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USCIB: 13/195

APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN
CODE WORD MATERIAL

11 July 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Measures for the Increased Security of
COMINT.

1. The attached report on the above subject has been submitted by the Security Committee in accordance with USCIB instructions.

2. It is contemplated that this report will be considered at the Sixty-sixth Meeting of USCIB, 13 July 1951.

H. D. Jones

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Secretariat, USCIB

Inclosure 1 SECCOM Report, dated 9 July 1951.

USCIB: 13/195

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MEASURES FOR THE INCREASED SECURITY AND MORE EFFICIENT
UTILIZATION OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider whether any change should be made in current regulations governing the handling of COMINT in order (a) to preserve and improve security with respect to the more sensitive types of COMINT and (b) to improve the efficiency of exploitation of the less sensitive types thereof.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. See Enclosure "A" attached.

CONCLUSIONS

3. On the basis of the discussion above referred to, it is concluded that:

- a. It is practicable and advisable to separate COMINT into four distinct categories (A, B, C, and D), each of which may further be subdivided into separate classes
- b. The COMINT material to be included in each category can be determined on the basis of sensitivity of source or content.

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- c. A distinction can and should be made in the clearance standards required for the more sensitive categories (A and B) and those required for the less sensitive categories (C and D), and such distinction should be commensurate with the relative sensitivity of the materials included in such categories.
- d. Indoctrination should be limited to the particular class or classes of COMINT as to which the indoctrinee has a legitimate "need to know."
- e. Existing principles of COMINT security should be maintained with respect to the more sensitive categories (A and B).
- f. The principles of COMINT security applicable to the less sensitive categories of COMINT, (C and D), should be relaxed in order to permit maximum utilization of this material, but such relaxation should be specifically regulated so as to insure, so far as possible, that this is accomplished without risk to the COMINT effort, and particularly to the more sensitive categories thereof.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that the revision of Appendix B of the BRUSA agreement attached as Enclosure B be accepted by USCIB as a basis for negotiations with the U K.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. All communications intelligence (COMINT) is currently subject to special security regulations to insure that it will be produced only by, and disseminated only to, specially cleared and indoctrinated personnel having the "need to know". Under existing regulations, the number of such personnel is to be restricted to an absolute minimum.

2 The primary objective of such special regulations is protection of source.

a. It is recognized that any nation reasonably sophisticated in cryptography which learns that its communications are being read is capable of denying, or at least minimizing, that source of intelligence to others.

b. It cannot be assumed that foreign nations are unaware that we are engaged in a COMINT effort. Nevertheless, it is of paramount importance that they be prevented from ascertaining, particularly on a current basis, (1) the scope of that effort, (2) the degree of our success in general, or (3) the specific categories of communications we are able to read.

c. It is also recognized that the danger of compromise of a particular source varies directly with the number and the reliability of the persons having knowledge of that source.

Enclosure A

3.-

3. The basic definition of the principles of security and dissemination applicable to COMINT is to be found in Appendix B to BRUSA, entered into 5 March 1944. It is therein stated (paragraph 2):

"It is recognized that, while the following principles are in general of universal application, certain of those primarily applicable to peacetime must be modified in time of war or emergency, to ensure that the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is derived from the source. Provision is made hereunder for the necessary modifications. In time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by USCIB and LSIB, Emergency Regulations embodying the emergency principles contained herein shall be brought into force by the respective parties."

4. Appendix B to BRUSA was amended in several relatively unimportant particulars at the U.S.-British Technical Conference, 15-26 July 1948, but it has not been significantly changed since 1946. No general "Emergency Regulations" have been brought into force by the respective parties.

5. Among the developments indicating the advisability of making substantial revisions to Appendix B at this time are the following:

a. Active military operations are being conducted in the Korean Theater. This has brought about a rapid increase in the number of persons engaged in the various COMINT activities. It has also multiplied demands for a more up-to-date approach to the problem of disseminating COMINT to lower echelons in the combat arms and the problem of effective operational use of COMINT.

b. The state of "cold war" which exists in other sensitive areas constitutes a grave emergency which puts upon us the

obligation to exploit to the fullest our all-source intelligence potential. Such exploitation requires the cooperation of a relatively large number of individuals and raises difficult questions as to the most effective, secure means of exploiting and disseminating COMINT, questions which did not exist, at least in their present form, when Appendix B was agreed.

c. In particular, intensive exploitation of plain text in conjunction with low and medium grade decrypts is a development which has occurred for the most part after the effective date of Appendix B, and it has not yet reached its peak. The importance of this development is augmented by the denial of high grade [] decrypts. Because of the nature of this material, its efficient exploitation requires the cooperation of, and consultation with, more individuals than any other category of COMINT.

d. Despite the special security regulations made applicable to COMINT, various important sources of [] COMINT have been denied to us. Although the causes thereof are not known with certainty, there has been an apparent relation between our success and denial in a number of instances which it is difficult to attribute to coincidence.

