Members of NSA Classification Advisory Panel

FROM: AG

DATE: 8 Feb 54
Geo. E. Campbell,
60235/cmj

TO: Members of NSA Classification Advisory Panel

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Geo. E. Campbell,
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1. Attached are summary minutes of meeting of NSA Classification Advisory Panel meeting held at 0830, Friday, 29 January 1954, in Room 19-232B.

2. Declassified when inclosure is removed.

GEO. E. CAMPBELL
Colonel, AGC

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-13-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526.
2 February 1954

MINUTES OF NSA CLASSIFICATION ADVISORY PANEL MEETING - 29 JANUARY 1954

1. The second meeting of the NSA Classification Advisory Panel was called to order by Col. George E. Campbell, Adjutant General, at 0830, 29 January 1954, in Room 19-232B. The following were present:

Mr. W. F. Friedman S/ASST
Col. Geo. E. Campbell AG
Mr. D. D. Croskery C/SEC
Dr. A. Sinkov PROD
Mr. F. E. Densmore PROD
Maj. W. R. Carson P/P
Mr. S. W. Reynolds SEC
Maj. W. T. Connor SEC
Mr. L. D. Callimahas TNG

2. Col. Campbell noted that inquiries have been received from various contractors in regard to declassifying wartime contracts for electronic computing machine developments. It was agreed that if there is definite proof that these contracts are for the identical equipments that are now unclassified and which are negotiated for as unclassified there is no reason why the old contracts should not be declassified at this time.

3. The draft of proposed guide lines for use by originators in determining the classification of materials was presented for discussion and the revision is attached as Inclosure 1.

4. Additional suggestions made in connection with the paper were that:

a. The final draft be forwarded to USCIB for consideration and the first section having to do with Top Secret Codeword classification be examined by the Security Committee, also specific clarification be requested in regard to making code words unclassified when they are not used in their codeword sense.

b. Paragraph 2 under Top Secret Codeword, as revised (A cryptanalytic process which is indicative of specific success on a particular foreign system), is unnecessary if the paper is accepted as an over-all guide. Dr. Sinkov stated that PROD considered the original statement (Cryptanalytic and other processes peculiar to the production of Special Intelligence: success, progress, process) much too broad and that the question is incapable of being spelled out. He noted the need for stressing the interrelationships between the crypto processes in discussing COMINT successes on foreign communications.

c. Reference to USCIB and LSIB be deleted where portions of the UK/US Agreement (B, USA) are extracted to elaborate upon certain points in the guide lines and that the paper be an NSA document.
d. In the final paper, particularly on the Top Secret and Confidential sections, the classification guides as promulgated by the Secretary of Defense be set forth.

5. Col. Campbell asked the Panel members to consider whether information stating that NSA is in the COMINT field and in the COMSEC field can be made public.

6. Inclosure 2 is a list of questions relating to problems of classification which has been submitted by PROD.

7. It was agreed that Inclosure 1 and 2 be considered at the next Panel meeting to be held at 0830, Friday, 5 February, in Room 19-232.

8. The meeting adjourned at 1130.

2 Incles
a/s

SECRET
TOP SECRET CODEWORD

1. A cryptanalytic process which is indicative of specific success on a particular foreign system.

2. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading. Exceptions would be listed separately.

3. Traffic Intelligence involving such combination ("fusion") of separate Traffic Intelligence or other Secret Codeword sources as produces information whose value is so great that security of content becomes the overriding consideration.

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*This paragraph is unnecessary if the paper is to serve as the over-all guide.

**Mr. Callihamo will clarify definition of phrase "separate codeword".
1. The detailed mission of a COMINT agency or a major component thereof.

2. The existence of peace-time collaboration in COMINT matters between US agencies and Australia and Canada.

3. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of high-grade enemy cryptosystems during World War II, provided the reference cannot lead to inferences as to the specific systems involved.

