

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

INCLOSURE (ARMY)

Program for Immediate Remedial Measures to Correct the Insecurity
of Portuguese Communications

1. USCIB requests concurrence of LSIB to the making of a direct unilateral (U.S.) approach to the Portuguese Government at the highest level with a view to correcting the current insecurity of Portuguese communications dealing with NATO affairs.

2. In presenting the matter to LSIB, the proposed steps would be indicated as being the following:

a. The U.S. Secretary of State, through the U.S. Ambassador in Lisbon, notifies the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that the U.S. Government has obtained a report from a U.S. agent in Spain which is a copy of a message sent by the Portuguese member of the Council Deputies on 22 May 1951 containing the COSMIC intelligence appreciation as given by Colonel Putnam to that body on that date.

b. The U.S. Ambassador would point out to the MFA that in the case of this message the President, Council Deputies, had expressly directed that this information not be sent by electrical means, but only by courier, and further that this message revealed an official policy of the Portuguese Government of non-compliance with the use of the TYPEX machine as the only authorized means of electrical transmission of COSMIC material.

c. The MFA would be informed that the U.S. is so concerned about this flagrant violation of NATO security that it is seriously considering referring the violation to the Council Deputies. However, the U.S. is loath to take such action and would be willing to forego it if adequate assurances are received from the Portuguese Government that the TYPEX will be used for the transmission of all COSMIC material, TOP SECRET and SECRET NATO information and national comment on such material, and that if hereafter requests by a government tabling information before a NATO body to transmit such information only by courier, will be strictly

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observed.

d. The MFA and his crypto advisors would then be given positive proof that the TYPEX is a secure means of communication, and the MFA should then be induced to direct the cryptographic office of the MFA to compile national settings for Portuguese TYPEX communications and that all Portuguese communications dealing directly or indirectly with COSMIC or TOP SECRET and SECRET NATO information be transmitted either in TYPEX with simplex settings provided by the British or in TYPEX with simplex settings of national production.

3. Upon acceptance by LSIB of the steps outlined in paragraph 2, to make the approach to the Portuguese MFA as indicated.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

(Comments on this approach)

It is recognized that to be effective, any approach to the Portuguese on this subject must shock them. This "shock" must be of such a nature that it will insure their compliance with the COSMIC security regulations regarding the use of the TYPEX, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The use of the foregoing approach and the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] contains two important

elements, a violation of the request by the President, Council Deputies not to transmit the information by electrical means, and the open statement of the Portuguese attitude on the use of the TYPEX.

Much NATO information received by Portugal has found its way into Spain because of their historical ties and close association, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it would be natural for the U.S. to want to

refer the violation to the Council Deputies. This threatened action would terrify the Portuguese and they would consent to almost anything to avoid such action.

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[REDACTED] and also provides
an excellent opportunity to indoctrinate the Portuguese at the highest
level in the actual security of the TYPEX.

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