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Paved with Good Intentions: How the Road to Somalia Turned into a Detour to Chaos

STATUTORILY EXEMPT

Two images of Somalia were indelibly imprinted in the psyche. The first was heart-rending: a child, terribly malnourished, clings to its mother's empty breast for comfort. The mother, apathy and tragedy etched into a thirty-year-old face which looks sixty, stares at the camera with pleading eyes. We are moved and indignant that such abject hunger can be inflicted upon fellow human beings. We want to feed them. We want to end their suffering. The second image is no less profound: young, and apparently healthy, Somali men bounce in triumph on the rotors of downed American helicopters as the bodies of its pilots and crew are ignominiously dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. These thugs have the energy to perpetuate these horrors precisely because we have fed them, and look at how we are being repaid for our good works. We are infuriated. We want our boys out of there. Now.

We Americans are suffering from emotionally induced U.S. foreign policy schizophrenia. The selling of editorialized U.S. policy, via electronic journalism, has, since the Vietnam War, become the modus operandi of the fourth estate. The scenes depicted hourly on CNN ram home the fact that a tinpot despot is outdistancing an international peacekeeping body being led by the mightiest power in the world.[1] Of course, what is not shown are the myriad tons of food distribution; the scores of children vaccinated against disease; the shelters built; the educational programs established. In short, we aren't getting the full picture. And we, the electorate, aren't alone. Hindsight being what it is, we can safely assume that American foreign-policy makers may have been apprised of the intelligence essential to the decision-making process precipitating America's entrance into Somalia, but they were confused by it or simply ignored it. The result was that, somewhere along the way in the debacle, the U.S. either forgot exactly what its goals were or, worse, had no clearly defined goals in the first place. Exacerbating the situation was that the ill-defined mission became unnecessarily complex and mired in the political morass of who's-supposed-to-do-what.

THEY DIDN'T DO THEIR HOMEWORK

At the time of the Somali operation, the mood in the United States was itchy: we wanted to "do the right thing" but at what price? What was the "right thing" anyway?

1. Terminology is problematic in reference to operations in areas like Somalia, Haiti, or Bosnia. As a process, "peacekeeping" might better be termed "peaceforcing." As peace has traditionally been a relatively rare commodity in many sociopolitical hot spots, "peacekeeping" is an oxymoronic term for what is being attempted.

How much were we willing to pay to achieve goals which, in the recent past, had been nebulous? Senator Byrd (D-W. Va.) spoke for most of us when he said that "Americans by the dozen are paying for a misplaced policy on the altar of some fuzzy multilateralism."[2]

African Policy Revisited

To understand, at least partially, America's involvement in Somalia, it might be useful to view it in the context of U.S. policy in Africa. Until recently, America's policy on Africa was, as Cecil Crabb notes, one of "benign neglect," its record of "caution, passivity, and ambiguity" indefensible.[3] But that seems to have changed. At the African-American Institute's 23rd American Conference, U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher spoke about the present administration's intentions in Africa. He stated that, as the Cold War ended, the United States began asking how its policies might affect Africa, rather than what advantage the superpowers might gain from existing applications – a paradigm shift in policy thinking. President Clinton has made it clear that "democratization" is now a cornerstone of his foreign policy focus. To this end, Christopher stated, ". . . we will help Africa build its capacity for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution . . . promoting democracy and human rights," and that their concerns ". . . will not be relegated to the footnotes of our foreign policy agenda."[4] The president insists that human rights issues would be seriously addressed when it came time to allocate resources in the form of foreign assistance. President Clinton is convinced, according to Christopher, that the development challenges facing African nations, though imposing, can be overcome by free-market democracies in the form of financial assistance for environmental and educational programs and the lessening of protectionist trade barriers to allow the African nations to begin competing in a global market. The United States, Christopher continues, is working closely with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on a variety of peacekeeping programs – the result hopefully being to assist Africa in building its ability to resolve its own conflicts. Christopher further stated that ". . . the people of Africa know where their future lies: not with corrupt dictators, but with courageous democrats . . ." and that ". . . [Africans] recognize that democracy offers the only framework for tolerance and harmony because it safeguards individual rights and provides protection for minorities."[5]

