

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

17 January 1952

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~USCIB Meeting to be held on 18 January 1952

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Briefing Sheet on Item 3Communication Security (USCIB: 14/185 and 188)

1. The events and considerations which resulted in a [ ] Conference on [ ] Communication Security, held at Washington in May 1951, are set forth in the Enclosure.

2. On 27 May 1951 the Report of the Conference (USCIB: 14/132) was discussed and approved by USCIB, which also agreed to submit it to the National Security Council (NSC) for approval of the recommendation to approach the [ ] and of the conditions precedent thereto.

3. The Chairman of USCIB submitted the Report to the NSC on 8 June 1951; on 11 January 1952 the President approved its conclusions and recommendations.

4.a. LSIB approved the Report on 7 June 1951, in a memorandum to the Chairman, USCIB, in which the Chairman, LSIB stated further that LSIB "has decided that it does not require the approval of any higher authority." He also stated that "a draft brief to the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors in [ ] is being prepared for discussion between representatives of our two Boards."

b. In a memorandum to the Chairman, USCIB, dated 10 December 1951 (USCIB: 14/185) the Chairman LSIB stated that "LSIB has now examined the [ ]

LSIB further proposed that the approach be made "at the first opportunity" and stated that the "UK authorities can provide in two months" [ ] machines to be offered to the [ ] (as per the recommendation in paragraph 4e of the Report). Appendix "A" to LSIB's Memorandum sets forth the details of [ ] to [ ] (as per last sentence of sub-paragraph a above). LSIB now wishes USCIB's comments on its proposals "at its earliest convenience."

5.a. Paragraph 3k of the Report of the US/UK Conference states that:

"Since the report of the Tripartite Group now studying the [ ] may well add to our knowledge in this regard, any approach to the [ ] should be deferred pending consideration of that report."

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

b. In August 1951 the Report of the Tripartite Working Group was approved by the US. As of this date neither the UK [redacted] Government has approved that Report. However, it is to be noted that despite the conclusion quoted above in sub-paragraph a, the pertinent recommendation based upon that conclusion simply states that: (USCIB: 14/132,4b)

"b. The proposed approach and plan be implemented when LSIB and USCIB have agreed that the requisite conditions have been met."

c. It appears, therefore, that the recommendation of the [redacted] Conferees does not require that the approach to the [redacted] be contingent upon the approval of the Report of the Tripartite Working Group by all three Governments. Hence, if USCIB agrees with LSIB, the approach to the [redacted] could be made without further delay.

6. With reference to the CCM's to be provided, the UK, as noted above, will be ready in about two months to provide its quota (8) of the twenty machines initially required for the [redacted]; the US agreed to furnish the remaining twelve. At the time of the Conference, the Army agreed to provide these twelve machines and it is assumed that this promise is still valid. Sixty additional machines are to be provided by the US and the UK "in a program phased in consonance with their respective NATO commitments."

W.F.F.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ENCLOSURE

1.a. Early Consideration: In 1948 USCIB discussed the problem of [redacted] as the most important aspect of the "Security of Western European Union Consideration." USCIB could not agree on measures to be taken and submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) a split

[redacted]

curity. NSC voted to take no action but to keep the problem under surveillance.

b. It may be noted at that time that [redacted] wanted to reveal

[redacted]

[redacted] so expressed himself to Marshall, but Marshall replied that NSC could not accept the British proposal.

2.a. Reconsideration of Problem 1950: The problem was raised again in USCIB in September 1950 when the seriousness of the situation was felt by CIA and the Department of State to merit reconsideration.

b. SECCOM to which the problem had been referred submitted its report to USCIB in November 1950 recommending that steps be taken to improve

[redacted]

c. On 12 December 1950 a letter was received from LSIB giving the

[redacted]

Conference be held in early 1951 to work out the details of action required.

d. In late January 1951 Admiral Stone appointed an AFSA Ad Hoc Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. William F. Friedman to work out a draft of the US position on the matter. This committee submitted on 7 February its report, the main conclusions of which were:

"a. Much valuable intelligence is contained in the [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

[REDACTED]

to any efficient communication intelligence (COMINT) organization.

c. This situation can be corrected only by a complete overhaul and replacement of the present insecure cryptographic systems by secure systems.

d. The importance of denying this source of COMINT to Russia is such that it is in the interest of the United States not only to accept a similar denial for itself, but to provide, at least in part, the cryptographic devices essential to security.

e. Negotiations with the [REDACTED] should be conducted in such a manner that [REDACTED]

f. Negotiations with the [REDACTED] should, if practicable, be conducted entirely by the British in order to avoid disclosure of BRUSA cryptologic collaboration.

g. Negotiations should not be instituted prior to the formation of a secure group within the [REDACTED] Government."

e. On 13 March 1951 a letter was sent to LSIB proposing the agenda for the forthcoming conference within the framework of overall [REDACTED] security. The points of the agenda were:

"1. [REDACTED]

2. The nature and scope of present [REDACTED] internal insecurity.

3. The most effective technical assistance which can be given to the [REDACTED].

4. The development of a specific plan for improvement of [REDACTED] communications insecurity.

5. The basis for a successful approach to the [REDACTED] Government."

The letter also stated the composition of the US delegation.

f. [REDACTED] proposals for the Conference were received 13 April 1951.

[REDACTED]

detailed than had been drawn up by the US.

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

g. The [ ] Conference was held 1-14 May 1951 in Washington. Its recommendations were

"a. The above conclusions be approved;

b. The proposed approach and plan be implemented when LSIB and USCIB have agreed that the requisite conditions have been met;

c. The respective Chairmen of LSIB and USCIB and/or their nominees visit [ ] in order to brief the U.K. and the U.S. Ambassador [ ] and also to participate as required; (h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

d. LSIB and USCIB keep this problem under continuous review, and take such implementing action as may be agreed to be necessary;

e. The [ ] Government provide eight and the U.S. Government twelve of the twenty CCMs required for initial implementation of the cryptographic plan, and that the additional sixty CCMs be provided by the two Governments in a program phased in consonance with their respective NATO commitments."

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~