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**Text w/Tape:**

**INAME: MARTIN, William H. and Mitchell, Bernon F.**

**IPLACE: Press Conference, House of Journalists in Moscow**

**U/ID Female**

**Speaker:** ((TR NOTE: The press conference is prefaced by an introductory statement made by an unidentified female speaker. The recording itself begins with this person speaking in mid-sentence as follows:))...the appearance of two employees of the National Security Agency of the United States: Bernon Mitchell and William Martin. These two men who had worked for the Agency for a considerable time are at present in Moscow, and asked for permission to speak at the press conference. They have decided to break with the United States and ask for asylum in the USSR for political ((XM)). ((Reporter speaking in mid-sentence as follows:))...has granted Mitchell and Martin the right of political asylum and they are Soviet citizens with full rights. A photographic copy of a statement left by Mitchell and Martin in the State Bank of Laurel, Maryland was handed out at the press conference. The two men were then introduced, and William Martin read the following statements.

**Martin:** Before leaving the United States of America at the end of June this year, we left the previously read statement in safety deposit box number 174 in the State Bank of Laurel, Maryland, rented in the name of Bernon F. Mitchell. We brought with us here a photographic copy of this statement. On the envelope containing this statement, we wrote and signed a request that the contents be made public because we wish to explain to the American people why we decided to ask the Soviet Union to grant us political asylum. Reports in the American press indicate that the United States authorities gained access to the safety deposit box and found our statement. But they did not fulfill our request to publish it. We can explain this only by assuming that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration does not wish certain of its policies...or certain aspects of its policies to become known to the American people. At this press conference, which has been arranged at our request, we would like to explain especially to the American public our reasons for leaving the United States. We were employees of the highly secret National Security Agency, which gathers communications intelligence from almost all nations of the world for use by the U.S. Government. However, the simple

fact that the U.S. Government is engaged in delving into the secrets of other nations had little or nothing to do with our decision to defect. Our main dissatisfaction concerns some of the practices the United States uses in gathering intelligence information. We were worried about the U.S. policy of deliberately violating the airspace of other nations and the U.S. Government's practice of lying about such violations in a manner intended to mislead public opinion. Furthermore, we were disenchanted by the U.S. Government's practice of intercepting and deciphering the secret communications of its own allies. Finally, we objected to the fact that the U.S. Government was willing to go so far as to recruit agents from among the personnel of its allies. An instance of this practice involving payment to the code clerk of a U.S. ally was mentioned in our first statement. At this time, we would like to make some general comments relative to our reasons for leaving the United States. Before joining NSA, we had a high degree of confidence in the honesty of the U.S. Government, and we considered ourselves to be loyal supporters of the American way of life. But the policies mentioned above which have been carried out by the U.S. Government in recent years raised serious doubts in our minds as to whether the policies that these...or whether...excuse me, whether the causes that these policies are intended to support are actually worthwhile. ((TR NOTE: Audio ends abruptly here, then immediately starts up again.)) It was a difficult and painful experience to leave our native country, families, and friends. Yet we felt that the U.S. Government, in carrying out policies dangerous to world peace, should not be allowed to rely upon these emotional attachments to guarantee the loyalty of its citizens. In the statement which we left in the United States, we expressed the opinion that a preventive war would be futile. It should be evident that those who contemplate unleashing wars constitute a grave threat to humanity. Should another war occur, there would probably be no further opportunity to build communism, capitalism, or any other form of social or economic system. However, some people in the United States disagree on this matter. For instance, General Thomas Power, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, made the following statement which was published in the United States in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations during debate on the 1959-1960 military budget. He said, "I would like to leave the deterrent role for a moment, and talk about the philosophy of initiation of a war and the tremendous advantages that accrue to the man who starts the war. You must always have the capability to strike first because obviously if these people thought we never could start a war, why then, they would just take this world away from us piece by piece because they would know that as long as they do not strike us, we could never do anything about it." General Power's statement involves the dangerous presumption that the United States owns the world, and implies that emulation of the Soviet Union represents taking something away from the