How do they *know*? Why should it be assumed that they *recognize* the benefits of democracy? These are noble ideas, indeed. However, the administration appears to be basing its policy on the theory that Africans have some sort of democratic process frame of reference. This hypothesis does not seem likely: models of democratized nations do not abound on the African continent. Assumptions such as those posited by Mr. Christopher are not only dangerous, but they are presumptuous.

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2. Helen Dewar and Kevin Merida, "From Congress, More Questions," *Washington Post*, 5 October 1993, Sec. A25.
3. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *Policy-Makers and Critics: Conflicting Theories of American Foreign Policy* 2d ed (New York: Praeger, 1986), 212–213.
4. Warren Christopher, "A New Relationship," *Africa Report*, 38, No. 1, (March–April 1993): 36–40.
5. Christopher, 36–40.

MOTIVATIONS

Mission Impetus

President Bush may have been a "lame duck," but he still had a healthy political ego. Often reviled for his perceived lack of interest in minority issues during his tenure, he may have wished to leave office having given the impression that he really was the benevolent and concerned leader he always said he was (remember those pictures of starving black babies!). So, was the motivation for President Bush's decision to assist with Operation Restore Hope based on altruism? Perhaps, at least to a degree. The knowledge that 350,000 Somalis had died of starvation, including 75 percent of all children under the age of five – an entire generation – impels one to act. (Ironically, as fifty refugees a day died, $68 million in relief funds were unused by the UN Development Program because it lacked the necessary signature – of a Somali bureaucrat from a nonexistent government! Just another example of the bureaucratic nightmare extant at the time, as we shall see later.)[6] Past experience was no small influence on either Bush or Clinton: the United States was castigated for reacting so slowly to a similar situation in Ethiopia in the early 80s. Public recrimination, again, over a similar issue is not something relished by any elected politician. Further, neither administration can have been unaware that, because of the success of American efforts in mediating Ethiopia's civil war in 1991, the United States was on a diplomatic roll in the region.[7] Nevertheless, thanks to Granada, Panama, and the Gulf War, perceptions of America as an international strong-arm still persist in much of the world. President Bush was certainly mindful that an apparently selflessly motivated American involvement such as Operation Restore Hope could prove to be a public relations boon: we do care what the rest of the world thinks of us. We got more than we bargained for.

Unfortunately, at the time of America's initial involvement, political instability in Somalia had been exacerbated to the extreme by the very international agencies that were there to help improve social conditions. UN organizations and others proved so inept in dealing with the situation that America had little choice (it felt) but to jump into the breach. There are a number of factors – misinformation and out-and-out blunders – which probably influenced U.S. participation. Prior to America's commitment, the UN World Food Program (WFP) allowed the U.S. government to release figures asserting that 80 percent of relief supplies were being looted. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the largest food distributor in Somalia, disclaims the figure, stating that it was closer to 10 percent. CARE, which distributed food for the WFP, thinks the numbers were around 50 percent. Whichever figure one chooses to believe, the WFP knew that the 80 percent figure was inflated, but as a spokesman for the organization stated to journalists, "We were never asked to correct it." Of course, once American troops arrived, the numbers "dropped" dramatically. Much was made in the press of the amount of food

6. Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Famine – A Collective International Failure," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World* (1992–1993): 114.
7. Clark, 112.

delivered by the United States. What was never mentioned was that the ICRC delivered twice as much during the same time-frame.