6. In the light of the foregoing developments, it is believed that Appendix B to the BRUSA Agreement in its present form is not adequate to insure that COMINT information will be exploited and used

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

to the maximum extent consistent with protection of source, since it does not

- sufficiently reflect the existence of de facto states of war and emergency;
- recognize that problems analogous to those involved in making effective operational use of COMINT arise in the non-operational exploitation of this material and should be provided for in like manner; or
- provide sufficient guidance in solving the security problems inherent in expanded exploitation of plain text, in conjunction with low and medium grade decrypts, by greatly enlarged staffs.

7. The principle of "compartmentalization" is recognized in the currently effective Appendix B to the BRUSA Agreement:

a. Although intelligence is, in a sense, a "seamless web", the very concept of classification implies that various types of intelligence material can, and should for security reasons, be segregated for processing, for exploitation, and for dissemination

b. In the COMINT field, for a number of years prior to the BRUSA Agreement, the concept of a codeword designator was superimposed upon classification and it served to distinguish all COMINT from all collateral intelligence. Only specially cleared and indoctrinated personnel are qualified to process, to exploit, or to receive codeword material. This protection has been

extended to the codeword itself

c. Further refinement of the same principle is also illustrated in Appendix B to BRUSA, wherein COMINT is subdivided into three general categories, each designated by a separate codeword and each, at least to some extent, subject to special handling. Each element of COMINT is allocated to one or the other of these categories, namely:

(1) "Special" Special Intelligence - Special Intelligence which by virtue of its source or content requires exceptional safeguards. This material is designated by the codeword applicable to Special Intelligence with the prefix "Special" or by an agreed subsidiary codeword (Appendix B, paragraphs 17 and 22).

(2) Special Intelligence - COMINT which by virtue of its source or content requires safeguards less exceptional than those employed for "Special" Special Intelligence but more restrictive than those governing Traffic Intelligence (e.g., Appendix B, paragraph 4).

(3) Traffic Intelligence - All other COMINT protected by the special security regulations applicable to COMINT, but less restricted than either "Special" Special Intelligence or Special Intelligence (e.g., Appendix B, paragraph 5).

d. The ultimate development of this principle is the concept of the "need to know",--the concept that each item of

COMINT, even within the foregoing general categories, is to be made only to those cleared and indoctrinated personnel who require it in the performance of their duties.

8. It is believed that existing problems can be solved without any fundamental change in principle by:

a. Revising Appendix B of the BRUSA Agreement in such manner as to implement this principle of "compartmentalization", which principle should be adopted to the current situation; and

b. Making appropriate changes in the regulations and operating procedures of the Agencies, the operations of which are coordinated by USCIB, so as to reflect and apply such revision.

9 Enclosure B, attached, is a recommended revision of Appendix B of the BRUSA Agreement which differs from the existing version in the following major respects:

a. Revised: COMINT is defined so as to exclude from special COMINT regulation;

(1) Press and propaganda broadcasts, and

(2) Unencrypted military messages of a tactical nature.

Existing: Appendix B in its present form contains no such express exclusions, although in practice, the first is not regulated by USCIB or LSIB

- b Revised: COMINT is divided into four general categories (A, B, C and D), and permission is given to sub-divide each category into separate classes.

Existing: As pointed out above, COMINT in practice is divided into three general categories and provision is made for certain classes within each category (e g., items of "Special" Special Intelligence and Weather Intelligence).

- c Revised: The basis for division into categories is sensitivity of source or content.

Existing: Primarily the basis for division into categories is cryptanalysis as distinguished from traffic analysis, although sensitivity of source and content is recognized to a limited extent.

- d Revised: Indoctrination is to be selective, based on the "need to know", in that an individual will be indoctrinated only for the particular classes of COMINT he requires to perform his mission and will not be told about the others.

Existing: No corresponding provision is contained in the present Appendix B.

- e Revised: A distinction is made in the security inquiries required for clearance and indoctrination into

Categories A and B on the one hand, and Categories C and D, on the other. It is contemplated that this provision will be implemented by USCIB so as (1) to continue existing clearance standards with respect to Categories A and B, and (2) with respect to Categories C and D, to require clearance standards not less stringent than those presently required for SECRET.

Existing: Appendix B makes no such distinction.

- f. Revised: It is specifically recognized that there may be a substantial difference in the numbers of persons cleared for the respective COMINT categories.

Existing: In its present form, Appendix B contains no such specific provision, other than the principle of the "need to know", the application of which is not spelled out.

- g. Revised: The existing general principles of COMINT are retained, but it is specifically provided:
- (1) When and by whom an exception may be made with respect to each category of COMINT, and
 - (2) That Category C and D COMINT only may be disseminated to unindoctrinated personnel when suitably "disguised", and the meaning

of the term "disguised" is defined.

