The Development of a Common Communication Security and Intelligence

The attached report on above subject was prepared by Mr. T. R. Chittenden of AS-81 and forwarded through the Chief, AS-60 to the Operational Survey Board. Since it deals with an overall National Defense consolidation of these activities, it is forwarded for consideration and further disposition.

1 Incl
Rpt "The Development of a Common Comm Sec and Intel Agency" (in dup)

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CSOAS Form No. 107
18 Feb 48
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON COMMUNICATION SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the necessity for and benefits from establishing a communication security and intelligence agency common to all three services; the scope and responsibilities of such an organization, and the means for achieving it.

DISCUSSION

2. The need for communication security and intelligence is just as great during a cold war as during a shooting war but the means of achieving it are far more difficult during the former period. The reasons for this are not obscure. Money, personnel, and interest are at ebb in peace-time. During an actual peace this condition is not good but neither is it dangerous. But this is a phony peace and an exceptionally dangerous one. In fact, from the standpoint of obtaining intelligence and protecting our own communications this present condition is a very reasonable facsimile of war - with one important exception. We do not have the money, or the personnel, or the interest with which to conduct adequate and integrated intelligence warfare. There are favorable indications that the money, and the people which would follow it, may become more plentiful. But - there is an appalling lack of real interest in effective communication intelligence. This lack of interest is most sharply outlined in the failure of the three military services to develop a common communication security and intelligence organization.

a. It is appreciated that the remodelling of the national military structure is less than a year old. When considered alone the argument that the persons on the upper echelons who direct the military policy simply have not had enough time in which to initiate action on all phases of the unification is valid. What cannot be excused by those within the military establishment, and eventually will not be tolerated by the citizenry, is the growing derision and defiance of the unification efforts by the military rank and file. The citizenry will eventually react to these disintegrating elements within the services as they do to a corrupt police force.

b. It is to forestall charges of malfeasance from without and disintegration from within that this plan for developing a communication security and intelligence organization common to all three services is advanced. It is realized that communication security and intelligence
are two minute functions in the military establishment as a whole. However, they are activities which are particularly well adapted to being organized for three service participation. They are the vital core of communications. They are a service to the using forces; and their general characteristics are common to all services. In addition, the existing organisations performing this work are, in general, comparatively small, effectively organized, competently staffed, and familiar with each other's operations. Because of these facts it is believed that the functions of communication security and intelligence and the organizations performing them offer a situation highly favorable to the development of a common service.

3. It should be noted that throughout this study care has been taken to use the term "develop a common service" rather than "unify the present services." This difference is based upon the belief that the only chance for achieving an effective common organization is to do it slowly — but deliberately. Speed is secondary; intent is primary. The one reef upon which most reorganizations founder is the theory that a reorganization should be made without consideration of the people involved. To follow this theory is sheer folly. An organization is fundamentally a combination of people and functions (work). If the functions are arranged without consideration for the people, the people will soon rearrange the functions among themselves in a manner that is acceptable to them. Few people are so adaptable that they can have the responsibilities and procedures to which they have become accustomed slashed away from them and new ones thrust upon them without being profoundly disturbed. Only by working with the people and, through the painfully slow process of education, substituting new responsibilities for the old ones which they themselves discard, can such a radical reorganization as the unification of the services be accomplished. Therefore it is the primary intent of this plan to recommend a means for the gradual development of a common service.

4. The common service proposed in this study would have the following responsibilities:

a. Research and development of all cryptographic communications equipment, key producing equipment, intercept equipment, and rapid analytic aid equipment.

b. Procurement of all cryptographic communications equipment, key producing equipment, intercept equipment, and rapid analytic aid equipment.

c. Compilation, production, distribution, and accounting for cryptographic instructional and key materials (except those most efficiently produced in the field by individual service field headquarters), associated with the cryptographic communications equipments.
d. Development of policies, techniques, instructions, and training facilities for the maintenance of cryptographic communications equipments.

e. Study, development, and promulgation of cryptographic operating procedures.

f. Enunciation of general policy governing physical security practices and requirements.

g. Collecting and studying cryptographic traffic volume statistics and violations of cryptographic operating procedures.

h. Declaration and determination of remedial action on all compromises.

i. Development and staff supervision of general policies and procedures used in each service for the allocation, distribution, and accounting for cryptographic material common to all services.