Focus of the Mission Changes

Compounding the misinformation upon which strategic policy may have been based was U.S. special envoy Robert Oakley's statement that the troops had witnessed a "full-scale civil war" upon their arrival in Somalia, but they had since "created a secure environment." Though he later retracted both pronouncements, the journalists had already printed the statement, and the script was beginning to change. As to the shootouts between relief workers and local employees, the team leader for CARE in Somalia, Rhodri Wynn Pope, admits that the situation could have been avoided altogether had they consulted more often with clan elders. Further, Pope noted that bringing food into the unsecured port by troops completely destroyed whatever value the local crops might have had. The UN special envoy insisted that ". . . it wasn't malcoordination, it was miscoordination. The farmers didn't speak up, and the aid agencies didn't know the crops were there." Another senior official of CARE stated that most of the relief shipments were delivered safely, but because expatriate members of nongovernmental organizations feared for their personal safety, they "created a reality of their own" and encouraged the deployment of troops.[8]

Compounding UN mismanagement was the Bush (and later Clinton) administration's apparent underestimation of insurgent clan leader Aidid's resources and his ability to re-supply his forces with fresh shipments of arms.[9] Ironically, not only had some of Aidid's arsenal been supplied by the United States (earlier times; different circumstances), many of his fighters were trained by American forces as well. (During the early 1960s, Aidid himself had trained for three years in the Soviet Union – a time during which the USSR was vying with the United States for influence in the Horn of Africa.[10] Did any of the ideology the Soviets surely expounded at that time become institutionalized with Aidid? The question should have been posed by Bush and Clinton policymakers.) Sins of omission and commission served neither the peacekeeping mission nor the Somalis very well. Initiatives, e.g., the Addis Ababa Agreement, failed to bring the Mahdi and Aidid factions closer together. And on 6 June 1993, twenty-three Pakistani troops were ambushed, mutilated, and killed, forcing the "peacekeepers" to alter the focus of their mission. No longer escorts on a mercy mission, they had become warriors on the offensive.

Is it also possible that President Clinton might have been predisposed to allow incrementalization of military activity for other than altruistic or security motives? From a behavioral point of view, the possibility certainly exists. Having suffered the slings and arrows of the presidential campaign, e.g., accusations that he was a draft-dodging, anti-military demonstrator during the Vietnam War (the implication being that, ergo, he was

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8. Mark Huband, "When Yankee Goes Home," *Africa Report* 38, No. 1 (March–April 1993): 20–22.
9. Keith B. Richburt, "Aideed's Urban War, Propaganda Victories Echo Vietnam," *Washington Post*, 6 October 1993, Sec. A28.
10. Douglas Jehl, "An Elusive Clan Leader Thwarts a UN Mission," *New York Times*, 7 October 1993, Sec. A1.

un-American), President Clinton may well have wished to put that image to rest. (The irony, of course, is that his escalation policies have been strongly questioned by the very electorate which scorned his lack of involvement in Vietnam.) His purpose (if, in fact, this is the case) will have been defeated. Further, President Clinton's reputation of having little knowledge of, and less practical experience in, foreign affairs could easily have acted as impetus for him to "get his feet wet," as it were. Unfortunately, the Somalian "experiment" has all but proven his doubters correct in their assumptions. President Clinton will do well to be mindful of past failures if the Bosnia operation is not to be a repeat performance.

United States' policy rhetoric aside (secure Somalia for the Somalians), it would appear that President Clinton saw it to be in America's interest to secure the site – for America. Though it is generally thought that the original humanitarian mission simply evolved into one of democratization and deposition of illegal leadership, this may not be entirely the case. Humanitarian intervention may not have been the only reason why the United States wished to exert its influence in Somalia. The port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden is strategically located to observe the sealine of communication (SLOC) in the Arabian Sea (into which flow the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman). The U.S. and USSR also maintained a presence, for the same purpose, on the Yemeni island of Socotra. The Cold War is over, but our interests are still keen in that region. The dynamics of the Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa – the spread of radical, political Islam; shifting alliances; oil – dictate a presence in the area.

ANOTHER VIETNAM?

Not only was there confusion about objectives, there was a concern that increased troop deployment was leading to greater commitment. The administration's assurances that additional forces were sent for the protection of troops already in place made the American public uncomfortable. Eventually, thanks to the media, it became personal – we could give a name to our frustrations and misgivings: Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant. The telling pictures of the POW were graphic reminders of another war, another time.

