MEMORANDUM FOR DIRAFSA
25 April 1951


1. Just after our brief discussion of the foregoing subject, during which I again urged that serious consideration be given to the solution I recently proposed for the problem (viz., that we work out a plan whereby we offer the French a sufficient number of CCN's (or equivalent) on the basis that they will facilitate and speed up the communications of their Diplomatic posts, and tell them nothing) I learned that the French have accepted the CCN for 2d echelon NATO communications.

2. This acceptance of the CCN for NATO communications seems to me to pave the way for a similar and apparently disingenuous offer of the same machine for Diplomatic communications. If the offer were accepted, I would be better off by my proposed solution in that, while availing ourselves of the advantages of assisting the French, we would avoid three of the five serious disadvantages pointed out by the Department of State in Par. 10 b, c, and d of Enclosure C to USCIB 11/122 of 1 March 1951, which are as follows:

   "d. If this disclosure were leaked to other powers, it would prejudice our political relations with friendly powers."

3. Although the acceptance of such an offer would close the door to further advantage by others, this disadvantage is, of course, inherent in any realistic plan for the improvement of those communications, but we would be better off by my proposed solution in that, while availing ourselves of the advantages of assisting the French, we would avoid three of the five serious disadvantages pointed out by the Department of State in Par. 10 b, c, and d of Enclosure C to USCIB 11/122 of 1 March 1951, which are as follows:
TOP SECRET AGNOR

AFSA-OCT/ef
25 April 1951

SUBJECT: U.S.-U.K. Conference on French communication insecurity

4. It can be pointed out that in offering the CCN to NATO countries we said nothing whatever about and apparently no reference to it was necessary. Might it not be possible to maneuver the same way with regard to

5. The French diplomatic organization comprises approximately 100 posts, and 200 machines would be adequate to provide each post with two. The CSP 1700 (and equivalents) cost about $1500; hence providing the French with 200 of them would involve an expenditure of about $300,000 - an investment that is considered quite moderate, considering the advantages which would accrue. We may not have a sufficient number to provide for both NATO and French diplomatic traffic; if so, we should manufacture the number of additional machines required for the purpose.

6. The AFSA proposed solution to the problem of insecurity of French diplomatic communications already envisages offering the French the CCN for Category I posts. Hence, my proposal in reality offers nothing new or novel in respect to what we contemplate offering them; the principal feature of my proposal is in regard to how the offer is to be made, or rather, the nature of the preliminaries to making the offer. Appropriate preliminaries should not be too difficult; possibly it would be sufficient to make a gesture on the basis merely of facilitating and speeding up all communications having to do with NATO, indicating that there would be no objection whatever, and that in fact, we would be glad, if they used the machines for other than NATO communications, including purely national ones, and that we would be glad to assist in their setting up their own rotor wiring shop, giving them the benefit of our long experience in the production of key lists, etc.

7. I suggest that this or an equivalent paper be discussed among U.S. representatives as soon as possible, and decide whether to present a similar paper to the U.K. representatives as soon as the Conference opens.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
AFSA-OCT

Copy to:
AFSA-OOA
AFSA-OOB
AFSA-OOC