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^{Eighth}
Minutes of ~~Seventh~~ Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Portuguese Communications Security

HELD: Pentagon, 30 July 1951, 1400 hours

PRESENT: Mr. William F. FRIEDMAN, AFSA, Chairman
Col. Gordon E. DAWSON, USA, ID
CDR Mark T. LITTLE, USN, NATO
Mr. William HARVEY, CIA
Mr. Winston SCOTT, CIA
Mr. Robert F. PACKARD, Department of State

Mr. FRIEDMAN opened the meeting by stating that he would ask each of the members to present his solution to the question in hand - ^{measures to be taken for} the immediate improvement of Portuguese communications security. He called upon Mr. HARVEY first.

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Col. DAWSON remarked that the same plan appealed to him. He presented the Committee with a draft report outlining a program for immediate remedial measures to correct the insecurity of Portuguese communications, (attached hereto as Appendix).

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


With regard to paragraph 2c Col. DAWSON remarked that the statement that the U.S. was loath to refer the violation to the Council Deputies was based on actual fact, since it is believed that such a step would be harmful to Western ^{unanimity.} ~~harmony~~ Such a step had, however, been seriously considered.

Mr. FRIEDMAN remarked that in paragraph 2d he would, because of the technical difficulties involved, prefer that the word "assurance" be substituted for the word "proof" and this was agreeable to the Committee.

Mr. HARVEY concurred with the outline of Col. DAWSON's approach.

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Mr. FRIEDMAN then called on Mr. PACKARD for comments on the plans proposed or outline of a plan he had prepared. Mr. PACKARD replied that he would like first of all to excise from [redacted] the words

[redacted]

Mr.

PACKARD believed that this might easily lead to their derivation that

[redacted]




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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)

To Mr. PACKARD's repetition that he saw no reason for the inclusion of references to national comment since the Portuguese might then realize their system had been compromised. Mr. HARVEY questioned the chances of their being that perceptive and with this view Col. DAWSON and CDR LITTLE agreed. Mr. PACKARD then remarked that a normal follow-up procedure would be to have technical personnel point out to the Portuguese the



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Mr. PACKARD then questioned whether it was desirable to include the



this the plan was hollow. Mr. PACKARD then asked what the U.S. would

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do [redacted] citing the independent attitude of the Portuguese in its relations with the U.S. concerning the Azores. CDR LITTLE remarked that the Portuguese had had 30 years in which to build up their stand in regard to the Azores and that that problem concerned a national question of sovereignty, quite different from this violation of NATO security regulations. With this Mr. HARVEY agreed, pointing out that in the question of the Azores the Portuguese were giving up something, here they were not. To further objections from Mr. PACKARD that the Portuguese might ask to see the proof, Col. DAWSON replied he thought they would not ask to see the proof, that they would be so thoroughly frightened that they would rather not see it. Mr. HARVEY supported Col. DAWSON's views, adding that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would probably be very anxious to keep this matter from the knowledge of the Portuguese dictator SALAZAR, and would therefore be most happy to comply. Mr. HARVEY cited the previous experience of the U.S. in regard to such matters. It is a long established practice in matters so delicate not to make an issue of obtaining exact information. [redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. PACKARD then said that, assuming he was wrong, should the U.S. refer the matter to the Council Deputies, thereby alerting the French and Dutch, [redacted]

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h) (2)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

To

Mr. PACKARD's query why we do not then simply give this information to the Council Deputies in a straightforward manner, Mr. HARVEY replied that there would be no real purpose in telling this to other governments. Given a proper briefing, the Council Deputies would handle the matter without questions, because revelation by us of the insecurity of a system would also mean the loss of their access to this information. With CDR LITTLE's confirmation, Mr. HARVEY said that the Council Deputies would not only support this action but would even attempt to stop the pinning down of a source of information.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)
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Mr. FRIEDMAN asked whether the Committee thought there was any virtue in Mr. SPAFFORD's calling in ULRICH, the Portuguese Ambassador, as a personal matter. Col. DAWSON expressed the view that this approach would be too limited in its effect and would not get to the main source of the trouble, the insecurity of Portuguese communications themselves.

Mr. PACKARD then said that he thought a statement should be inserted in the report of the Committee to USCIB that an approach to the Council Deputies was not advised. He also stated that he thought the last statement on page 2 of Col. DAWSON's report was not entirely justified

This suggestion
was accepted by the Committee.

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A long-term program, as an adjunct to and follow-up of the immediate steps for improvement was agreed upon by the Committee as necessary, but only as an adjunct to the immediate action. Mr. FRIEDMAN stated that Capt. WENGER had indicated to him that Major General CANINE was not in favor of piece-meal action but was anxious that improvement be made also on a general basis, extending the measures from Portugal to other countries. Mr. PACKARD then asked if the Committee had abandoned the other plans for immediate improvement, one of which was instruction by the Security Coordinating Committee in the proper use of TYPEX. To this suggestion CDR LITTLE replied that it must be borne in mind that such a matter would have first to be considered by the Standing Group, of which the French were a member. Mr. HARVEY also stated that the matter would then be taken up on a general rather than a specific basis, thereby lessening its effect.

To Mr. PACKARD's query how quickly a visit by a member of the Security Coordinating Committee to Lisbon could be arranged, CDR LITTLE replied three weeks. CDR LITTLE, however, said that he would argue against this approach, for although the Portuguese were outwardly very obsequious, they did not carry through all their promises. Col. DAWSON confirmed this view and said that in his opinion the effect of such a visit depended on the initial step to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was not practicable as an initial step in itself.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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The draft report revised as of 27 July was then reviewed and changes made as outlined in Appendix "B" and the meeting was brought to a close. The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. PACKARD to aid him in drafting a report for consideration of the Committee at its next and final meeting, Thursday 2 August at 1400 hours, and which time he hoped the report could be approved in final form for presentation at the next regular meeting of USCIB. The CHAIRMAN indicated that he should like to be able also to indicate the decisions of the Committee to USCIB at its special meeting on 3 August, should General SMITH raise the question. The meeting was then adjourned.

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