Those of us who lived through the "war" in Southeast Asia have a sense of deja vu, and, in some ways, that perception has been borne out. Aidid's clandestine radio station was lauding the tribal leader's victory over the "U.S. colonialism" – shades of Hanoi Hannah. Major David Stockwell, the UN military spokesman in Somalia, claimed that Aidid's operation did have some parallels with the operations of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA): Aidid's rhetoric was garnering some financing for his operation, and the longer he was able to keep his guerrilla operation going, the sooner the American people would

become disheartened.[11] The fact that the analogy may have been somewhat false (Vietnam had a clear and sustained policy goal from the beginning – the Vietnam effort really was an American rather than a collective initiative) is not really the issue. The issue is one of perceptions – they are very real to the people who have them, and, whether valid or not, the fear of this initiative escalating into another Vietnam was, and will continue to be for future missions, an internal driver of foreign policy vis-a-vis the use of American military forces.

WORDS BELYING DEEDS

In late September 1993, President Clinton stated that he had altered his policy of pursuit of Aidid, deciding to isolate him instead. In the words of an administration spokesman, barring Aidid's surrender, ". . . our goal is to marginalize him." This, as we now know, was not the case. The hunt continued into the next week, resulting in eight American troops dead and seventy-eight wounded. There was an apparent disconnect between policy statement and action. The Clinton administration blamed the "confusion of authority" on the UN. In any event, Gellman of the *Washington Post* asserted that Clinton had sole power to stop the "track-and-snatch" operation against Aidid, but didn't exercise the privilege.[12]

The decision to use coercive methods while attempting to negotiate with Aidid at the same time may appear to be duplicitous, but perhaps not. Richard Pape suggests that coercion works when it raises the costs of continued resistance or reduces the probability that the resistance won't succeed. The trick is in convincing the enemy that it is no longer to his benefit to continue, e.g., cause him to "vary components in his decision calculus."[13] One of the problems with American use of coercive methodologies is its apparent unwillingness to make the kind of commitment necessary to push the mission to its logical conclusion.

INTERVENTIONISM AS POLICY

Prince Metternich stated that ". . . there really is no such thing as a policy of non-intervention; there are only various forms of intervention." That America has, either actively or de facto, intervened in the affairs of other nations is a matter of public record. Has the Somali experience influenced whether the U.S. will, or will not, continue to intervene in other countries' problems? Probably not. *Novus Ordo Sectorum* – a New Order of the Ages – is engraved on the Great Seal of the United States. America is on a

11. Peter A. Jay, "Somalia: Limits to the Vietnam Analogy," *Baltimore Sun*, 10 October 1993, Sec. E3.
12. Barton Gellman, "U.S. Rhetoric Changed, but Hunt Persisted," *Washington Post*, 7 October 1993, Sec A37.
13. Richard A. Pape, Jr., "Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishment Doesn't" The *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15 (1992): 430–431.

proselytizing mission and has been since its inception. Thomas Paine stated that ". . . the cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind." Abraham Lincoln observed of the Declaration of Independence that it gave ". . . liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope for the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men." Woodrow Wilson noted that "America's flag is the flag not only of America, but of humanity." In 1863, Secretary of State William Seward, regarding the Russia/Poland crisis, specifically targeted another nation:

> Founding our institutions upon the basis of the rights of man, the builders of our Republic came all at once to be regarded as political reformers, and it soon became manifest that revolutionists in every country hailed them in that character, and looked to the United States for effective sympathy, if not for active support and patronage.

It is, therefore, not whether the United States will continue its interventionist foreign policy maneuvers, or even why. It is more a question of *how*. Regardless of motivation or rationale, interventionist goals will not be reached without understanding the target: its motivations, goals, values, and beliefs. American administrations have not traditionally shown abiding interest in, nor understanding of, others' cultures.