(1) In order to enable each service to supply and utilize cryptographic materials most efficiently and with due allowance for the peculiarities of the communications problems confronting each service, the distribution of cryptographic equipment, key producing equipment, and associated keying materials common to all services and/or produced by the common agency would be made in bulk from the common agency to the individual distribution organizations maintained by each service.

(2) Accounting for such material would be in detail only to the service organization and in bulk to the common agency.

(3) Field organizations of the services presently performing this work (i.e. Navy's Registered Publications Issuing Offices and District libraries, Army Security Agency theater units, and Airways and Air Communications Service Group Registered Publications Issuing Offices) would be kept in existence and utilized to the fullest possible extent. A policy of mutual aid would be followed by all.

j. Study and development of general policies and procedures for transmission security. Administration would be a command function exercised by the individual services.

k. Research, development, and staff supervision of an overall countermeasures program.
(1) Monitoring practices and countermasures programs would be performed and controlled by the individual services with only staff supervision by the common agency.

1. Establishment and maintenance of intercept facilities and techniques adequate to meet cryptanalytic demands.

(1) Existing intercept facilities of the three services would be utilized fully.

m. Determination of intercept assignments and staff supervision over administration of the stations.

n. Development of rapid efficient procedures for handling and processing raw intercept material.

c. Research and development of cryptanalytic procedures.

p. Development of procedures for rapidly placing cryptanalyzed and translated traffic in the hands of intelligence evaluation agencies.

5. Before discussing the merits of the common service outlined above, an answer should be given to the inevitable question, "Cannot the aims and effects of a common service be accomplished by the full use of the present technical collaboration boards and committees composed of representatives of the three services?" The answer is NO.

a. In the first place, the committee approach to the problem extends and aggravates the understandable fears of all but the boldest. A person who sits on a committee is no longer merely a working man, he is a REPRESENTATIVE. And if he is a good committee member he never forgets it. The outlook of a representative is considerably different from the outlook of a worker. The nagging pressure of the ever-present thought that everything he says is being said not as his opinion but as the opinion of the agency which he represents, affects his thinking. Minor problems become major; difficult problems are made to seem insoluble. To the normal tension of working, it adds the hypertension which accompanies a Binding and Official Utterance by a REPRESENTATIVE. The actual day to day problems of communication security and intelligence are sufficiently complex and difficult when naked. We should not add to their complexity and encumber their solution by clothing them in the tight fitting suit of an OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

b. Secondly, because of the fact that the Air Force has not been in the business, only the Army and Navy could contribute personnel to the committees who are experienced in detailed workings of communication security and intelligence work. However, each service member of the committee has equal rights and votes. Thus a situation is created
in which, because of inexpeirience, the member from one service does not know whether the proposal upon which he must act is good or bad. He isn't even sure how it will affect his agency and thus how its ultimate results will reflect back upon him individually. Being in such a position he has to refuse to agree until he and his chiefs have had time to study it. The result is lost time, a general slowing of the work, and an increase in the possibility of misunderstanding.

c. Third, committees meet only infrequently by comparison with persons who are working side by side day after day. Even a committee which meets once a week for two hours at a time brings the members in contact if they worked in the same office. Obviously, then, the amount of common problems which they can attack with common action is only a fraction of what it could be.

d. Fourth, because of the OFFICIAL aspect of committees, the administrative procedures surrounding committee considerations and agreements are more complex and time and energy consuming than the procedures through which a single working group operates. Usually only about one third of these procedures are necessary, the rest are outward manifestations of the fears which permeate a committee. Fears of the members that they will commit their organization to something which is not in accordance with local policy or which is unfavorable to their chiefs. Fears of the organization chiefs that their representatives will commit the organization to extra work or will agree to something which will bring pressure to bear upon them. Fears that another committee will take action on a problem which doesn't actually belong to it and in so doing, gain in prestige. Fears that the action taken by the committee is a bit radical and should have the protective coloration of a general concurrence by other committees, however unrelated their responsibilities may be. These are the fears which plague committees and which father such operational jungles as coordinating committees and such administrative jungles as the present procedure for implementing a decision of the Joint Communications Board.

e. Finally, because the composition of committees is continually changing, continuity of action, thought, and policy is lost.

6. The essential elements of this plan for eventually achieving a common communication security and intelligence service are:

a. The creation of a medium for daily working contact of the three services.

b. The acceptance by the three services of compulsion for decision and agreement upon matters of common interest.

c. The adoption and prosecution of a policy designed to develop
a single organization participated in by the three services for their mutual benefit.

