Special Intelligence involves a unique security problem, which arises from the fact that the source exists only because, and only so long as, the other countries believe it NOT to exist. Once they suspect that a special Intolligence source has been successfully tapped, it lies within their power to close it off instantly. Therefore, the misuse of a single piece of Special Intelligence information, especially information not easily obtainable from other sources, is likely to cut off the source, not only of that particular type of information, but of much other valuable information as well. Communications Intelligence is intelligence produced by a study of communications not originated by United States Authorities. This fact must be totally safeguarded.

I, the undersigned, understand the provisions of AFR 205-1 and DAF Regulations for the Security and Dissemination of COFINT and that no portion of this document may be disclosed to any persone not indoctrinated and cleared for access to COMINT.

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CG, ADC AUTHORITY:

27 AUG 1952

HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMAND Ent Air Force Base Colorado Springs, Colorado

5**3333 B**

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ADDSE 350.09

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Latest Revision for Project Blind Man

TO:

SSOLO

Air Defense Command Ent Air Force Base Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Reference is made to the ADC booklet, classified Secret, entitled "Project Blind Man" which was sent you in March 1952. Inclosed herewith is the revised list of indicators, with their definitions, for the Air Defense Command Indications Board effective 1 July 1952. Comments from the Air Defense Forces, major Commands and other recipients have been most valuable in making these revisions.

2. Pertinent to this revised list are the criteria established by the Indications Committee for the acceptance of reports to be posted:

a. Accepted for Posting and Pegged Accordingly.

Reports, positive and negative, which directly contribute to the evaluation of an indicator.

b. Filed; Not Pegged.

Reports, positive and negative, which bear on but do not directly contribute to the evaluation of the indicator; or reports the validity of which cannot be assessed, and are, therefore, to be held for additional information. (A "Filed; Not Pegged" report may ultimately be accepted for posting or be rejected.)

c. Rejected.

Reports which on evaluation are found to lack direct or potential relation to the indicator or are proved invalid by other reports.

3. Reports with valid effect on more than one indicator will be shown on the Board by posting under each indicator so affected.

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4. The revised indicators are oriented toward the development of Soviet capability for air attack upon the United States and toward the initiation of general hostilities. This in no way negates the acceptability of reports of intent. It is the opinion of the Indications Committee, however, that the state of Soviet intentions may be logically assessed from the nature of and emphasis on the capabilities developed. This has been clearly demonstrated during the first six months of the existence of the Indications Board. During this period only one report (F-6) of intent was received; the conditions forecast by this report have not been met, and its validity cannot be assessed. The development of Soviet and Satellite capabilities and the trend established by their actions forms the most logical basis for deductions of future actions under any given set of conditions.

. 5. The original set of indicators, together with a copy of the record photo of the Indications Board for period 1 January 1952 to 30 June 1952 are also inclosed for comparative purposes. Comments or suggestions on the revised indicator list will be welcomed.

6. The classification of this letter will be downgraded to Secret if inclosures are withdrawn in accordance with Par 25e, AFR 205-1.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

3 Incls

- 1. Revised List of Indicators
- 2. Original Set of Indicators
- 3. Record Photo of Indications Board

THOMAS C. SAVAGE Major, USAF Asst Adj Gen.

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