

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

This document is to be read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in accordance with communication intelligence security regulations and authorized to receive the information reported herein.

~~SUBJECT NUMBER~~

USCIB: 23/46 Item 9 (Not on Agenda) for the Eighty-second Meeting of USCIB, held on 13 February 1953.

Subject: Allied Communications Security.

GENERAL CANINE stated that recent security breaches on the part of Allied nations had come to his attention, and he thought the old problem of COMINT versus communications security was again before the Board. He referred specifically to reports of NATO meetings which were transmitted in insecure systems. He expressed his opinion that the problem was becoming more and more serious, in fact, to the point where we were handing out intelligence in eight to ten different directions and getting no quid pro quo in return. He said that we appeared to be at the point of having to determine whether we wanted to continue our emphasis on communications intelligence, or become primarily concerned with communications security.

The Acting CHAIRMAN thought the present might not be a propitious time to attack the problem in view of the large number of new people who have just come in to high government positions. He thought it might be preferable to deal with the problem just prior to the next NATO meeting, in April.

MR. ARMSTRONG commented that embarking upon a corrective program in this field was not unlike taking the first step on a ski-run, in that once you got started there was no turning back. He thought that our reluctance to take positive action to increase the security of allied nations was, in large part, due to the realization of this fact, and the fear that we would get started before we were adequately prepared. He suggested that it would be well, for example, to determine which nations were the worst offenders in order of priority, and to make an overall appraisal and evaluation based on the importance and frequency of their security leaks. He thought it likely that the [ ] would head the list, but said that the order thereafter might well be different from what one would expect.

GENERAL CANINE said that the [ ] would probably be found to be as bad as the [ ]. He asked for information on the status of the [ ]

MR. PACKARD explained that a State Department representative had made the offer of 16 machines (based on the Board's earlier decision) to the [ ] in October. He recalled that this number was about half of the quantity requested, and said that the [ ] are now supposed to be deciding whether they will accept or not. He expressed the opinion of the State Department Cryptographic Officer that the [ ] probably considered the number of machines offered inadequate for their needs.

GENERAL CANINE recalled that it was later believed possible to provide about 26 machines, which would still be 10 short of the number requested.

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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[ ] MR. PACKARD expressed his opinion that machines were not what the [ ] really needed to improve their communications because they did not have the maintenance facilities or technical know-how to operate them efficiently. He said that it now appeared to be unfortunate that one-time pads were not offered to them, since it would have been a means of improving their communications and security without having to tell them that [ ]

The Acting CHAIRMAN asked for comments on Mr. Armstrong's proposal that an analysis of the messages of the offending countries be made.

MR. ARMSTRONG stated that most of the messages were [ ] [ ] and expressed his willingness to collaborate with NSA in the preparation of a report for the Board.

It was later agreed that Army, as well as State, would coordinate with NSA representatives in the preparation of this report.

DECISION: (13 February 1953) USCIB agreed that representatives of the Department of State and Department of the Army would coordinate with the Director, NSA, in the preparation of a report to USCIB on the importance and frequency of security violations by various allied nations, based on an analysis of their transmissions.

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