuy indicated that the enemy was creating an incidnt similar to the one on the night of 4 Aug in ordr to strike us and all stations were directed to examine existing a/d plans and to

cammuflage correctly. Shortly thereafter, Port Wallut notified the T221 that the enemy was planning to attack and that the targets would consist of NVN military, economic and political installation. All naval units were ordered to disperse, Ha Long bay was to be reinforced, timely waring and reporting was to be emphasized, and vessels were to seek haven in concealed anchorages.

On 19 Septmber stations in the southern fleet were cationed to fire only after th enemy had opened fire and to continue under alert condition one. Northern and southern fleet elements were again reminded of the events of 4 and 5 aug and informed that the American STATE dEpart had announced that an american ship was attacked in the GTK the night of 18 Septmber. Port wallut added that the NVN had been falsely accused of luanching torp attacks. Gen thuy directed sub unit 2 TP 253 and T259 at 19 1459Z to remain in alert condition one and during the day to assist tin aidr defense; at night they were to strike the raiders. The "raders" may be referring to either the presence of American capital ship, the feared incursions of south Vietnamese boats, or both.

Late of 19 September, NVN units were informed that th 7th fleet had retired to an area south of the DMZ. At 192120Z Port Wallut infomred the T191 and the T193 that effec5ive 05000 20 S they were to assume alert condit 3 vice 4 to asto assume an a/d posture during the day and again to strike the enemy at night. This alert posture continued through 20 S with DRVN units

being admonished to maintain a defense posture, to avoid provocations and to concentrate on defending the shoreling.

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TRACKING

NVN naval tracking entities were noted at a moderately increased state of readiness uring the period 1719 s with 327 msgs noted 98 of which relected the DS misn. Altho 2 msgs from Haiphong gave ordrs to "report continuously" on the enemy destroyers, tracking was oth sporadic and erratic when caompared to acty noted during the aug patrol. Cannot identify any NVN naval acty reflected on tracking net as having of been rouse into action because of the presence of the DS patl. Comparison of the patrol's posit log with avail tracking indicates that algo discrepancies up to 10 NM were observed in some reports, overall. The 3 tracking appears to be somewhat more acurate than the Aug patrol.

During the period of the attack: at 1256 followed to 1435Z. Shortly thereafter, reflex of "enemy a/c" were noted in tracking from Deo Ngang . The a/c , which were reprted variously asone, 2 and 5 units, were observed from 10 miles nw of ...Another ENEMY possible a/c was reported as being at 1520Z. Its acty was prob a reflex of the carrier based a/c ivolved in droppin g flares and illuminating the attack area for wasearch ofor debris.

19 s only 7 traking refelx N) O OTHER NOTED.

September - a total of 41 hours 26 min of intercept consisting exclusively of northern and southern fleet VHN MM traffic was collected between 14 2015 and 210001. VH air and ground and all [redacted] target entities were nil heard throughout the patrol.

VHN produced 46 readable or partially readable encoded operational msgs and 23 tracking msgs. [redacted]

tracking appeared highly accurate based on prelim comparisons with DS nav log.

1st msgs 170245Z port wallut to T 120

one msgs vinh son to ben thut to sub unit 6 received order to postpone the battle . This intercept was subj of msgs which suggested Have not yet received orders to fight as a possible interpretation.

946 adn 950 id'd when ships passing two antenna-rigged fishing craft. first closely encountered vesselx of patrol.

Haiponhg to so-1 sub chaster T231... follow precisely the intention to expect war which was pblicized. anschoe discreetly.

NSA25X3