Existing: Provision is made for exceptions to the general principles of COMINT security but such exceptions are not sufficiently spelled out nor are they sufficiently elastic to permit adequate exploitation of the less sensitive categories, the compromise of which would not endanger other aspects of the COMINT effort, especially in time of limited emergency or localized hostilities.

h. Revised: Two additional general principles of COMINT security have been added, namely:

(1) Provision is made for the exchange of UK and US clearance standards to insure uniformity; and

(2) So far as practicable, in the dissemination of each class of COMINT, even though to cleared and indoctrinated personnel having the "need to know", technical data identifying the particular source is to be omitted.

Existing: Appendix B in its present form contains no corresponding provision.

i. Revised: Each class of COMINT is identified by an unclassified "designator", the meaning of which

can not be revealed except to persons authorized to receive (cleared and indoctrinated for) the material designated thereby.

Existing: Each category is identified by a classified codeword, but the meaning of such codeword, in practice, is not revealed except to person authorized to receive the material designated thereby.

j. Revised: The classification of COMINT material is to be determined in accordance with established standards, provided that:

- (1) All Category "A" must be classified TOP SECRET,
- (2) All Category "B" material must be classified not less than SECRET,
- (3) All Category C and D material must be classified not less than CONFIDENTIAL,

If either the COMINT designator or the classification as applied to a particular item requires a more restricted handling, such restricted handling is to be given the item.

Existing: The inter-relation of codeword and classification is not made entirely clear

k Revised: An attempt has been made to put the various provisions of Appendix B in a somewhat more logical sequence.

10 Enclosure C, attached, affords an indication of the effect of the adoption of the recommendations made in the present study, as respects:

- a Particular source,
- b. Classification,
- c. Clearance standards,
- d. Numbers of persons cleared,
- e. Compartmentation, and
- f. Dissemination outside USCIB intelligence components.

11. The principal advantages of the recommendations herein proposed are assessed as follows:

a. A return to the strict application of highest security standards for the protection of the most sensitive COMINT material by means of separating from the present, overall body of special intelligence a large body of low level and plain text material.

b. The establishment of a flexible mechanism for handling unique problems (such as WHEEL) on a regulated rather than an ad hoc basis.

c. Provision for broad dissemination of low-level tactical material for which such dissemination is necessary and outweighs the degree of risk involved.

d Provision for broad dissemination and use of plain text

material without detriment to the most sensitive COMINT with which it is now associated.

e Strict regularization of procedures for sanitizing and disguising materials.

f. Allowance for a great increase in the efficiency of COMINT operations through:

(1) Permissive lowering of investigating and clearance standards for indoctrination to handle low-level materials.

(2) Allowance for clear-cut compartmentation within the COMINT effort.

g. Anticipation of a clear-cut delineation of those COMINT activities or products which may be exchanged with third parties.

12. The principal risks appear to be as follows:

a Considerable increase in the number of people involved in COMINT activities with respect to the less sensitive categories.

b. Considerable increase in dissemination with respect to such categories.

c. The admission of large numbers of people to only one of the tents on the midway thereby arousing their curiosity about other sideshows.

~~TOP SECRET~~RE-DRAFT OF APPENDIX BTABLE OF CONTENTS

1-2. INTRODUCTION

DEFINITIONS

3. Communication Intelligence

4. Category "A" COMINT

5. Category "B" COMINT

6. Category "C" COMINT

7. Category "D" COMINT

INDOCTRINATION

8. Security Inquiries

a. Standards for each category.

b-d. Determination of "need to know" for indoctrination.

e. Emergency waiver of security inquiry.

9. Maintenance and exchange of records of indoctrinated personnel.

PRINCIPLES OF COMINT SECURITY

10. General

11. Restriction on combat activities of indoctrinated persons.

12. Time limit for safeguarding COMINT never expires.

Enclosure B

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

13. "Need to know" as applied to each item of COMINT; restrictions on numbers of persons cleared for each class of COMINT; commercial advantage prohibition.

PRINCIPLES OF COMINT DISSEMINATION

14. General
15. Designators, classes, classification of designators, lists of COMINT under each designator.
16. Classification of Categories A, B, C, D, Raw Traffic.
17. Specific Principles of Dissemination Applicable to Category "A".
18. Specific Principles of Dissemination Applicable to Category "B".
19. Specific Principles of Dissemination Applicable to Category "C".
20. Specific Principles of Dissemination Applicable to Category "D".

PROCEDURES

21. Use of Designators and Classification on Documents.
22. Means of transmitting Category "A" and "B" COMINT.
23. Means of transmitting Category "C" and "D" COMINT.
24. Means of transmitting Raw Traffic.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

B-30/32

APPENDIX BPRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATIONINTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communication Intelligence issued by or under the authority of USCIB or LSIB and other appropriate officials of the Government parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with requirements of the Parties, Agencies, Departments, and Ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect. To ensure uniform interpretation of what constitutes such accord, each party shall forward all such regulations to the other for information.