United States. His proposal to strike first in an attempt to prevent the trend toward socialism sounds to us like a more suicidal than effective policy. Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, made a speech in Chicago on the eve of the Republican National Convention in which he said, "We must not agree to a further ban on nuclear testing nor disarmament in the near future." In the same speech, he also said, "To our undying national shame, there are among us those who would prefer to crawl on their bellies to Moscow rather than to face the possibility of an atomic war." We do not hesitate to include ourselves in the company mentioned by Senator Goldwater. In fact, we would attempt to crawl to the moon if we thought it would lessen the threat of an atomic war. General Power and Senator Goldwater occupy important posts in American society, but we do not believe that they reflect the attitudes of the majority of the American people. After the U2 incident, the U.S. Government admitted its policy of deliberately violating the airspace of the Soviet Union. United States officials, particularly Vice President Nixon, tried to justify this policy by claiming that it was the only way to forestall a surprise attack by the USSR. Vice President Nixon did not mention that much of the information gathered on these flights could be useful only in an attempt to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet Union. In connection with this, the statements of General Power take on ominous meaning. They could indicate that there are plans in the United States to forestall a surprise attack by the Soviet Union by striking first. It is very difficult for the Soviet Union and other nations to assume that General Power was only expressing his private opinion in his official testimony before Congress. Besides these attempts to contain communism in the Eastern Hemisphere, the United States recently declared that it would not tolerate communist influence in the Western hemisphere. Perhaps U.S. hostility towards communism arises out of a feeling of insecurity engendered by communist achievements in science, culture, and industry. If this is so, such feelings of insecurity are a poor excuse for endangering world peace. The ring of U.S. military bases surrounding the Soviet Union seems to indicate that the U.S. Government thinks it can effectively combat the ideas of communism by military means. If the United States and the Soviet Union were to improve communications between their peoples, perhaps there would not be so much mutual antagonism, and conditions might be created which would make possible the large scale diversion of military funds to peaceful purposes. Let us now consider the aerial intelligence policies of the U.S. Government. Our first acquaintance with these policies was during the time that we served with the U.S. Navy from 1951 to 1954. We both served as communication technicians at several U.S. Naval radio intercept stations during this period. The U.S. Government has recently admitted carrying out intelligence flights around and over the borders of communist nations only during the last four years. However, we would like to state

that these flights were also being conducted in the period from 1952 to 1954 when we were serving at a U.S. Naval radio intercept station at Kamiseya, Japan near Yokohama. In advance of a reconnaissance flight of a U.S. military plane along the Chinese or Soviet Far Eastern borders, a TOP SECRET message would be sent to Kamiseya and other communications intelligence stations informing them as to the flight time and course of the plane. At the designated flight time, monitors at these stations would tune in on the frequencies used by radar reporting stations of the target country—i.e., the Soviet Union or Communist China. At the same time, radio direction finders would scan on these frequencies to seek out the locations of radar reporting stations. Information gathered in this manner would then be forwarded to the National Security Agency. There, analysts study the communications and code systems used by the radar stations. NSA is then able to estimate the degree of alertness, accuracy, and efficiency of the radar defenses of the target nation. And it is also able to collect information on the organization of command within the nation's...a target nation's internal defense system. After going to work for the National Security Agency, we learned about another type of aerial intelligence mission which involves incursion into the airspace of the target nation. These missions, known as ELINT missions or electronics intelligence, consist of flights in the immediate proximity of radar installations of the Soviet Union and other countries to obtain data about the physical nature of radar emanations from radar transmitters. This information is used in an attempt to find ways to render the radar defense system ineffective—for instance, through the use of radar jamming devices operating from bases close to the Soviet borders. Flights of U.S. planes along and over the borders of the Soviet Union are routine operations, and the number of such flights is far greater than is generally supposed by the U.S. public. In order to clarify the nature of such flights, we would like to discuss one of them in detail. In September 1958, a U.S. C-130 plane flew over the Turkish border into Soviet Armenia. This plane never returned. The U.S. Government—as it invariably does in such cases—issued a cover story claiming that the plane was engaged only in gathering scientific information, and that the crossing of the Soviet border was accidental. The U. S. claimed that the C-130 had been shot down over Soviet territory without provocation. The Soviet side confined itself to a statement that the plane crashed. In February 1959, the State Department released a recording in the Russian language which it claimed substantiated its contention that the C-130 had been shot down inside the Soviet Union. However, the State Department said nothing about the actual reason that this plane was flying over the Soviet Union. In connection with this incident, we would like to make the following comments. Late in the afternoon of the same day that the State Department released the above recording, Lieutenant General John Sanford, Director of NSA speaking on the NSA internal broadcasting