4. Codewords applicable to Special Intelligence and Special Weather Intelligence.

5. Disclosures of the details of cryptanalysis of specific low-grade enemy military cryptosystems during and after World War II.

6. COMINT end product, except such as by mutual agreement with GCHQ is Secret Codeword, is Top Secret.

SECRET CODEWORD

1. Traffic Intelligence (including freely available privacy and brevity systems such as commercial codes) except where specifically assigned to other categories:

   a. Traffic analysis processes, except elementary principles.

   b. Summaries, etc., based on Traffic Intelligence.
SECRET CODEWORD (CONTINUED)

except as noted in paragraphs 4 and 5 under Top Secret Codeword.

3. Special Intelligence specifically assigned on the basis of crypto-systems by USCI.


SECRET

*1. Standing operating procedures and instruction manuals governing the respective COMINT organizations (except instructions to processing activities governing their processing in detail and the handling and security of their final products).

**2. Intercept assignments.

3. Detailed intercept and D/F plans and over-all operational effectiveness of intercept and D/F organization as a whole.

4. General reference to the fact of cryptanalytic success against low-grade enemy military crypto-systems during World War II and the Korean conflict, without any detailed description of the cryptanalytic methods used.

*Requires clarification and elaboration. Some SOP's are higher or lower classification. This might be suppressed, and merely list subject matter of such SOP's under appropriate category.

**Cannot reconcile this with SECRET inasmuch as Texta (paragraph 4, under Secret Codeword) is an integral part of intercept assignments and is classified Secret Codeword.
SECRET

Revised: 1 Feb. 54

SECRET (CONTINUED)

5. Details of traffic analysis (not involving high-grade callsign decryption) as applied to enemy communications during World War II.

6. Description of equipment peculiar to intercept stations.

7. The broad outlines of Traffic Analysis processes.

8. Reference to cryptanalysis as a source of intelligence, but excluding details of processes.

9. The listing of US Service operated intercept stations designated either by geographical locations, or by numerical designation (2 or more).

10. Existence of peacetime collaboration between the US and UK (GCHQ) in the COMINT field.

11. All personnel reports, civilian and/or military, which indicate authorized and/or actual strength by job designation or by organizational element title where such designation or organizational element title would indicate details of the cryptologic mission.

12. Codeword applicable to Traffic Intelligence.

13. Current instructions for forwarding processed RU traffic.

14. Information relating to an entire system of cryptological (R/D) equipment.

15. Cryptanalytic short titles involving two or more.

* This seems to include "Elementary principles of T/A" listed under Restricted in REG SM II, as well as "intercept, D/F... as source of intelligence" under Confidential.

** Do we hope to conceal fact that cryptanalysis is a source of intelligence? This is at least unrealistic.

*** Note that numerical designation appears on Confidential raw traffic.
CONFIDENTIAL

1. Association of broad COMINT functions with specific activities and organizations by name (except as provided under "non-classified" below).

2. Charts and descriptions of the organization of NSA and service cryptologic agencies.

3. Individual intercept and D/F station products and statements of operational effectiveness.

4. Association of specific phases of COMINT activity with types of units.

5. Intercepted raw traffic that shows no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes.

6. Reference, in general terms, to intercept, D/F, RFP, and MOA as sources of intelligence.

7. Administrative records of indoctrination and execution of security oaths.

8. Cover names assigned to various sources of traffic, when used out of context.

9. NSA's possession of or interest in RAM equipment.

10. The terms "United States Communications Intelligence Board" and "U. S. Communications Security Board" (abbreviations "USCIB" and "USCSB") are unclassified.

* Requires clarification.

** Should this be classified?

*** This should not be classified.
11. Traffic Intelligence relating to D/F mission assignments, bearing reports and fix reports (i.e., target frequencies, call-signs, "piped signals," other signal information, bearings and fixes), provided that no complex changing call-sign systems are included.