7. These three elements form the nucleus of the plan. They are listed in the chronological order of their maturity, but they should be adopted simultaneously. Adoption of all three elements will lay the foundation for the common agency. Adoption will not mean unification. It isn’t that easy. Let us consider these individually and in more detail.

a. The creation of a medium for daily working contact of the three services. This is the first active step to be taken after the adoption of the program. It is not merely a training program and must not be allowed to deteriorate into one. Training is an integral part of it but its primary purpose is to familiarize each service with the communication intelligence and security problems and means of the other two services. Familiarization differs from training in the same way that eating ice cream differs from reading about it. The emphasis must be upon details and the people involved must come from the working level. It is the working people which must shake down this organization and make it operate, consequently it is the working people which must initiate the first active phase of the program. In brief, the medium which must be created is a program of long term exchange of personnel. Not so many people initially that operations of any service are going to be crippled and not so few that the familiarization phase cannot be satisfactorily accomplished within one year.

b. The acceptance by the three services of compulsion for decision and agreement upon matters of common interest. This is the crux of the plan. Acceptance of it makes it possible for truly mutual operations. Rejection of it guarantees failure. Without this element this plan is akin to a statute without an enforcement clause. It is the lack of this very provision which has made the accomplishment of even the simplest of joint projects through the various joint committees an Herculean task. There simply is no compulsion (other than the necessity for continuing essential work) upon any of the joint committees to reach a decision. Earlier in this study considerable space is devoted to a discussion of the fallibilities of committees and the people who serve on them. Suffice it to say that generally there is no agreement where there is no requirement for agreement. In essence this element calls for the creation of a head which will be required to decide in each instance. This head initially may take the form of a governing board composed of people from the three services. The difference between this board and the present joint committees or boards is that this one will be required by its charter to decide each issue that is presented to it. Agreement or compromise of the factions in an issue are acceptable but stagnation is not.

c. The adoption and active prosecution of a policy designed
to develop a single organization participated in by the three services for their mutual benefit. If we consider the first two elements as the flesh of this plan then this one is its spirit. This policy is a charted course, subject to and capable of being changed, but with a fixed destination. When actually defined and stated it will be the handbook by which the common agency will be built. The adoption and prosecution of a workable policy by the three services will be concrete evidence of sincerity and will do the most of any single act to eliminate resistance from within and suspicion from without.

8. It is realized that a very strong argument can be made in opposition to the development of a common service by citing the dangers inherent in disrupting the present organizations in the face of a grave international situation. It is realized too that the immediate and usual result of simplification or unification programs is confusion. However, the confusion is inevitable only when the structure in which the people have developed some efficiency, by virtue of familiarity, is leveled in a single stroke to make way for the new, "simple" one. The very destruction of the medium causes the first wave of confusion. In its wake comes a period of resentment arising out of the frustration caused when the people fail to adapt rapidly and make mistakes. This in turn is followed by the period in which most reorganizations fail; the one in which the people consolidate what they liked in the old with what they like in the new. The elements which they select from each organization are not necessarily the simplest or best in each case but rather what they are able and want to salvage from both. I say salvage for by this time the simplification in practice bears little resemblance to the virgin paper one. New organizations seldom are created successfully on the same ground and from the same materials as the old. What actually results is an organization which combines, often in unsatisfactory proportions, some things that the director had in mind, some things that the people want, and some things that the job (work) requires. Result: a bastard complexity. However, this argument of the dangers of disruption is valid only if an attempt is made to achieve the common service by an immediate action directive. What is needed is a program of specific action with the aim of developing, let me repeat, developing, not implementing overnight and by dictum, an organization for collective communication security and intelligence. The danger lies in the haste of the action not in the action itself.

