

~~TOP SECRET CANO~~~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

6 July 53

~~TOP SECRET CANO - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB

SUBJECT: USCIB 23/67

1. The delegates and technical experts of the UK and the US, including the one from CIA, agreed unanimously to a procedure for improving COMSEC of NATO member nations through NATO COMSEC channels. The essence of USCIB 23/67 is that the CIA, one of the US agencies represented at the Conference, wishes to amend the Report of the Conference.

2. The grounds on which CIA urges a rescission of certain of the Conference conclusions and recommendations are:

- a. That the Conference report does not specify what US authorities are the "cognizant US authorities" for the initial approach to the French;
- b. That the Conference failed to set down the specific level and means of initial approach to the French;
- c. That no monitory memorandum issued by the Standing Group is likely to cause a national COMSEC organization to admit its weaknesses or to volunteer to remedy its admitted weaknesses;
- d. That the "NATO COMSEC Board" does not include representation of authorities responsible for the production of diplomatic ciphers, and that these authorities might therefore resent and resist its recommendations;
- e. That Appendix B to the Conference report is technically inadequate, providing too much guidance for some nations, not enough for others;
- f. That other means exist for approaching NATO nations on this subject.

3. The grounds set forth in par. 2 above were discussed at length during the Conference; USCIB 23/67 introduces no new material to justify a reconsideration of the conclusions and recommendations. USCIB 23/67 is merely an urging upon USCIB of ideas thoroughly discussed and rejected by the Conference itself. It might do no harm to indicate briefly the attitude of the conferees toward the points raised:

- a. The Conference was agreed that the Foreign Office and the State Department were the "cognizant UK/US authorities." The phrasing was changed at the request of the CIA conferee.

~~TOP SECRET CANO~~

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

- b. The problem of determining the specific level and means of initial approach to the French was deliberately left out as infringement on diplomatic prerogative and restriction of diplomatic technique.
- c. As regards the ineffectiveness of a Standing Group memorandum in causing national organizations to admit or correct their weaknesses:
  - (1) The issue of a SG memorandum will obviate the necessity for any confession of sin;
  - (2) Certain NATO nations are already approaching the Standing Group for advice on COMSEC (see Appendix A to Conference report);
  - (3) Certain NATO nations can only be effectively approached through NATO since they have already failed to respond to individual approaches.
- d. Concerning the non-representation of diplomatic cryptographers on the "NATO COMSEC Board":
  - (1) There is no such board;
  - (2) The existing NATO COMSEC organizations (SECAN and EUSEC) were established as such by NATO action; therefore it seems unreasonable to expect NATO nations to "resent and resist" their advice;
  - (3) NATO is governed by the Council of Ministers, exclusively a diplomatic organization, to which the Standing Group is subordinate.
- e. Appendix B was prepared by the acknowledged technical experts of the UK and the US, who do not agree with the new CIA assessment of the contents of the Appendix. It is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves here that the ultimate goal is not to do something to every nation's communications for the sake of change, but to raise the level of COMSEC to an acceptable minimum for all NATO nations.
- f. It is obvious that other means exist for approaching NATO nations on this subject. These other means were examined by the Conference, and rejected.

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~E~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

4. The conclusions of USCIB 23/67 imply that "possible alternative methods of approach" were not fully investigated by the Conference. The report of the Conference, in pars. 12 and 15, contradicts this implication.

5. It is my opinion that USCIB 23/67 presents no grounds sufficient to warrant what would amount to a very drastic revision of action recommended by the Conferees of both nations and would certainly require a restudy of the whole subject by another Conference. The establishment of an "Executive Agent" and the making of detailed recommendations to USCIB by this Executive Agent and by the "cognizant US authority" as prerequisites to further action on the Conference report would interpose completely unnecessary delays. USCIB need only set up the "cognizant US authority" and proceed as indicated in the report.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN  
Chairman, U.S. Delegation  
US/UK Conference

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CANOE~~