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AFSAC 63/68

23 October 1952

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY COUNCILDECISION ON AFSAC 63/68REPORT OF THE UK/US COMMUNICATION SECURITY CONFERENCENote by the Secretary

1. On 16 October 1952 the Members of AFSAC approved the Report of the UK/US Communication Security Conference, 1952.
2. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of AFSAC 63/68.

*M. C. Fisher*  
M. C. FISHER  
LTJG, U.S. Navy  
Secretary, AFSAC

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF AFSAC:

**Subject:** Report of the UK/US Communication Security Conference, 1952

1. At its 38th Meeting, AFSAC agreed to "forward to the NSC for adjudication, via USCIB, the question of whether Communication Security or Communication Intelligence is foremost to the interests of the U.S." The Chairman, USCIB, has now informed me that the National Security Council does not desire to establish a general policy on this matter but, instead, prefers to decide each case on its own merits.

2. The specific case which accentuated the requirement for defining a U.S. policy on [redacted] with the proposed release of [redacted]. Since no general U.S. policy on [redacted] has been established at this time and since there is now no specific U.S. case requiring presentation to the National Security Council, I therefore recommend that the inclosed memorandum be approved and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Inclosure "B" to the memorandum has been previously distributed to the Members as the Inclosure to AFSAC 63/63.

4. It is requested that the Members indicate their concurrence or comments on the attached vote sheet and return to the AFSAC Secretary prior to 16 October 1952.



RALPH J. CANINE  
Major General, US Army  
Chairman, Armed Forces Security Agency Council

Inclosure - 1

Memorandum by the Chairman,  
AFSAC, for the Joint Chiefs  
of Staff, subject as above.

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~MEMORANDUM BY THE CHAIRMAN, ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY COUNCIL

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REPORT OF THE UK/US COMMUNICATION  
SECURITY CONFERENCE, 1952  
Reference: J.C.S. 2074/7

1. In 1950, the British Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed (J.C.S. 2074/7) to continue for the next four years the series of Communication Security (COMSEC) conferences which was begun in Washington in September, 1950; the third UK/US Communication Security Conference was held in Washington in May 1952.
2. The report of the Conference is contained in Enclosure "B". An identical report is being forwarded to the British Chiefs of Staff by the Chairman of the U.K. Delegation. The Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, has forwarded a copy of the report to the Director, Communications-Electronics, for his information.
3. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
  - a. Approve the report contained in Enclosure "B", subject to the amendment expressed in Enclosure "A".
  - b. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A" to the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

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D R A F T

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff approve the Report of the 1952 UK/US Communication Security Conference held in Washington in May 1952.
2. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff ask that consideration be given to inserting the following statement in the Report at paragraph 9j:

"In all cases where crypto-equipments are to be made available to NATO, the revelation of crypto-principles involved should be restricted to general summaries and descriptions, and should not include specific wiring details, drawings, etc., until after the equipment is in production."

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff believe that disclosure of all details of the crypto-principle prior to its embodiment in a manufactured version is a practice to be avoided, since such detailed knowledge would allow a non-Brusa NATO government to produce for its own national communications an equipment embodying excellent crypto-principles even though the U.K. or U.S. proffered equipment might be officially rejected for NATO use.

enclosure "A"

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