9. On the other hand, although it would be dangerous to rush into the development of a common service, this does not mean that considerable time need elapse between the time of adopting the program given in paragraph 6 above and the time benefits are realized. Once the basic agreement has been reached, there are several specific actions which can be taken immediately to initiate the services into the practice of exerting common effort to overcome a common security or intelligence problem. An examination in some detail is made below of two current problems and the practical benefits which would materialize from a solution reached through mutual effort.
a. The production of one-time key tapes. This requires considerable special key producing equipment and personnel to process the tapes. The Army Security Agency has the equipment, but due to a lack of personnel cannot utilize the complete output of the equipment. The Air Force is the largest user of one-time tapes, but has no facilities for producing them. The time required to establish, organize, and perfect a new production unit and the waste of money required to finance duplicate overhead could be eliminated by the simple expedient of joining forces and expanding the existing facilities. The Navy, although not using one-time tape on the scale of the Army or the Air Force, is now assembling the necessary personnel and equipment to produce it. The Navy and the Air Force could contribute money and personnel to the existing production unit and the tape produced by this common effort prorated according to a percentage breakdown of the circuits in each service requiring one-time tapes. Initially a careful bookkeeping system could be maintained in order to assure each service that it was getting full value for money contributed and not paying for tapes used by another service. However, it is firmly believed that such a procedure would last only so long as required to prove to the skeptics in each service that the common production unit was the most efficient and most economical. A security advantage would also accrue to this arrangement, in that the tapes used by all three services would have uniform characteristics.

b. The production of short term cryptographic material for tactical forces. Much of the cryptographic material used by tactical Army, Navy, and Air units must be produced in great quantities (tens of thousands of copies per edition) and used only for a very short period of time (24 to 72 hours). The effort and expense of producing and distributing such quantities of material is enormous. For example, the Joint Aircraft Code is used by the three services. Under war-time conditions, it requires the printing of 29,000 copies of a 16 page code book which is used only for 48 hours. The Navy has printing facilities in Washington and in various major Navy commands with a greater production capacity than the Army's at the Army Security Agency; but it doesn't have the personnel to utilize the equipment completely. Again, contributions of personnel and funds by the Army and Air Force would result in complete and efficient employment of the equipment, and a completely satisfactory solution to a titanic printing job.

c. These are but two examples of the immediate results which could be realized by an agreement among the services to establish a common agency. These results could be achieved fairly soon after the adoption of the three point program listed in paragraph 6 above and would not have to wait until the actual achievement of a common organization. Similar results with similar economies of effort and money and an increase in the quality of the product could be gained on the communication intelligence side.

10. In order to actually launch this program without disrupting operations, creating unnecessary resistance to it, and lowering morale,
an investigation should be conducted of the present needs for communication intelligence and security among the three services, the existing organisations engaged in the business, and the best means of implementing elements 1 and 2 of the program given in paragraph 6 above. It is believed that a board of inquiry is the best means of conducting a thorough and reasonably impartial investigation.

a. The members of this board should be appointed from the executive-technical level of the existing communication security agencies in each service, should be a mixture of civilian and military personnel from each service, and should be of comparable administrative level, if civilian, and equal rank, if military.

b. Each member should be freed of sufficient present duties to enable him to devote two full days per week to the investigation.

c. The board should be a free agent with the right to investigate any aspect of communication security and intelligence operations. It should have the responsibility and authority to:

(1) Investigate the responsibilities and facilities of existing organisations, the present division of work, and the areas of common interest.

(2) Consider the desirability of an organization having centralized control with decentralized operations as opposed to a completely centralized and unified organization.

(3) Consider the development of common procedures, instruction, and equipment.

(4) Consider the relationships and methods of employing the Army Security Agency field organisations, the Navy's Registered Publications Issuing Offices, and the Air Force Airways and Air Communications Service Group security organisations.

(5) Consider the administration and control of intercept problems.

(6) Consider the best means for projecting cryptanalytic attacks and utilization of cryptanalytic talent.

(7) Consider the relation of the common agency to the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and other government agencies requiring communication security and/or intelligence.

(8) Develop and supervise the implementation of a detailed
plan for the founding and gradual building of an organization supported by and composed of members of the three services for the purpose of providing communication security and intelligence to all military services.

(9) Recommend the order in which the various phases of this plan shall be implemented.

CONCLUSIONS

11. Therefore, it is concluded that:

a. A communication security and intelligence agency common to all three military services is necessary and would benefit the services in particular and the government in general.

b. The most important action to be taken, and the only one requiring any haste, is for the three military services to agree that it is desirable to have a common communication security and intelligence agency and that it is their intent to develop such an agency.

c. The program to implement an agreement to develop a common agency should provide for and stress the necessity for this development to be instituted slowly and along the most natural and least disruptive lines possible.

d. An investigation should be conducted into the problems involved in the development of such an agency by a board of representatives from each service. This board should be charged not only to investigate but to recommend in detail the means and schedule for building a common agency.

e. The details and scheduling of the development of a common agency should be in the hands of the aforementioned board.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretaries of Defense, Army Navy, and Air agree that a communication security and intelligence service common to all three military services is necessary and would benefit the services in particular and the government in general.

b. A board of inquiry (to be known as the Crypto-agency Board) consisting of representatives from the three services, be appointed and charged with investigating the problems involved in developing a common agency and recommending in detail the means of and schedule for accomplishing it.
e. The Secretary of Defense direct that the Crypto-agency Board adopt the following program as its foundation on which to build the common agency:

(1) Create a medium for the daily working contact of the three services in communication security and intelligence activities.

