

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

London

10th December, 1951

LSIB/244/51

Chairman,
United States Communications Intelligence Board.

With reference to your memorandum UC 000227 dated 22nd June 1951, the London Signal Intelligence Board notes that the United States Communications Intelligence Board has approved the report of the [redacted] Conference on the Security of [redacted] Communications, but observes that it has not yet been advised of the decision of the National Security Council.

2. In paragraph 3(k) of the Conference report it was concluded that any approach to the [redacted] should be deferred pending consideration of the report of the Tripartite Group. L.S.I.B. has now examined the Tripartite Group's report and concludes

[redacted] are sufficient to warrant the U.S. and the [redacted] making an initial approach to them about their communication security.

3. L.S.I.B. proposes that the [redacted] should be briefed according to the document attached as Appendix 'A' and that the approach should be made at the first opportunity. L.S.I.B. also

[redacted] make the first approach, to be followed a few days later by that of the U.S. Ambassador.

4. L.S.I.B. further proposes that the U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. nominees who according to paragraph 55 of the Conference Report, are

[redacted] advance in order to coordinate final details. For this purpose L.S.I.B. will nominate a senior representative and an expert from

[redacted] preliminary meeting between the U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. nominees.

5. U.K. authorities can provide, in two months time, 8 CCM machines to be offered to the [redacted].

6. L.S.I.B. would welcome U.S.C.I.B.'s comments on these proposals at its earliest convenience.

/s/ [redacted]
Chairman
London Signal Intelligence Board

Inclosure with USCIB 23/43 dated 27 December 1951.

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Appendix 'A'

[REDACTED]

therefore prepared to offer material help towards improving them.

[REDACTED]

3. The [REDACTED] Governments therefore think it reasonable to assume that [REDACTED] intelligence to Russia on Western diplomacy and strategy, indeed that they may well be her most prolific, most speedy and most reliable source of all. They regard it as imperative that Russia should be deprived of this source, not only so that she will be denied the intelligence now accessible to her from it, but also so that officials of the U.S. and U.K. Governments may more freely discuss important matters of common concern with officials [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. The [REDACTED] Governments have therefore decided to instruct

[REDACTED]

- (a) undertake an energetic programme for reorganisation of its Cypher Service and appropriate replacement of its present systems and practices;
- (b) accept without qualification and promulgate [REDACTED] essential standards of security in each phase and aspect of the programme;
- (c) accept direct [REDACTED] participation in executing the programme, including participation on a working level by representatives qualified in the field of general security as well as all aspects of communication security.


/6, Should
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Appendix 'A'




7. If [redacted] is willing to accept these proposals, the U.S. and U.K. Governments are for their part willing to provide as a minimum, on long-term loan, sufficient Combined Cypher Machines (CCM) to equip about 30 of the most important diplomatic posts with two machines each, a quarter to a third of them at once and the remainder phased in consonance with NATO requirements. (This machine has already been accepted by the [redacted] Government for [redacted]) For those posts which cannot immediately be equipped with CCM Machines, and as a standby for those which can, the [redacted] Governments propose one-time pads and are prepared to advise on and assist in their construction. [redacted] can be assured that, as the [redacted] would be producing their own settings for the Cypher Machines and their own one-time pads, their telegrams would not be readable by the [redacted] Governments.


8. The [redacted] in [redacted] should be aware that two of the problems which their Governments have had to face in arriving at these conclusions have been

(a)

(b)



9. The approach to the [redacted] is to be made by both Governments in order that it shall have the greatest possible impact, but in order to



in the course of the Moscow talks in 1947 the U.K. Government received a

/report


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Appendix 'A'



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