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8 June 1953

Critique of Approaches to Non-Standing-Group

NATO Nations

1. It is agreed between the UK and the US that by some means the Standing Group, NATO, must be made to promulgate;
 - a. The concept that insecure national communications of NATO member nations endanger the common security of NATO;
 - b. A list of minimum communication security standards.
2. Once the concept and the list are promulgated, it is the US proposal:
 - a. That the Standing Group request each nation to assure the Security and Evaluation Agency, NATO, that the standards are met or exceeded in that nation's communications;
 - b. That the facilities of the Security and Evaluation Agency, NATO, be made available for advice and assistance to any member nation requiring help in meeting the standards;
 - c. That the Security and Evaluation Agency, NATO, continually review the situation to be certain that the promulgated standards are being met.
3. Once the concept and the list are promulgated, it is understood to be the UK proposal:
 - a. That a new permanent group be established under the Standing Group, NATO, to be distinct from the Security and Evaluation Agency, to be composed of equal representation from the UK, the US, and France, for the purpose of guiding national communication security of the member countries;

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b. That this new group call before it, one by one, the other eleven NATO members, in order to review their communications security, each nation being asked to give a complete presentation of its communication security techniques and practices;



d. That this group recommend to each nation the changes necessary to achieve communication security;

e. That this group review periodically the communication security status of each NATO nation.

4. The US recognizes in the UK proposal two advantages:




b. Possible contributions to the COMINT effort of the UK, the US, and France, as a result of national disclosures to the new group.

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5. The US feels, however, that these nominal advantages are outweighed by eight major disadvantages, which may be discussed under the headings of:


- a. Organizational duplication
- b. Misplacement of initiative
- c. Workload distribution
- d. Delay in reaching goal
- e. Incompleteness of recommendations
- f. Infringement of national prerogative
- g. Security hazard to the BRUSA COMINT operation

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8. Workload Distribution. Closely related to this is the question of workload distribution. Under the UK proposal, not only the initiative but the major part of the work devolves upon the new group. The holding of hearings, long deliberations, security studies, etc., will represent a substantial - and, to the US, an unwarranted - addition to the NATO budget, or to the budgets of the US, UK, and France because of the loss of services of the group members.
9. Delay in Reaching Goal. The process of straightening out NATO national communications under the UK proposal is essentially a sequential process. This means that the ultimate goal is not reached until the new group has had opportunity to talk with each nation in turn, and to assuage all the tactics of noncooperation which the US foresees will arise. An additional delay is introduced through the necessity of disposing of the Standing Group nations before commencing operations with the other eleven countries. To the US this seems not only unwieldy but downright dangerous.
10. Incompleteness of Recommendations. It is of the essence of the UK


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11. Infringement of National Prerogative. Either approach can only succeed by achieving whole-hearted co-operation of all 14 NATO countries working unselfishly for the common good. This spirit can only be gained by treating free and sovereign equal nations as such. Any Non-Standing Group country is going to view the British approach as a clear and direct infringement of his sovereignty, as outside the scope of NATO, and as a



the US approach, on the other hand, provides these nations with what they need without waiting for them to offer their systems and practices for evaluation.




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