(2) Secure acceptance from the three services of the principle of compulsion for decision in all matters of common interest during the period of development.

(3) Adopt, promulgate, and prosecute a policy and course of action designed to develop a single organization participated in by all three services for their mutual benefit.
TAB B

CSGAS-80

14 June 1948

Staff, ASA and Its Relationship with the Operating Divisions

PROBLEM

1. To consider the present organization of Staff, ASA, and its relationship with the Operating Divisions.

DISCUSSION

2. The complex mixture of situation, motives, personalities, authority, responsibility, facts, necessity, action and reaction which is inadequately described by the word "relationship" is difficult to analyze and doubly difficult to express. Thus, in a study of this sort any attempt to dissect a relationship existing between such groups as the ASA Staff and Security Division will result, at best, merely in carving it into its major quantities and not in a true analysis. However, it is felt that it would be beneficial to both groups to separate, examine, and discuss the major quantities of this relationship from the standpoint of each group.

3. The need for a staff to assist the Chief of the Army Security Agency in the active persuasion and accomplishment of his many responsibilities is readily recognized. Equally self-evident is the need for capable operating divisions to perform the work arising out of these responsibilities. The difficulties and friction which occur between these two groups, each pursuing the same end, occur for the most part in those areas in which authority and responsibility have not been sharply defined. In other words there is confusion over the specific duties, authority, and responsibility of each group. More specifically there is confusion in Security Division as to the nature and extent of the control which it is intended Staff should exercise over the operating divisions.

4. The concept which Security Division holds of its place in the Agency structure is as follows:

   a. The Chief, Security Division is responsible for providing secure crypto-equipment, material, and doctrine to users at the proper time; directing proper usage, surveying actual usage, and correcting improper usage of this equipment and material; and liaison with other
military and government agencies necessary to assure basic communication security and to develop a coordinated, effective program.

b. In order for the Chief, Security Division to successfully meet these responsibilities, he must be able to determine basic operating policies which will fit the requirements of the functions involved, the limitations of the situation, and the most appropriate means of accomplishment. The approval or rejection of these policies should be made by the Chief of the Agency.

c. It is considered by Security Division that the responsibilities of staff, ASA in the field of communications security are to assist the Chief, ASA by assuring that policies recommended by the Chief, Security Division, do not conflict with existing policies of ASA or of a higher echelon, or with political or military considerations of which the Division Chief may not be aware.

5. This concept is consistent with the Division Chief's responsibilities for all activities contributing to communications security and with his position as head of a division performing communications security activities and functions of a technical and operational nature. In private industry, for example, the governing policies of the company are determined by the directors, most of whom are operating vice-presidents in charge of some department or other in the company. The implementation of these policies is left almost entirely to each operating vice-president. To conclude the comparison, the operating division chiefs are the operating vice-presidents of the Agency. Let us now proceed to the consideration of this important question: Do the Chiefs of the Operating Divisions have the authority and freedom necessary to discharge their responsibilities?

6. It is considered by Security Division that the answer to this question at the present time is "No." The operating division chiefs have the facilities and personnel (as elaborate as the budget permits) necessary to perform the functions arising out of these responsibilities but they are not assigned the responsibility of formulating the policies affecting the utilization of these personnel and facilities. They may recommend policies to a group of intermediaries, but in themselves they do not constitute the policy making group for the Chief of the Agency. In other words by comparison with other federal agencies and with private industry, Chiefs of the Operating Divisions have certain restrictions placed upon them which limit their authority in their respective fields.

7. New policies and changes to existent policies may be initiated in one of several ways. Generally speaking, the Division recommends such actions, based upon its operational activities. However, Staff also initiates policy matters and changes thereto. Under such an arrangement, confusion can easily result unless the closest coordination exists. There have been a few occasions when Staff has initiated, or determined the course of action on, a matter of policy which has affected Security Division without complete coordination. It would appear that a simple
method for elimination of any such difficulty in the future would be to refer all matters of policy to the Operating Divisions for their recommendations. Such an arrangement still permits Staff to fulfill its responsibilities in assisting the Chief, ASA.