It has been suggested that America's interventionist policies have been ethnocentric: follow the American model of democracy, or we will not assist you in your pursuits. (In the case of Somalia, Aidid's renewed "commitment" to political Islam was appealing to the growing "fundamentalist" movement. Presumably, whichever form of government emerges in Somalia, Islamism will be a strong influence in its formation. To ignore Aidid's – or other tribal leaders' – ability to tap transnational Islamic resources and/or ideological and other support, would certainly prove to be a tactical error vis-a-vis any diplomatic goals the West may have in that country.) Cecil V. Crabb fears that insisting upon democratization limits America's relevancy regarding global diplomacy.[14] Though the United States would prefer that all nations/states were oriented to American philosophy and goals, not all societies want to be "saved" – at least not with the net that America has traditionally offered.

Another serious defect in interventionist policy as practiced by the United States, according to political scientists Julius Pratt and Bernard Crick, is that liberal interventionists tend to be unwilling to use real force to defend their programs: intervene for the sake of ideology, but don't see it through militarily. The commitment simply isn't there.[15] Not only Aidid, but Khadafi, Noriega, Hussein, and Ho Chi Minh may have comprehended this Achilles' heel quite well.

Ideally, American interventionist foreign policy should be as little contingency-based as possible; should not be perceived as being based upon a double standard; and should be more pragmatic and less dogmatic. Further, policymakers must understand that the

14. Crabb, 218.
15. Crabb, 217–220.

power America possesses is real but finite and that it must be used to the advantage of all the actors. Vietnam is an object lesson not to be forgotten.

LESSONS LEARNED

What role the United States will play in the future – assisting others toward goals of self-determination, or serving as peacekeepers, policemen, power brokers, international traders, etc. – is up to conjecture. Whichever tack America takes, it is clear that, if the United States is to maintain international credibility in its chosen role, it must alter the way foreign policy is formulated and implemented.

As part of his campaign platform, President Clinton stated that, though the Gulf War was precedent setting vis-a-vis nations working together, the United States had borne too heavy a load: too much fighting, too many dead. If he were president, he said, the UN would take a greater part in future operations. As we have seen, the experiment of collective action in Somalia was a failure. The United States had to take control of its own actions, became mired in an all-but-impossible situation, and now future operations under the aegis of the UN are in doubt.[16]

Clearly, the operation in Somalia appeared to be poorly planned and executed from the outset: intelligence was either lacking, faulty, or worse, ignored; objectives were ill-defined; contingencies weren't considered; and input-outcome ratios were improperly weighed. Future interventions, collective or not, will surely fail if these mistakes are repeated. In fact, in the minds of many, the Somali operation is inextricably linked with present operations in Bosnia, even though the two are dissimilar in many ways. If policy-makers don't get smarter, the United States may lose its ability to wield any meaningful influence in the global arena. In General (Ret.) Colin Campbell's view, ". . . a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia could make the Somalia operation look simple by comparison."[17] Nevertheless, like it or not, the United States will likely be intervening in concert with others in the future. Morton Halperin and associates posit that, primarily because of the dictates of international law, unilateral interventions are no longer viable. As collective efforts appear to be the accepted modus operandi for the future, philosophically and practically, we must be better prepared for contingencies.[18] Lack of preparation is a luxury we can neither afford nor excuse.

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16. Ann Devroy, "Collapse of U.S. Collective Action May Force Second Look at Bosnia," *Washington Post*, 29 September 1993, Sec. A17.

17. Ann Devroy and Julia Preston, "Clinton Seeks Shift of Focus on Somalia," *Washington Post*, 29 September 1993, Sec. A17.

18. Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffe with Patricia L. Small, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), 105. Unfortunately, one of the lessons *not* learned in the forty years since implementation of the Marshall Plan is that throwing money into the Third World pot doesn't work by itself; without a social infrastructure previously based on a skilled and talented work force and viable bureaucracy, economic aid alone is doomed to failure.

