

Mr. Friedman
~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

Minutes of an ad hoc committee of the BRUSA COMSEC CONFERENCE to discuss and arrive at a decision regarding the disclosure of the cryptographic principles embodied in the AFSAM-7 (Held on 30 Sept 50)

Present:

Admiral Stone
General Gillmore
Colonel Collins
Colonel Lynn
Captain Harper
Mr. Friedman

Colonel Sears
Dr. Sinkov
Mr. Small
Mr. Battey
Lt. Colonel Lardin
Lt. Colonel Horton

1. Admiral Stone opened the meeting by stating that certain points had been raised with regard to the advisability or wisdom of disclosing the principles of the AFSAM-7 to the British during the present conference and asked that Mr. Friedman briefly review the matter for the benefit of those present.

2. Mr. Friedman referred to the JCS 207⁴ series as the basis for the BRUSA COMSEC CONFERENCE and explained the two purposes of the conference, which are (a) to discuss, demonstrate, and if practicable to agree upon the seven-rotor BCM or the PCM as the replacement for the present OCM and (b) a limited exchange of cryptographic principles. As a result of the second requirement the Joint Chiefs of Staff and AFSAC had been requested to authorize a number of equipments, among which are included the AFSAM-7 and AFSAM-9. The Executive Committee of the conference had met during the afternoon of 22 September to discuss the advisability of disclosing the principles of the AFSAM-7, since the need for disclosure was not apparent at this time, and that they had unanimously agreed to recommend that the device not be demonstrated at this time. This recommendation had been referred to Admiral Stone, who had requested this conference for the purpose of further discussing the problem with representatives from the Army.

3. Admiral Stone indicated that he wished to be guided by the Army recommendations in the matter since the AFSAM-7 and AFSAM-9 were primarily Army developments. He further stated that in any event, AFSA fully intended to push the development of the AFSAM-7 to its conclusion and that the Army would not be deprived of the use of the machine, regardless of what decision was reached with regard to its disclosure to the British.

4. Mr. Small stated that the Army Security Agency did not ask for the disclosure of the AFSAM-7 but did concur in its disclosure. He further stated that the AFSAM-7 did not possess any security features that were not required for the purpose for which intended.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY~~~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET U. S. EYES ONLY~~~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~

5. Question was raised as to the implications of the capture of the machine. Mr. Small replied that the Army Security Agency was not worried over the prospect of its capture; that they assumed that in actual operations it would be captured or compromised and that it would not adversely affect the security of U. S. communications for some time.

6. Colonel Lardin pointed out that the British Brigade presently operating in Korea did not have a machine for communication with U. S. Forces and that he felt the need for such a device as the AFSAM-7 was urgently required for that purpose.

7. Mr. Battey stated that in combined meetings of Subcommittee A the British had indicated their desire for a 32-point or 36-point rotor machine with a single cryptographic principle for both on and off-line application.

8. Admiral Stone recalled the AFSAC decision that the AFSAM-7 was not to be considered as the replacement for the CCM. The AFSAM-7 was developed more as a replacement for the M-209 - low echelon use in the Army and Air Force.

9. Mr. Small stated that it was the desire of ASA to discuss the AFSAM-7 with the British as a combined machine for low level - below division level.

10. Mr. Friedman inquired as to whether or not the Army considered the PCM of sufficient strength to satisfy the Army needs for a machine below division level. Mr. Small indicated that in his opinion the PCM was below the standard desired by the Army and would not be used for that purpose.

11. Mr. Friedman commented upon the great loss to the COMINT field should the AFSAM-7 be captured and used against us.

12. Dr. Sinkov pointed out that all such machines would have approximately the same effect upon the COMINT field and did not believe that it was a valid argument or limitation to be placed only upon the AFSAM-7.

13. Admiral Stone stated that he was in a difficult position when it came to evaluating the merits of COMINT when its interests conflicts with the U. S. needs for secure communications. He further stated that he had nevertheless concluded that the security of our own communications must be considered as paramount and that AFSA policy was guided accordingly.

14. Mr. Small recommended that General Gillmore refer the problem to Admiral Stone for decision.

15. General Gillmore indicated that the suggestion that the AFSAM-7 be "placed on the shelf" left the Army with nothing for use in low echelons.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET U. S. EYES ONLY~~~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~~~TOP SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY~~

16. Admiral Stone informed General Gillmore that he would not advocate putting AFSAM-7 "on the shelf," and that the Army did not have to disclose the machine to the British in order to assure the use of the machine in the U. S. Army - in any echelon to be agreed upon.

17. Colonel Lardin pointed out that it was the desire of the Army to use only one machine in all echelons from the Corps down and that it had been their hope that the British would be able to do the same.

18. Colonel Lynn was requested to express the view of the Air Force with regard to the AFSAM-7. Colonel Lynn stated that he was not prepared to present the Air Force point of view at this time. The Air Force was more interested in the AFSAM-9 than in the AFSAM-7 but were definitely interested in both equipments - primarily because it would simplify the cryptographic equipment problem by supplying one off-line and one on-line teletype equipment.

19. Admiral Stone stated that he would be guided by recommendations from the Army and asked General Gillmore if he would care to make a decision at this time or take a few days to firm up the Army position.

20. After further discussion General Gillmore stated that the Army Security Agency was willing to disclose the AFSAM-7 as an Army development to satisfy a need within the U. S. tactical forces. Dr. Sinkov and Mr. Battey were requested to draw up a paper that would serve as a basis for discussing the equipment with the British. Generally, it was agreed that:

a. The machine was not to be considered available for combined U.S.-U.K. use.

b. The level of distribution within U.S. Services was not yet determined.

c. It is intended to reserve this machine for U. S. use only.

21. Admiral Stone stated that discussion and demonstration of the AFSAM-9 had been approved for disclosure at his discretion and that it was his intention to approve such disclosure since the AFSAM-7 principles were embodied in the AFSAM-9. After considerable discussion of the matter it was agreed that either neither of these machines should be disclosed or else both of them should be disclosed - an "all or nothing" proposition was involved. It was then agreed that both would be disclosed to the British.

22. Colonel Lynn raised the question of disclosing the AFSAY-806. Since he had originally proposed the disclosure of the device and had since that time reconsidered his recommendation he now desired that the AFSAY-806 not be discussed. All present agreed.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~~~TOP SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY~~

23. All present agreed upon disclosure and discussion of one-time tape generating equipment during the conference with the British.

Russel H. Horton
RUSSEL H. HORTON
Lt. Colonel, Signal Corps

APPROVED:

Earl E. Stone

EARL E. STONE
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

~~TOP SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY~~

~~U. S. EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~