8. There have been but few occasions when Staff has indicated non-concurrence on the fundamental idea behind various policy matters recommended by the Division. On the other hand, there are many occasions of differences of opinion between Staff and Security Division on “how” such policy recommendations should be stated, i.e., differences involving the wording, style, format, etc. There have been dozens of pieces of correspondence, submitted to Staff in draft form which have been rephrased, and rewritten, and yet, so far as is apparent to Security Division, have remained essentially unchanged or, in some cases, actually presenting an erroneous or vague substitute for the original presentation. Of these some have been changed by Staff without referral to the Division. However, it is appreciated that Staff is attempting to assure necessary coordination in all cases. In some of this correspondence it may be that the fault lies with the Division, in that it failed to perform completed staff work. In others, it has seemed that there were certain methods of expressing the basic thoughts desired by Staff, with which the Division was not familiar. If the first possibility is true, it would be advisable to point out at the time of occurrence all cases of improper staff work or presentation. If the second is true then the Division should be advised in detail of the manner in which the ideas should be expressed. Most of the difficulties seem to arise from a concentration by Staff on the “how” of correspondence, rather than on “what” the correspondence is attempting to accomplish. Such misapplication of attention results in much wasted effort and less accomplishment by the Army Security Agency. In fact the misunderstandings with Staff over policy matters appear to be largely a matter of semantics. Most of the time Staff is not talking about policy—it’s talking about procedures with which it has little actual contact and even less control. However, on those occasions where errors in policy implementation or expression occur, AS-80 expects, and welcomes, Staff to call such errors to its attention.

9. As a result of the above situation, confusion over the difference between policy and procedure, Staff has gradually assumed more and more control over recommended actions of Security Division. In effect the Division furnishes the information and Staff edits, rephrases and rewrites a large percentage of the Division’s work. Such procedure results in needless delay, uneconomical usage of Division personnel and inefficient utilization of Staff, ASA. Staff should be familiar with the projects and programs of the Division and should take corrective measures when violations of approved policy are evident, but should not serve as a procedural supervisor.
CONCLUSIONS

10. A need exists for the operating divisions to have the authority and responsibility to devise and submit for approval by the Chief, ASA, basic operating policies.

11. A redefinition of Staff’s responsibilities in so far as they affect Security Division’s operations and policy recommendations is needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that the following two proposals be considered:

a. That the Chief, ASA be provided a staff consisting of the Chiefs of the three Operating Divisions and a "Deputy Chief for Administration" plus a small secretariat or personal staff. The Chiefs of the three Operating Divisions would be responsible to the Chief, ASA for all matters of an operational nature concerning communications security, communications intelligence and research and development pertaining thereto, and for recommending to the Chief, ASA all policy and revisions of policy in these fields. The "Deputy Chief for Administration" would be responsible for all matters concerning personnel, fiscal affairs, training and supply.

b. That Staff, organizationally, be retained, but that the position of Staff be redefined. The Division Chiefs would have complete responsibility for all operational and non-policy matters and for approval of all correspondence thereon, as at present, and matters of policy would be recommended by the Division Chiefs, to the Chief, ASA, who would utilise his Staff to assure him that no conflict will result with existing policy should the policy recommended by the Division Chief be approved. Under such an arrangement, the term "matters of policy" must be clearly defined, and all effort made by Staff to concentrate upon "what" the Division recommendation is attempting to accomplish.

13. A suggestion of a general nature is considered of merit. If we are to have a Staff, undertaking the important responsibilities for the Chief, ASA, then an effort must be made to assure a permanence of tenure of the individuals who comprise the Staff. It is considered that Staff officers cannot exercise properly their responsibilities if such a large part of their tenure must be spent in learning the job. ASA and its missions are technical and complicated and Staff ASA requires men of ability and experience. This ability and knowledge is not acquired in a short time. It is recommended that Staff be either liberally sprinkled with career civilians of experience and ability, or that the tenure of military personnel be increased. Assuming a tenure of four years, it is further recommended that an assistant be assigned each responsible Staff
An officer at the end of two years, and that the assistant be trained in all the phases of the position, with the aim that he succeed his supervisor upon the reassignment of the latter officer. Such a program would guarantee at all times that the position would be held by an officer with at least two years experience on the job.