A NEED FOR SECURITY STRATEGY

Setting the Criteria

In anticipation of future American involvement in UN operations, and in an attempt to avoid some of the pitfalls experienced in previous missions, as well as to minimize negative impact on U.S. resources, Presidential Directive 25 (PDD-25) was signed on 3 May 1994. PDD-25 sets the following *selective* and *effective* criteria for U.S. participation:

- Will the mission advance American interests?
- Is there a threat to international peace and security?
- Does the mission have a clear mandate which isn't too broad?
- Is there sufficient funding, and troop strength, for the operation?
- Has a limited time-frame for American involvement been set and stated?

PDD-25 also makes the following provisions:

- Command (constitutional authority to establish and deploy forces) must rest with the American president.
- Operational command is granted for a specific time-frame, mission, and location.
- There must be (a) no impairment of U.S. unilateral military operations;
  (b) no involvement in a standing UN army;
  (c) no earmarking of U.S. involvement in UN operations;
  (d) no increase in U.S. involvement in UN operations.[19]

Clearly, the PDD-25 guidelines and regulations help define the "how" of U.S. involvement in future UN interventionist operations. But it is interesting to note that PDD-25 does not limit the U.S. to multilateral missions. The door is still open for American unilateral intervention.

Analyzing the Variables

American involvement in Somalia has become an example of foreign policy run amok. The United States is presently involved in a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and, it may be assumed, will be active in future interventionist missions. The relative success of these activities will depend upon the ability of foreign-policy makers to understand the dynamics and alter their methodologies accordingly. As Richard Haas notes, "Ours is a period of 'international deregulation,' one in which there are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments – but, as yet, no new rules."[20] The script is being re-

19. Simon Duke, "The United Nations and Intra-State Conflict," *International Peacekeeping* 1, No. 4 (Winter 1994): 379–380.
20. Peter N. Haas, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs* 74, No. 1 (January/February 1995): 43.

written daily. How does one make sense of this, and how can the mistakes made in Somalia be avoided in the future, PDD-25 notwithstanding? The answer, at least in part, lies in the analysis of both past performance and current environments, the results of which will allow for making predictions of future probabilities. A variety of foreign policy models have been formulated for this purpose, to wit:

(1) *Interstate Behavior Analysis Model* – looks at independent (psychological, political, societal, interstate, and global), intervening (economic structure, governmental structure, capabilities), and dependent (spatial, temporal, relational, situational, substantial, and behavioral) variables.

(2) *Rational Actor Model* – a rational goal-directed decision-making process based upon cost/ benefit, maximum benefit/minimum loss analysis.

(3) *Decision-Making Approach* – assumes that policy decisions are made incrementally, immediate concerns driving decisions; analyzes the information-processing system.

(4) *Organizational Behavior Approach* – characteristics and behavior of the organization are analyzed, e.g., size, complexity, hierarchy, culture, standard operating procedures.

(5) *Bureaucratic Politics Model* – analyzes bureaucratic conflict and adjustment in terms of competition and special interests.

(6) *Human Behavior Model* – approaches analysis from a psychological point of view, e.g., motivations, perceptions, values, beliefs, and attitudes of personalities.

(7) *Democratic Politics Model* – analyzes how public opinion, the media, electorate behavior, etc., affect foreign policy decisions of elected officials.

(8) *Pluralistic Politics Model* – looks at how private interest groups influence policymakers vis-a-vis conflict resolution.

(9) *Elitist Approach* – assumes a ruling elite drives the policy-making process, e.g., dictators, wealthy individual players, etc.; analysis of power elites, conspiracies, and class included.

(10) *International Politics Model* – assumes all states to be in a constant struggle for power, influence, and interest promotion.

(11) *Transnational Politics Model* – emphasis is upon boundary-crossing factors, e.g., technology transfer, goods and services, political movements, multinational corporations.

(12) *World Systems Analysis Model* – assumes foreign policy to be formulated based upon changes within states, and upon external changes.