12. Plain-text tactical or operational traffic provided that no interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems, enciphered map references, or results of advanced traffic analysis are included. This material shall include local procedural and local grid and zone systems used for artillery direction, tactical control and movement of frontline units, early warning and exercise of tactical combat control of aircraft.

13. Traffic Intelligence or Special Intelligence from analysis of radar tracking reports and visual observation reports as found in tactical or operational traffic, provided that enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems are not included. Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local procedural codes used for brevity and plain text interspersed with cover words is permissible.

14. Special Intelligence from Naval tactical maneuvering codes, when used as such, and from jargon codes.

15. COMINT concerning weather which is derived from this category source includes only that COMINT described in paragraphs 12 and 13 above.

16. All personnel reports, civilian and/or military, which indicate authorized and/or actual agency strength in total, by organizational
element, short title or symbol, by primary program element, or by function.

17. Special purpose features of and extent of effort with computers.

18. Information relating to individual parts of cryptological equipment (R/D) may be in this classification.

19. The terms "task dollar amounts", "funding programs", and "total year amounts" (R/D).

20. Terms "key study (when not related to specific systems), wired wheel machine, Hagelin machine, isolog, stereolog, depth search, ABNER program, ATLAS program, ENIGMA machine, key generator, intercept traffic".

21. Table of Allowances of an operating office.

22. Rosters, telephone lists, etc., which show names of all employees of an office together with their phone number, room number, location, and assignment.

23. Reference to the term "special code word" in connection with cryptologic activities.

24. Detailed references to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against specific military cryptosystems used by foreign powers between 11 November 1918 and 7 December 1941.

25. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of the diplomatic cryptosystems used by foreign powers between 11 November 1918 and 7 December 1941.

26. The fact that NSA performs security analysis and evaluation of U.S. cryptosystems and classified communications transmitted by electrical means.
CONFIDENTIAL (Continued)

27. The fact that NSA produces cryptographic keying materials including rotors, key lists, one-time tapes, one-time pads, codes, discs and other broad categories of keying materials, and employs cryptographic key generating equipment to produce this material.

28. US collaboration with UK and Canada on COMSEC matters.

29. Holding of annual conference to discuss UK/US COMSEC matters.

30. US use of UK produced crypto equipments and UK use of US produced crypto equipments.

31. Production of cryptomaterial for

32. The fact that NSA is assigned

33. Diagrams and descriptions of COMINT and COMSEC communication networks or related communication plans including cryptographic arrangements except where higher classification is justified by the listing of sensitive intercept stations.

34. Consolidated listings and records of cryptomaterials and crypto holdings by short title.

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Non-specific or hypothetical references to Communication Intelligence without any association of that function with specific activities and organizations other than the National Security Agency as a whole and
service cryptologic agencies as a whole, and association of NSA with the latter.

2. Elementary principles of traffic analysis, military cryptanalysis and cryptography, in production of instructional material and language training material used at NSA School.

3. All compilations and materials in the public domain used at NSA. Only information which would indicate use for classified purposes should be classified.

4. Identification with NSA of NSA authors of technical papers on matters already in the public domain.

5. Cover names assigned to "Rapid Analytic Machinery" (RAM) when used out of context.

6. The terms NSA Field Activity Far East (NSAFE), NSA Field Activity Europe (NSAEUR), NSAAU and NSAUK. If all are listed together, should be classified Secret.

7. Civil Service Job Titles and NSA "Classification Standards Manual".

8. Existence of and individual employees interest in computers, except as noted under Confidential.

9. Specific components of equipment under research, if use of component is not revealed. (R/D)

10. Mention of interest in computer type circuits, if no indication made of type of systems in which they are to be used.

11. Report of inspection trip to uncleared company that is a prospective contractor, if no mention is made of actual applications of components.

