

MEMORANDUM FOR OOB

SUBJECT: USCIB 14/122

1. I have studied the conclusions in subject paper and have compared them with those in 14/100. The following are the principal points of difference:

a. USCIB 14/100 lays great emphasis upon French insecurity in general, states that because of their overall insecurity the immediate advantages which would accrue to the security of the U.S. by improvement in security of French diplomatic traffic would be likely to be of limited value, and concludes that steps to improve French diplomatic cryptographic security should be taken only after there will have been established within the French Government a secure group to which the U.S. may pass highly classified information of combined interest without risk of compromise.

b. USCIB 14/122, while recognizing the existence of French internal insecurity, states that its nature and scope have not been clearly established, notes the absence of conclusive evidence thereof (Par. 6 of the Discussion states that "This appraisal of French personnel insecurity is only partially substantiated by the findings of US and UK intelligence agencies), and concludes that it now appears appropriate to consider steps toward the improvement of French communications security without awaiting either the establishment of a secure group within non-communications areas of the French Government or the raising of the general level of overall French security.

2. In other words, USCIB 14/100 proposes that nothing be done until the overall French security in all fields has been raised and until there has been established within the French Government a secure overall group to which classified information in general could be passed without risk to US security; USCIB 14/122 proposes that if certain conditions can be assured steps to improve French communication security be taken without awaiting overall improvement or the establishment of such an overall secure group in the whole field of classified information, and if a program can be devised to meet these conditions an approach be made to the French forthwith. One of the conditions was that the approach to the French "be such as to ensure ... the security of the French authorities involved in each stage of the program for improvement of French communications security so as to assure minimum loss of communications intelligence to sources other than French...". It appears, then, that USCIB 14/122 proposes action even if improvement in French personnel insecurity is made only as regards French communications personnel.

3. I think this is dangerous, involves great risks without compensating advantages, and should be very carefully considered by USCIB.

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