## OUTING ANDWORK SEET

(PAR. 40.62 O.R.)

By Authority of the Chief Signal Officer

SUBJECT\_

Comments on "Security of U.S. Military Communications "

(Memo dated 1 September 1943)

1. During my visit to England I had two sessions with Paymaster Commander Dudley-Smith who coordinates information relating to the German Army Y Service successes with British and Allided cryptographic taffic. In regard to compromises in North Africa he indicated that their information showed some scanty evidence of the Germans reading certain low-grade ciphers but he stated that probably most of the data obtained were from their inter- ception of radiophone conversations in plain language. There was no evidence whatsoever of the Germans being able to read high-grade or even medium-grade cryptographic traffic of either the British or Americans. In one or two cases where a code or cipher was obtained by capture, there was a temporary reading of a few messages. For example, from 18th to 28th of February, the German Army Y Service in Tunisia communicated back to higher headquarters a considerable number of "decoded and partly decoded" American Army messages. The time lag between interception and the dissemination of the alleged decode varied from 6 hours to 5 days. GC & CS initiated an inves- tigation but no definite results had been produced, although later information indicated the possibility of another compromise by capture. There was no evidence at all of the Germans being able to read our M-209 traffic at that time.  2. Elsewhere, I have encountered references to the fact that many of the communications from American Air Listson Officers are in plain language and that their communications are not so secure	Number each action	То—	Memorandum	Name, Division or Branch, and Date
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(PAR. 40.62 O.R.)

SUBJECT Comments on "Security of U.S. Military Communications"

(Memo dated 1 September 1943)				
Number each action	То—	Memorandum	Name, Division or Branch, and Date	
		this is found in the fifth example on the attached memo.		
		3. However, the nature of the majority of the translations in the accompanying memo do not appear to me such as might have been intercepted in plain language and I think an investigation would be well worthwhile. In view of the fact that this information comes from the highest grade sources, care will have to be exercised in making the investigation so as not to disclose the source. For this reason it is recommended that a letter be sent by airmail to Colonel Hayes forwarding the information contained in the attached memo, and asking that he make a very quiet and discreet investigation to ascertain, if possible, the nature	ng }	
		of the transmissions and the codes or ciphers that were employed or any other circumstances which might shed light on the situation.		
	•	4. It is possible that the Britis themselves have already initiated such an investigation and we should therefor check with them before taking any steps ourselves.	re	
			W.F. Friedman Dir. Com. Res. SPSIS-3	
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