* Decision requested by Colonel Brown on this point.
UNCLASSIFIED (Continued)

12. Association of NSA with cryptography, COMSEC, Friedman, Hagelin, Hebern, keys, rotors, etc.

*13. Short titles (R/D)

14. Communications giving a person's security clearance as "cryptologic", "cryptographic".

15. Project number and titles used in justification for purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified.

16. The terms NSA-PWPU (LANT) and NSA-FWPU (PAC).

17. Detailed reference to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against World War I military cryptosystems.

18. References to intelligence derived from cryptosystems in which successful cryptanalysis has already been revealed by official U.S. action (e.g., the Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack).

19. Any reference to intelligence or cryptanalytic success against operational cryptosystems as disclosed by foreign publications appearing in the public domain. These references must be accompanied by the source and be without further elaboration or amplification.

20. The fact that NSA procures and produces crypto equipments and spare parts.

21. Accounting reports and correspondence referring to only one or a few isolated items by short title.

* Requires elaboration.
The following questions have been submitted by PROD personnel as being representative of their problems in classification:

a. At such times as a change in codewords occur, is any overlap permitted - does material initiated the last day of one period to be signed the first day of the new period bear the old or new codeword stamp? Is it possible to continue working on a problem and predato it and therefore have it classified with the old codeword even though several days have elapsed into the new period? Is there any bar to sending material containing both the old and new codewords in the same package through authorized channels?

b. When reference is made to a phrase such as "TOP SECRET (WORD)" and is otherwise unclassified should the document be classified TOP SECRET (WORD), TOP SECRET or is some other lower classification permitted? What is the procedure for classifying material that contains a combination of classified information such as SECRET (WORD) and plain TOP SECRET? Is the phrase TOP SECRET (WORD) permitted or does one use solely the classification TOP SECRET or add the TOP SECRET CODEWORD? Does the presence of an individual page among several pages within a document of CODEWORD material necessitate the application of a CODEWORD to all pages or only the page required? Is not undue emphasis being placed upon the cover sheet bearing the legend that the material contained therein is of CODEWORD level? Should not some requirement be established that the notation of the existence of CODEWORD material be included on the cover and the first three or four pages of any given document?

c. Current practices result in documents containing CODEWORD information being reproduced on CODEWORD paper. Is it possible to extract information from these documents, and, determining that the extract is not of CODEWORD sensitivity, to reproduce it at some other classification level? The present proposed revision to Appendix B in the BRUSA Agreement provides for the downgrading of CODEWORD information from Categories III through II to I. Will obliteration of the old CODEWORD classification be sufficient or will it have to be removed from each individual page? Does the utilization of the weather CODEWORD prevent inclusion of information falling in other CODEWORD categories?

d. Current instructions require that codeword material not be disseminated unless the recipient has been properly indoctrinated. How does an individual determine the status of indoctrination of another without disclosure of information, that
individual should not otherwise have? In the transmission of CODEWORD material is it sufficient to mark the package "TO BE OPENED ONLY BY" (the name of the individual) or should the title be used?

e. It has been noted that the Army Security Agency is now using the procedure of stamping the phrase "THIS PACKAGE CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL" on the inner wrapping of the package. This instruction seems to be contrary to existing NSA regulations.

f. One occasionally still sees the expression US EYES ONLY. Is this phrase legal or has it been supplanted by US OFFICIALS ONLY? What procedures should be used in handling paper so marked? It has been noted that such documents are left in working areas where personnel from authorized foreign support groups are permitted to enter.

g. Intercept assignments going out from NSA to the field are classified SECRET CODEWORD, although they contain only case numbers and supporting notations. Similar information coming in from the field stations is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

h. Language training material utilized by the NSA School contains no classification but does give a direct tie-in to the language areas of interest to NSA. Information prepared by the school is held to RESTRICTED levels although if similar documents were PROD produced they would carry a much higher classification.

i. Current instructions for forwarding processed RU traffic are SECRET. Considering the sensitivity of the information contained therein should they not be given a CODEWORD classification?

