1. The subject paper is noteworthy not so much for its convincing nature, as for its evidence of a completely crystalized and rigid British position.

2. The portions dealing with mechanism can be ignored at this time, since they are secondary to the main question which is whether this step should be taken.

3. It appears from the paper as a whole that the U.K. is convinced:

   - That Russia could obtain the information sought by non-physical means.

4. Point 3A above is elaborated upon at length in Appendix A, in a survey somewhat similar to that prepared by the AdHoc Committee of USCIB.

Examination of cited examples reveals that their selection is considerably less rigid in terms of what is damaging. I think it probable that examination of the complete texts would reveal many instances of messages which sound serious in the extract but are rather trivial in the whole. Some are highly questionable even from the extract, as for example:

- Annexure 2 item 4c
- Annexure 2 item 4d
- Annexure 2 item 4e
- Annexure 2 item 4f
- Annexure 7 item 5b
- Annexure 7 item 5c (30 Jan 53)
- Annexure 4 item 4c
- Annexure 6 item 4c
- Annexure 7 item 3b

Nevertheless there is no doubt that a quantitatively small but nevertheless real leakage of intelligence is taking place. With respect to...
goes so far as to state that the amount is small. In this and in the appraisal of potential, the U.S. and U.K. are essentially agreed. The divergences are in estimates of degree.

5. Point 3B is the fundamental questionmark in the U.K. position. This statement made without qualification or further comment in any form represents an assumption rather than a fact. This assumption runs counter to the known:

2. Communist infiltration of [REDACTED] and other NATO nations.

b. Elaborate public press and radio reporting of all NATO nations - particularly the U.S.

c. Recent oral report by Mr. Elliott and Mr. Keev.

6. Point 3B is essential to the U.K. position since unless it is very nearly true, the course of action which the U.K. insists upon would mean that Point 3C would be a burnt offering to an unresponsive deity. In addition if 3C is untrue to the extent that our attempts to inform

7. The fundamental problem is not answered by the U.K. position paper. It remains a cold fact that someone with the requisite authority must make a command decision in which only part of the factors are known, a few can be guessed at and the remainder are hidden in the future:

a. { Known - NATO national systems are not secure to us

   Infer - They are also not secure against the USSR

b. { Known - The quantitative leakage is not dramatic as of now

   Infer - It could grow worse - particularly in war

   Known - Western open sources leave relatively little work for USSR intelligence as of now

   Infer -

c. { Known - USSR espionage of all types is very widespread and quite effective

   Infer - We might not accomplish much

d. { If not of

   Known - Dominant importance

   Infer -

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? - Will one or more NATO nations go communist?

? - Will at least the elements of existing cryptography remain if they were forced into...

? - Will we then want to read them?

? - Will we one day get intelligence vital to us in our position as leader of the Western block? Will we perhaps get warning of defection?

8. In one sense the die is cast. All we can do is control the speed of the eventual loss. When modern devices were given NATO by the U.S. and... This process will be relatively slow. We can accelerate this or let nature take its course. The decision must weigh the possible gain against the accelerated loss.

9. One final thought: If we are going to do anything more at this moment, let us improve the COMSEC only of those of our NATO partners of whose constancy we feel more or less certain and whose COMSEC needs improvement. For example:

L.B. SHYN

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