2. It is recognized that, while the following principles are in general of universal application, provision should be made for pertinent modifications in the event of war or emergency, to insure that the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is derived from the source. Provision is made hereunder for modification in specific situations. It is contemplated that in time of war, or exceptionally as agreed by USCIB and LSIB, additional Emergency Regulations embodying emergency provisions shall be brought into force by the respective parties.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEFINITIONS~~TOP SECRET~~EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

3. Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to the results (including end products, details of analytic methods and procedures, and information relative to the degree of success achieved by analysis) derived from the work of agencies, the operations of which are coordinated by USCIB and LSIB, which study communications (including radio transmission and telecommunications of all kinds, save for press and propaganda broadcasts and unencrypted military messages of a tactical nature) not originated by authorities.

a. The terms Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) are synonymous.

b. Communication Intelligence is divided into four general categories, as follows:

- (1) Category "A" COMINT
- (2) Category "B" COMINT
- (3) Category "C" COMINT
- (4) Category "D" COMINT

c. As agreed by USCIB and LSIB, each of the foregoing categories of COMINT may be subdivided into separate classes in order to permit differentiation in the processing, exploitation, or dissemination of any one or more of such classes.

4. Category "A" COMINT is that Communication Intelligence which by virtue of the sensitivity of its source or content requires the most exceptional safeguards and which should

~~TOP SECRET~~

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therefore be controlled most strictly in processing and in exploitation and limited most strictly in dissemination. Source protection is the paramount consideration affecting Category "A" COMINT.

a. There is no single criterion other than sensitivity of source or content to distinguish Category "A" COMINT. It shall include: (1) Those results pertaining to analysis of material protected by cryptosystems (including those applied to procedural systems) which, by their nature, afford the highest orders of crypto-security; and (2) COMINT of other categories (including plain text) dealing with certain most highly sensitive subjects.

5. Category "B" COMINT is that Communication Intelligence which, by virtue of its source or content, is sufficiently sensitive to require safeguards of a high order, but not the exceptional safeguards made applicable to Category "A" COMINT. Protection of source is also the paramount consideration with respect to Category "B" COMINT.

a. Illustrative of the types of material which it is contemplated will from time to time be included in Category "B" COMINT are: (1) those results appertaining to analysis of material protected by cryptosystems (including those applied to procedural systems) which, by their nature, afford medium or high (but not the highest) orders of crypto-security; (2) those results appertaining

~~TOP SECRET~~

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to traffic analysis and transmitter identification where analysis of complex procedural systems is involved; (3) those results appertaining to the solution of sensitive plain text proformas; (4) those results appertaining to subjects of medium or high sensitivity, which do not warrant inclusion in Category "A"; and (5) those results appertaining to the analysis of complex meteorological reporting systems.

6. Category "C" COMINT is defined as those results appertaining to the analysis of texts of unencrypted messages (including those transmitted by voice) except (a) those results which may, by virtue of sensitivity of source or content, be placed in a higher category, and (b) unencrypted military messages of a tactical nature, excluded from the definition of COMINT under paragraph 3, above.

7. Category "D" COMINT is Communication Intelligence of such of such low degree of sensitivity of source that its compromise would have a minimum effect upon other aspects of the overall COMINT effort and which, to be useful, must be disseminated operationally to substantial numbers of indoctrinated personnel, cleared for the classification appertaining to its content. Operational dissemination, as used herein, includes dissemination to combat units in the field and to other recipients having the "need to know".

~~TOP SECRET~~

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a. Unless otherwise specifically agreed by USCIB and LSIB, Category "D" COMINT shall be strictly limited to: (1) those results pertaining to traffic analysis (including Direction Finding) of specified target nations wherein no analysis of complex procedural systems is involved, and (2) those results appertaining to the analysis of cryptosystems of a medium or low order of cryptosecurity, as may be specified by either party.

INDOCTRINATION

8. Except in categories of persons and in individual cases agreed upon from time to time by USCIB and LSIB, all personnel to be assigned to Communication Intelligence duties or indoctrinated as recipients of Communication Intelligence shall be the subject of special security inquiries. To ensure that such inquiries are similar in character, each party shall forward all regulations governing the same to the other for information.

a. It is recognized that the standards of such special security inquiries may differ depending on whether the individual in question will have access

(1) To Category "D" COMINT and/or Category "C" COMINT, only; or

(2) Additionally, to Category "A" COMINT and/or Category "B" COMINT

and that such differences will be commensurate with the difference in the sensitivity of the materials included in such categories.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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b. The principle of indoctrination is based on the "need to know", which means that each person will be indoctrinated only for such portion of Communication Intelligence (which may be any one or more classes of COMINT) as he requires in order to perform his assigned mission. The indoctrinations for the various classes of COMINT will differ in accordance with the "need to know".

