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USCIB: 29.5/8

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~~APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS  
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

21 February 1955

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject:

Reference: USCIB 29.5/6 of 19 January 1955.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of certain views of the CIA member with regard to the reference, which will be considered at the next regular meeting of USCIBEC.

  
RUFUS L. TAYLOR  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure  
CIA Memo dtd 18 Feb 1955

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

18 FEB 1955

~~TOP SECRET EIDER~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, USCIB

SUBJECT :

REFERENCES : a. USCIB 29.5/7, 14 February 1955  
b. USCIB 29.5/6, 19 January 1955

Pursuant to your request, following are some of the points tentatively suggested for consideration by USCIBEC in connection with the proposed plan for negotiation of a [redacted]

- a. Last sentence, paragraph 3, page 2 of General Schow's Memorandum to Executive Secretary, USCIB (enclosure with reference b) in which he states that "implementation of the Agreement, coordination of Service participation, and direct contact for the provision of technical assistance, liaison and guidance to the [redacted] COMINT Authority will be the responsibility of the Director, NSA." Identification of NSA personnel as such, and their introduction into "direct contact" with representatives of the [redacted] COMINT authority is believed to be an unnecessary security risk in view of the known poor security practices of the [redacted]
- b. Paragraph g in the "Statement of Broad Objectives and General Terms of U.S. Collaboration with [redacted]" (enclosure 1 with General Schow's memorandum), and paragraph 4 of the Aide Memoire for General Hull (enclosure 2 with General Schow's memorandum), provide that "all materials and products will be exchanged only with the U.S." In view of the fact that all material received by the U.S.

[redacted]  
it is difficult to see any advantage in attempting so to bind the [redacted] since it would almost inevitably evoke

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a request for a corresponding commitment from the U.S., impossible of fulfillment. Moreover, paragraph 1 of General Schow's memorandum states that the U.S. is to supply to the [ ] only such material as is covered under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix P, UKUSA. Thus there would seem to be little likelihood that, as a practical matter, the [ ] would have occasion to pass it to another country.

- c. Minimum Security Standards for the Classification, Dissemination, Transmission, and Physical Security of COMINT (enclosure 3 with General Schow's memorandum): Since there is no intent by USCIB or by the Executive Agent negotiating the agreement to go beyond the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix P, the applicability of some of the special provisions in the Minimum Security Standards is open to question. For example, since we are not prepared to give the [ ] [ ] "intelligence reports and summaries based on COMINT," should not the last sentence of paragraph 1 be deleted?

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(SIGNED)

[ ]  
CIA Member, USCIBEC

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