j. The NSA "Schedule A Classification Standards Manual" is unclassified but refers to CA and TA in connection with certain technical skills which would indicate the need of classification.

k. Should not the NSA-GCHQ relationship be reviewed in lieu of recent British relaxations on security of that organization? We ship all material for them to SUSLO who in turn distributes it to GCHQ. Since the British have announced the existence of GCHQ at Cheltenham, the tieup between SUSLO and GCHQ can not be maintained at a highly classified level. Therefore, either sufficient protection of our relationship with GCHQ is not being maintained or the entire matter should be down graded.
m. IBM and RAM runs are given general classifications (e.g., TOP SECRET COWARD) rather than classifying them according to content. Certain runs containing preliminary stages of Cipher System Solutions which do not reveal either source or purpose could be given a lower classification. Should runs which are stapled by ACCO fasteners be considered as bound volumes with only cover classification or should each page be classified?

n. Runs have been made from unclassified material such as backward dictionaries of foreign languages which have a significance in the work within PROD. Should these not be classified?

o. Although the new proposed revision of the security manual stipulates that certain categories of listed materials within secure operational areas need not be classified, nothing official has ever been promulgated within PROD. This exception is not clearly understood in that material within any given working area is subject to coordination which requires interchange of information between two or more working areas. Is it to be firmly understood that a paper must be classified before it is removed from a given working area or can a looser interpretation be given wherein it will be understood that material need only be classified prior to its official publication or when material is to be removed from the confines of Production altogether? Should this same exception be applied to material used for reproduction such as mimoographed, multilith stencils, etc.?

p. There seems to be an arbitrary reasoning that once material is extracted from a given classified source, that extracted material will retain its original classification and, if inserted into other material, will no affect that new material. Thus, in certain alphabetical compilations of surnames, geophysical names, etc., the intermittent sprinkling of information which was derived from certain CANDT sources upgrades the lower compilation to the highest named category. The mere presence in a given title can in no way be attributed to its former source and, therefore, should it not be permitted that the new publication or compilation be classified at a lower category?

q. When a panel, working on a given highly sensitive problem, requests information of unclassified nature from numerous sources (e.g., Library, etc.) should the fact that this panel is requesting the information be classified or should the request be considered on the basis of its face value only? This Agency has within its collateral sources numerous publications which are unclassified (e.g. Moscow Telephone Director, Handbook of International Organizations, etc.) which in themselves mean nothing, but their presence in the agency can be indicative of the direction of agency interest. Should the existence of these documents within PROD be classified and/or should the documents themselves be classified?
r. Short titles which have been used to designate geographical areas of interest as well as specific countries are supposed to be non-informative in nature. It is quite easy however, to piece together the breakdown of this table in consideration of the segments of short titles used for certain countries such as RU for Russian. Either these titles should be classified commensurate with this information or the digraphs should be random selected.

s. In accordance with current regulations, BRUSA short titles are to be classified TOP SECRET which supposedly includes receipts for BRUSA publications. In consideration of the terrific volume of TOP SECRET material in this Agency, it is proposed that the short titles be downgraded to SECRET.

t. Existing regulations require that information received from other governmental sources will be given the same classification as prescribed by the originator. However, NSA security interpretations may often require a higher classification, or in some instances a lower classification - is it necessary to go back to the originator of the publication to secure his approval for a change in classification?

u. What is the over-all and specific classification of PROD organizational components?

v. What is the classification of an item linking NSA with the field of COMINT? According to the BRUSA agreement it would seem to be T/S CODEWORD.

w. What is the classification of the relation existing between NSA and the consumer activities, the service cryptological agencies, and other field activities?

x. What is the criteria to be followed in determining the classification of a document referring to other highly sensitive documents - what will determine whether or not information is being imparted by the reference.

y. When we use the CODEWORD to protect a source, is it to be construed as only referring to a COMINT source or may we consider other highly sensitive intelligence sources to be similarly protected.