c. Above all it is imperative that unauthorized persons be prevented from ascertaining, particularly on a current basis, (1) the scope of the COMINT effort, (2) the degree of success obtained in general, and (3) the specific types of communications which can be read. It is only by a strict application of the principle of the "need to know" to COMINT indoctrination, as well as to its dissemination, that it will be possible to minimize the risk of compromise inherent in the indoctrination of substantial numbers of individuals.

d. A person who has been indoctrinated for one or more of the less sensitive classes of COMINT may be indoctrinated for one or more of the more sensitive classes thereof only after such individual has been the subject of the special security inquiries applicable to the more sensitive material.

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e. In time of war or emergency, or in areas agreed upon from time to time by USCIB and LSIB as subject to Emergency Regulations, or otherwise as agreed by USCIB and LSIB:

(1) Exceptional occasions may arise where it is considered essential for an individual to take up his duties before the special security inquiries can be completed. In such case, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority of such senior officers or officials as are designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that special security inquiries are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.

(2) It may be considered essential to employ, solely for intercepting or translating raw traffic in connection with the production of Category "C" or "D" COMINT, persons as to whom the prescribed special security inquiries are impossible or impracticable. In such cases, the persons concerned may be specially indoctrinated for such limited purposes, and not otherwise, on the authority of such senior officers or officials as are designated by USCIB or LSIB, after such special security inquiries as may be practicable have been made.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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9. USCIB and LSIB shall maintain complete lists of persons currently indoctrinated for Category "A" and Category "B" COMINT under their respective Governments, specifying in each instance the one or more classes of COMINT for which the person concerned has been indoctrinated.

a. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the other party's COMINT agencies or to the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he be approved by his parent agency or Board, and be properly indoctrinated, and such access or knowledge shall at all times be limited strictly to the particular one or more classes of COMINT for which the person concerned has been indoctrinated, with the approval of his parent agency or Board.

b. USCIB and LSIB shall keep each other fully informed of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, Offices, Headquarters, and Commands receiving Category "A" and Category "B" COMINT, or either of them, or any one or more classes thereof, indicating the approximate number of indoctrinated persons qualified to receive each class.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMINT SECURITY

10. The value of Communication Intelligence in war and peace cannot be overestimated; conservation of the source is of supreme importance. It is essential, therefore, that the production, exploitation, and dissemination of COMINT, and as

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well of all related or resultant information, be strictly controlled and appropriately limited. The provisions of these regulations shall apply to any intelligence which, in whole or in part, includes items which can be traced solely to COMINT sources.

11. a. The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient; it is essential that all reference to the existence of COMINT, either direct or indirect, be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties.

b. Every effort shall be made to ensure that:

(1) No person who has been a recipient of Category "A" COMINT or who has been engaged in its production within the preceding 12 months shall be assigned to or be engaged in activities which might reasonably be expected to place him in a position where he might be captured by an enemy or otherwise be forced to submit to questioning by unauthorized persons.

(2) No person who has been a recipient of Category "B" COMINT or who has been engaged in its production within the preceding 6 months shall be assigned to or be engaged in activities which might reasonably be expected to place him in a position where he might be captured by an enemy or otherwise be forced to submit to questioning by unauthorized persons.

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12. The time limit for the safeguarding of COMINT never expires. It is of the utmost importance that, subject to the limited exceptions hereinafter stated, complete and absolute silence on all Communication Intelligence matters be maintained by those who have ever been connected with the Communication Intelligence organization, and by all individual recipients of Communication Intelligence, whether past or present, unless and to the extent that they are freed from this obligation by unmistakable and categorical order of proper authority as shall be designated by the respective parties. If at any time indiscreet matter referring to Communication Intelligence is broadcast or published, even through by prominent people or those in authority, this does not in any way free those other persons who are, or ever have been, producers or recipients of Communication Intelligence from their continuous obligation to maintain silence in accordance with these regulations.

13. The principle governing the production, the exploitation, and the dissemination of COMINT is the "need to know", and this principle extends to each item of COMINT as well as each class thereof. Each item of COMINT shall therefore be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and, with the limited exceptions hereinafter specified, who have been appropriately indoctrinated with respect to the particular class of COMINT to which such item appertains.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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a. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of persons indoctrinated as to each class of COMINT to the absolute minimum. It is recognized as consistent with this principle that there may be a substantial difference in the number of persons indoctrinated for Categories "A", "B", "C", and "D" COMINT, respectively.

b. So far as practicable, in the dissemination of each class of COMINT to cleared and indoctrinated personnel having the "need to know", technical data identifying the particular source shall be omitted.

c. It shall be permissible for persons indoctrinated in less sensitive classes of COMINT to work within Agencies or Centers in which there are located other persons engaged in the production or exploitation of more sensitive classes of COMINT, only so long as due precaution shall be taken (by providing segregated, secure areas for activities related to the more sensitive classes, or otherwise) to insure that the activities and knowledge of such persons are confined to the class or classes of COMINT for which they have been indoctrinated.

d. Communications Intelligence shall never under any circumstances or in any form be disseminated to any Ministry, Department, Agency, Organization, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the

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possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial competition or commercial gain or advantage.