(13) *Adaptive Behavior Approach* – looks at how states adapt and respond to change in the external environment.[21]

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21. Joseph P. Smaldone, Ph.D., *The Foreign Policies of the Superpowers*, 2d ed. (College Park, MD: University of Maryland Press, 1991), 2–8.

The variables influencing American foreign policy in Somalia – societal, geopolitical, behavioral, environmental, economic, bureaucratic, organizational – were many and convoluted. There are no pat answers, and no single model of analysis will give the policy-maker a complete picture of the situation. Unfortunately, authorities tend to use models that have been built to suit their particular prejudices and assumptions. Based upon such limitations, conclusions about either past policies or decisions affecting future initiatives can only prove, in the end, to be less than sound. That being the case, Czepiel and Rosenau suggest a model large enough to include all factors, thus creating a neutrality and theory-testing environment, the product of which is more likely to produce a realistic and workable paradigm.[22] Because isolationism is anachronistic in today's world, nation-states will most certainly be interacting, not only with each other, but with entities which do not fit into traditional paradigms. In most cases, then, it would be incumbent upon the analyst to build a model which reflects a global perspective. The World Systems Mode, incorporating applicable variables from other models, would appear to be the logical approach to most foreign-policy building processes today. Had Presidents Bush and Clinton used such an analysis model prior to making commitments in Somalia, the results might have been quite different.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

By introducing PDD-25, President Clinton has attempted to remedy some of the problems which occurred in Somalia by setting guidelines (adequate funding and troops; clear mandate) and limits (operational time limits; presidential approval; the possibility of unilateral approaches by the U.S.). But if sound preliminary strategic planning is not performed, those guidelines and limits could easily be misdirected. Whether for private enterprise or bureaucracy, decision-making and strategy-planning procedures for successful goal accomplishment and crises avoidance and/or management are not very different. Though Dr. W. Edwards Deming originally formulated the following principles for organizational/industrial purposes, the tenets are applicable for the building of effective and efficient foreign policy paradigms:

(1) Create constancy of purpose, keeping an eye on long-range needs rather than short-term "bank for the buck," with goals and objectives being clearly defined and realistic.

(2) Adopt a philosophy for stability by refusing to allow commonly accepted levels of delays, mistakes, and defective leadership.

(3) Do your homework: require statistical evidence that the program/operation is functioning as planned (not knowing can prove to be fatal).

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22. Ernest-Otto Czepiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 117–118.

(4) Eliminate elements which are detrimental to the mission (can't do much about the media, but if the job is done right, the media won't have much that's detrimental to report!).

(5) Reevaluate the process constantly, searching for problems and eliminating them.

(6) Educate, educate, educate (it is appalling how little Congress apparently knew of what was happening in Somalia, before or after America's entrance into the situation. As well, the electorate needs to have as full a picture as security concerns will allow: if the president wants public approbation, he must give it the tools to make informed judgments about the administration's performance).

(7) If a better way of doing things becomes evident, do it – now.

(8) Keep the lines of communication open – in both directions.

(9) Eliminate meaningless slogans which promise the world and deliver nothing (propaganda – necessary evil – if mismanaged will surely backfire).

(10) Eliminate standards which are biased or unrealistic.

(11) Eliminate barriers which deny any entity a stake in the process, thus any feeling of ownership in the results. (Americans need to feel that is in their interest that their country is committing precious resources.)

(12) Clearly define the commitment of leadership and its obligation to implement all the principles listed above.[23]

THE END-GAME

Mid-crisis in Somalia, President Clinton again shifted his foreign policy. In a discussion with NBC's *Meet the Press*, Secretary Christopher stated that "Our mission now is to try to help the Somalis and help the adjacent country-leaders to find a sound, political solution," and to "turn over any nation-building to nearby African nations." What? Allow a state or region to decide its own composition and fate? What a novel idea!

23. W. Edward Demming, *Out of the Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for Advanced Technology, 1988). 68–69.

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