system, suggested that NSA personnel refrain from discussion of any questions pertaining to the C-130 flight. It is clear that if the C-130 had really flown with the sole intent of gathering scientific information, NSA would have had nothing to conceal. Despite General Sanford's suggestion, NSA employees did discuss among themselves the possible far reaching consequences of the C-130 incident for the United States. A high official of NSA told William Martin that this particular C-130 plane was carrying electronic specialists and special equipment for receiving at close range, the signals of Soviet radar transmitters. This official added that the Turkish-Armenian border had been deliberately crossed in order to get into the immediate proximity of Soviet radar installations. It should be clear, even to a layman, that information about radar defenses has no bearing whatsoever on the problem of ascertaining whether or not the Soviet Union is preparing for a surprise attack. This information can be utilized only for the purpose of determining the defense potential of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, various U.S. officials condemned the Soviet Union for allegedly shooting down the C-130 without sufficient reason. Hubert Humphrey said in effect that the Soviet Union should not have shot down the C-130, and should refrain from molesting U.S. planes, eh...U.S. planes in the future. His arguments assumed that the State Department's statements regarding the incident were truthful and that the U.S. was the injured and innocent party. Thinking that Senator Humphrey and perhaps most members of Congress were ignorant of the facts, we decided to speak privately with a Congressman, and see if this was the case. In February 1959, we obtained an appointment with a Congressman who had publicly expressed concern over the State Department's concealing from Congress pertinent facts about the C-130 incident. During this appointment, we discussed the statements of Hubert Humphrey and commented on the failure of the Executive Branch to keep Congress correctly informed. We explained to him the nature of the C-130 intelligence mission, and indicated that we felt such violations of the airspace of other nations were dangerous to world peace. Our conversation was interrupted when the Congressman received a telephone call from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Mr. William (B% McComber) who requested him to refrain from further public discussion of the C-130 incident. Again, it is clear that if this plane had been engaged solely in gathering scientific information, the State Department would have had no reason to be concerned. Further corroboration that the U.S. has a policy of conducting overflights was obtained when a high official of NSA told Bernon Mitchell that the U.S. intentionally violated the Chinese communist borders on aerial intelligence missions. We hope that the American public will bring pressure to bear against the U.S. Government's policy of violating the airspace of other nations. A single incident or misinterpretation concerning the purpose of planes involved in these flights could be the cause of war. It is difficult to

understand how U.S. officials can maintain an attitude of indignation when the Soviet Union takes defensive action against U.S. planes flying over its territory. The Soviet Government has shown great forbearance with respect to these flights, and has repeatedly called upon the U.S. Government to cease them. Moreover, so far as we know, the Soviet Government has refrained from making any retaliatory flights around and over the United States. We have purposely stressed in detail the intelligence flights of American planes over the territory of the Soviet Union and other countries because this practice might be the cause of a great catastrophe. The connection of NSA with aerial intelligence missions has already been described. Now, in order to give a better perspective of NSA, we would like to add the following detail. Some information concerning NSA's activities is given in the book, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, Harvard University Press, 1958. The author correctly states...This author's name is Ransom by the way. It's (B % omitted) here.

#### **U/ID Male**

**Speaker:** Mm hmm.

**Martin:** "The NSA specializes in communications intelligence. It operates as a semi-autonomous agency of the Department of Defense under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Special Operations. In addition to maintaining its own professional staff for technical operations, NSA exercises broad supervision over and coordination of the Army Security Agency and similar communications intelligence groups within the Navy and Air Force." Further, Ransom states, "NSA plays a major, if unobtrusive role, in the national intelligence community. At any rate, through the National Security Agency and related units, the American Government is again engaged in communications intelligence on a worldwide scale. NSA Headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, about 25 miles north of Washington, D.C. The NSA building at Fort Meade is second in size only to the Pentagon among U.S. Government buildings. Approximately 10,000 people work there under the direction of Air Force Lieutenant General John A. Sanford. About 100 million dollars a year are spent to maintain NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade—the basement of which contains the largest single digital computer installation in the world. The network of radio intercept stations which supply information to NSA extends throughout the world, and keeps in continuous operation more than 2,000 manual intercept positions which are staffed by more than 8,000 armed forces intercept operators. A smaller number of additional personnel operate equipment for the interception of radio teletype transmissions. Some intercept units are located on ships and planes, but most of the intercept activity is carried out at U.S. military radio stations located in foreign countries. Both