PRINCIPLES OF DISSEMINATION

14. The principle that the preservation of communication intelligence sources is a vital consideration affecting the use of Communication Intelligence, and any action taken with respect to it, shall be recognized at all times. In applying this principle, intelligence and operational needs must be balanced against a realistic appraisal of the risk of compromise of source. It is to enable this to be done, and not in derogation of the above-mentioned principle, that some differentiation is made in the rules of security and dissemination applicable

- a. to the various classes of Communication Intelligence and
- b. under special circumstances affecting the national security.

DESIGNATORS AND CLASSIFICATION

15. The purpose of the designators applicable to the various classes of COMINT is to indicate that the material designated thereby is COMINT of a particular degree of sensitivity of source or content and is to be handled in accordance with the COMINT regulations applicable thereto.

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a. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 15b, below, all Category "A" COMINT shall be designated by an agreed designator, which shall be unclassified, but its meaning shall not be revealed except to persons authorized to receive the material designated thereby.

b. In the event that either party produces individual items or a class of COMINT which by reason of the extreme sensitivity of source or content should be restricted to categories of personnel more limited than those qualified to receive Category "A" COMINT, it will be for such party to request that such items or class of COMINT be designated, with the consent of the other, by an agreed separate or subsidiary designator and to indicate the nature of the restricted distribution to be given to such items or class. Any such separate or subsidiary designator shall be unclassified, but its meaning shall not be revealed except to persons authorized to receive the material designated by that particular separate or subsidiary designator.

c. Each agreed class of Category "B" COMINT shall be designated by an agreed designator which shall be unclassified, but its meaning shall not be revealed except to persons authorized to receive the class of material designated thereby.

d. All Category "C" COMINT shall be designated by an agreed designator, which shall be unclassified, but its meaning shall not be revealed except to persons authorized to receive such material with designator.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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e. All Category "D" COMINT shall be designated by an agreed designator which shall be unclassified, but its meaning shall not be revealed except to persons authorized to receive such material with designator.

f. Technical matter appertaining to the production of each class of COMINT is to be handled in accordance with the regulations applicable to the class to which it appertains, and if it appertains to more than one class, to those applicable to the more sensitive of such classes.

g. Documents which reveal actual success, progress, or processes in the production of each class of COMINT shall bear the appropriate designator and be subject to the regulations applicable thereunder; provided, however, that this shall not require that a designator be applied to papers which do not reveal any of such facts, even though such papers may refer to COMINT activities and organizations, so long as each of such papers is classified not lower than SECRET.

h. Mutually agreed lists shall be prepared and maintained in current status by USCIB and LSIB to indicate, by source, by content, or by other mutually understood means of identification the types of COMINT which are to be designated as Category "A", "B", "C" or "D" COMINT, respectively, together with the separate or subsidiary designator applicable to each class thereof.

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CLASSIFICATION~~TOP SECRET~~

16. The classification of COMINT shall be TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL, as appropriate, using established standards for such classifications, subject to the following:

a. As provided in the preceding paragraph, the respective COMINT designators shall be unclassified, but the meaning of each of them shall be classified in the sense that such meaning shall be made known only to persons authorized to receive the material designated thereby.

b. Category "A" COMINT shall be classified TOP SECRET.

c. Category "B" COMINT shall be classified not lower than SECRET.

d. Category "C" COMINT shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL.

e. Category "D" COMINT shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL.

f. Technical matter appertaining to the production of COMINT shall bear the classification appropriate for the material to which it appertains.

g. Raw traffic (i.e., intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes thereof, including items thereof carrying a case number and/or an arbitrary practice traffic designator) shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL.

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h. In those cases where there is any difference in the dissemination of any item of COMINT, depending upon whether the rules made applicable by the COMINT designator or those made applicable by its classification be applied, those rules requiring the more limited dissemination are to govern.

17. With respect to Category "A" COMINT. preservation of source shall be the paramount consideration in time of war and peace alike. No exception shall be made to the following rules governing such material without the prior agreement of USCIB and LSIB, save in a case of extreme emergency in which there is an imminent threat to the vital national interests of a BRUSA party.

a. No Category "A" material, including any intelligence which in whole or in part can be traced solely to a Category "A" COMINT source, shall be disseminated to any person who has not previously been cleared and indoctrinated for such material and the number of such persons shall be kept at an absolute minimum.

b. No action based on Category "A" COMINT shall be taken lacking suitable "cover", which, for the purpose of this rule, shall be interpreted to mean substantially identical information based upon a genuine, less sensitive source (including a less sensitive COMINT source).

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c. The determination of a case of extreme emergency justifying making any exception to the foregoing rules shall only be made at the highest departmental or ministerial level, and in such a case:

(1) Any necessary communication shall be so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced back to a Category "A" COMINT source (with names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from original decrypted texts omitted or carefully disguised) and the "A" designator shall not be used in connection therewith.

(2) A studied effort shall be made to ensure that such action cannot be attributed to a Category "A" COMINT source, by providing suitable cover or otherwise affording a rational basis for attributing such action to another, less sensitive source.

18. With respect to Category "B" COMINT, preservation of source shall always be a highly important consideration, but it may be qualified by intelligence and operational needs under the circumstances hereinafter specified. No exception shall be made to the following rules without the prior agreement of USCIB and LSIB.

a. Subject to the exceptions hereinafter specified, no Category "B" COMINT, including any intelligence which in whole or in part can be traced solely to a Category "B" COMINT source, shall be disseminated to any person who has

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not previously been cleared and indoctrinated for such material and the number of such persons shall be kept at a minimum commensurate with the sensitivity of the particular source or of its content.

b. An exception to the foregoing rule may be made in a case of emergency involving a matter of importance to the national security of one of the BRUSA parties, but only by senior officers or officials at a level to be agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

(1) In determining whether an emergency justifying such an exception exists, due regard should be given to the following:

(i) Whether a state of peace or war exists. Either USCIB or LSIB may, by notification to the other party, designate a particular area in which hostilities exist, and by virtue of such designation Category "B" COMINT relating to the area designated shall be regarded as subject to war-time regulations.

(ii) The relative sensitivity of the particular COMINT source involved and the possibility that its compromise may lead to the compromise or loss of other COMINT sources, particularly those which are more sensitive.

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(iii) Whether the particular action contemplated is of sufficient importance to justify the inherent risk of compromise or loss of source.

(iv) The effect of such compromise or loss on other commands, areas, or operations at the time and in the future.

(v) The availability of suitable "cover", which, for the purpose of this rule, may be substantially similar information derived from a collateral intelligence source or appropriate reconnaissance or other covering action with respect to a specific target or activity revealed by Category "B" COMINT.

(vi) The necessity that operational use be made of such Communication Intelligence in order to realize its full value. "Operational use" as employed herein includes action taken by any governmental authority on matters of importance to the national security.

(2) In making any such exception, studied effort should be made to ensure, so far as possible, that the action taken or the communication made cannot be attributed to a Category "B" COMINT source alone. Any necessary order or communication should not bear the "B"

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designator and should be so worded (with names, dates, positions, and other data identical with that of the original text omitted or carefully disguised) that the subject matter cannot be traced to COMINT sources. Unindoctrinated personnel involved are to be given only the minimum information they require, with no unnecessary detail, and, where practicable, the action being taken or the communication being made should be attributed to a simulated collateral intelligence source.

(3) Any action taken, or any communication made, lacking suitable cover, must be carefully balanced against the possibility of compromising the source or sources involved. Only after it has been decided that the over-all military or other advantage to be gained, realistically considered, clearly outweighs the loss which may result from compromise of source, shall action be taken based on Category "B" COMINT or a communication based on Category "B" COMINT be made available to unindoctrinated personnel in the absence of suitable cover.

c. A second exception to the rule of paragraph 18a, above, is that forecasts or conclusions derived in whole or in part from analyses of maps on which results appertaining to the analysis of meteorological reporting systems are

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plotted may be issued to flying personnel and to other personnel who are not indoctrinated for Category "B" COMINT, but only in such form as can give no indication whatever of the source.

19. With respect to Category "C" COMINT, preservation of source is an important consideration which should always be carefully weighed against the necessity of producing and disseminating satisfactory intelligence.

a. Subject to the exceptions hereinafter specified, no Category "C" COMINT, including any intelligence which in whole or in part can be traced solely to a Category "C" COMINT source, shall be disseminated to any person who has not previously been cleared and indoctrinated for such material, and the number of such persons shall be the minimum commensurate with (a) the sensitivity of such material, (b) the personnel needed to produce satisfactory intelligence therefrom and (c) the necessity for adequate dissemination.

b. Intelligence based in whole or in part on Category "C" COMINT may be disseminated without the "C" designator to unindoctrinated personnel qualified to receive information of the classification required by the subject matter if the source of such intelligence has been appropriately disguised prior to such dissemination. The source of

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such intelligence is considered disguised if, and only if:

(1) All technical data which might identify the COMINT source has been removed; and

(2) A studied effort has been made to disguise the intelligence to be disseminated so that it will not be attributed to a COMINT source, by:

(i) Rewording the subject matter so as to conform to collateral intelligence information which is substantially similar; or

(ii) Attributing the intelligence to a genuine or simulated collateral intelligence source; or

(iii) Otherwise affording a rational basis for attributing such intelligence to another, less sensitive, source.