enciphered and plaintext communications are monitored from almost every nation in the world, including the nations on whose soil these intercept bases are located. To maintain this extensive network of intercept stations and to forward intercept material to NSA Headquarters, cost about three hundred and eighty million dollars a year. Thus, including the cost of operating NSA Headquarters, the United States spends almost half a billion dollars a year for communications intelligence. NSA Headquarters is subdivided into four main offices: the Office of Production, PROD; the Office of Research and Development, R&D; the Office of Communications Security, COMSEC; and the Office of SECURITY, SEC. The major functions of PROD are to receive intercept material from the outstations, to perform cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, and to analyze the resulting information. R&D carries out research in the fields of cryptanalysis, digital computing, and radio propagation; and carries out the development of new communications equipment. COMSEC is responsible for the production and security of U.S. cipher systems. SEC conducts investigations of NSA personnel, gives lie detector tests, passes on the loyalty and integrity of NSA personnel. Major subdivisions within PROD and R&D are as follows. PROD: ADVA—studies high-level Soviet cipher systems and diplomatic codes. GENS—studies Soviet military code systems and medium-level cipher systems. ACOM—studies the code and cipher systems of Asian Communist nations. ALLO—studies the code and cipher systems of U.S. allies, neutral nations, and some communist nations. MPRO—provides electronic digital computing and data processing services to other divisions of NSA. In R&D: REP—conducts cryptanalytic research and works on applied cryptanalytic problems without restriction as to country; provides consulting services to other divisions of NSA; and carries out research in computer componentry. RADE—designs radio receiving and transmitting devices, radio direction finders, radio fingerprint apparatus; and studies unknown communication systems. STED—studies possible weaknesses of cipher machines in general; assists COMSEC in the design of cipher machines for U.S. use; studies the process of enciphering speech. Successes obtained by the National Security Agency in reading the code and cipher systems of other nations are due primarily to the skillfulness of cryptanalysts frequently aided by electronic digital computers. However, success in at least one case has also been facilitated by the fact that the U.S. supplied to other nations cipher machines for which it knew the construction and wiring of the rotors. As we have said before, success concerning one of the U.S. allies was aided by the fact that the United States paid money to a code clerk of that country for his information. The National Security Agency includes a special group—the United Kingdom Liaison Office, UKLO—which is staffed by British citizens. Likewise in the British communications intelligence organization, called GCHQ, there is a corresponding NSA

liaison group. Britain and the United States exchange information as to cryptanalytic methods and results in reading the code systems of other nations; and their respective networks of radio intercept stations supplement one another. Besides the United Kingdom, the United States maintains close cooperation with Canada in the field of communications intelligence." As we know from our previous experience in working at NSA, the United States successfully reads the SECRET communications of more than 40 nations, including its own allies. Besides what we have said above, other factors in our decision to defect were the suppression of informations, restraints on the freedom of expression and political activity, and discrimination against people who are not theists, which exists in the United States. For instance, according to U.S. press reports, the Federal Government each year confiscates about 50 million pieces of mail entering the United States—frequently without notifying the addressees that any seizure has taken place. In the state of Maryland where we live, in order to hold any post whatsoever with the State Government, it is necessary to take an oath to the effect that one is a theist. People with political convictions unpopular with those who determine United States policy are frequently hailed before investigating committees, harassed, fined, imprisoned, and denied jobs. By means of withholding passports, the U.S. State Department attempts to keep within U.S. borders citizens whose political views are not in favor. Victims of this practice have won some court battles, but the State Department is constantly pressing Congress for new legislation to tighten up the issuance of passports. Are these practices in keeping with the free and open society which U.S. officials so often proclaim exists in the United States? We do not think so. Finally, we would like to say a few words about our personal situations. We have, of course, renounced our American citizenship. We have asked the Soviet Government to grant us Soviet citizenship and assistance in learning the Russian language. Both of these requests have been met. And in addition, the Soviet Government has offered us the choice of living where we choose. Moreover, we have been offered the opportunity of continuing our educations and assistance in finding jobs in our capacity as mathematicians, providing approximately the same salaries we received in the United States. Recently, we made a tour of the Soviet Union, visiting a number of cities, plants, collective farms, universities, exhibitions, cultural centers, and sanatoria. We have familiarized ourselves with the way the Soviet people live, the progress they have made, and the problems they now face. We will be glad to hear from relatives or friends who wish to correspond with us or visit us, and we will give them a good reception.

#### **U/ID Female**

**Speaker:** After that, Mr. Martin and Mr. Mitchell replied to questions. One of the American newsmen present asked Mr. Martin whether he knew



anything about Soviet espionage activities against the United States. Mr. Martin replied that as far as he knew, the Soviet Union does not conduct aerial espionage like the United States does. Another correspondent asked for a more detailed explanation as to whom Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Martin had in mind when they mentioned "a code clerk" at one of the embassies in Washington who had been recruited by the American secret security agency. He was told that it was a code clerk in the Turkish Embassy. Next, a few personal questions were asked, such as the men's age and details about their past activities. Mr. Mitchell is 31 years old. He's a mathematician with a bachelor's degree, specializing [sic] in statistics. William Martin is 29. He has the same degree and profession. When asked whether American intercept stations operate only against the Soviet Union or also against other countries where they were located, Mr. Mitchell replied that there is no discrimination in intercepting foreign stations. They are all intercepted. The two men were then asked what they are now doing. They replied that they are studying Russian, and preparing for entry to a university. ((She pauses.)) That was a report about a news conference in Moscow today ((audio abruptly stops at this point))...

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