20. Category "D" COMINT shall be governed by the same regulations as those made applicable to Category "C" COMINT in the preceding paragraph.

PROCEDURES

21. Subject to the limited exceptions specified above and hereinafter:

a. The appropriate designator and classification shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains, or discloses the existence of, any class of COMINT. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information

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derived from any class of COMINT. The appropriate designator and classification shall be encrypted in the text of every encrypted communication conveying COMINT and shall appear in plain language at the head of the decrypted version.

b. All documents containing COMINT and technical matter shall remain exclusively in the custody of persons who have been appropriately indoctrinated for the class of COMINT therein contained, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.

c. An exception which is applicable to each class of COMINT permits an Agency engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence, at the discretion of the senior officer concerned and after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, to omit the classification and the designator from its work sheets and similar documents used exclusively within the Agency or within intercept or D/F stations in technical operations.

22. Material bearing the Category "A", Category "B" or Category "C" COMINT designators shall be transmitted as follows:

a. Encrypted, in systems specifically provided for this purpose.

b. Unencrypted:

(1) Sealed, by safehand channels, over routes specifically approved by USCIB and LSIB.

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(2) Over landlines, specifically approved in each instance by USCIB or LSIB.

(3) Over completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to Agencies or Offices producing or utilizing COMINT of the appropriate classes.

23. Communication Intelligence material bearing the Category "D" COMINT designator shall be transmitted in the same manner as Category "A" COMINT designator material whenever possible. When it is not possible to transmit by Category "A" COMINT designator channels, the material may be transmitted by conventional channels used for material of identical classification.

24. Raw Traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL and CONFIDENTIAL technical material shall be transmitted as follows:

a. Encrypted, in systems specifically provided for this purpose.

b. Unencrypted, by mail channels provided for material of the same classification.

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Enclosure C

EXAMPLES OF MATERIAL TO BE INCLUDED IN NEW CATEGORIES

1. The attached chart sets forth examples of COMINT to be included in the various categories and sets forth suggested classifications and conditions under which the various types might be handled and disseminated.
2. The chart does not purport to determine finally under which category all given types of COMINT will fall or how they will be handled. It is anticipated that the suggested categorization will be subject to further consideration by the U. S. and between the U. S., U. K.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Enclosure C

-41-

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

CATEGORY	EXAMPLES	CLASSIFICATION	CLEARANCE STANDARDS	NO. OF PERSONS CLEARED	COMPART-MENTATION	DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE USCIB TOP SECRET COMPONENTS
A-plus	1. [] High level 2. [] Conclusions 3. Certain others as at present.	TOP SEC/Designator "A" plus sub-designator	USCIB Dir. #5	Highly limited	Strictest compartmentation	No normal dissemination.
A	1. [] 2. [] medium level 3. Certain identifiable "pinch"	TOP SEC/Designator "A" " "	USCIB Dir. #5 " "	Limited " "	Strict compartmentation " "	As at present. " "
B-1	1. ALLO not in "A" or "D"	TOP SEC Designator B-1 SECRET Designator B-1	"	As at present	As at present	"
	2. [] POL conclusions	TOP SEC Designator B-1	"	"	"	"
B-2	1. [] 2. Other [] and ALLO T/A, D/F and RFP	SECRET Designator B-2 SECRET Designator B-2	" " "	" " "	" " "	" " "
B-3	RU and ALLO Weather	SECRET Designator B-3	"	"	"	"
C	RU and ALLO Plain Text	TOP SEC) Designator SECRET) CONF.) "C"	Normal clearance for TOP SECRET	More than at present	See note 1.	Unless sanitized in doc. recipients only. After sanitization to any recipient cleared for pertinent classification.
D	1. North Korean & Chinese Communist Mil, Air, Naval low level crypto now being done in field plus related T/A, D/F, RFP. 2. Selected other low level crypto.	SECRET) Designator CONF.) "D"	Normal clearance for SEC.	More than at present	See note 2.	

TOP SECRET SUEDE

TOP SECRET SUEDE

Note 1. Compartmentation Category "CN"

ALLO Plain Text will normally be processed by the groups working on the pertinent cipher material.

Russian Plain Text will normally be processed by a group separate from that working on cipher material.

It is envisaged that the relaxation of clearance standards to those normally required for T.S. will require physical compartmentation of this group from personnel cleared for higher categories.

Note 2. Compartmentation Category "DN"

Category "DN", low level crypto, will normally be processed in the field with the maximum security provisions possible under field conditions.

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Distinct | Clearance
In declassification

Polling
Against declassification
of words.

Armstrong
No —
plain text
would be
in a
house it
is AE