TRANSCRIPT OF NSA CLASSIFICATION ADVISORY PANEL MEETING

29 JANUARY 1954
Col. Campbell called the meeting to order.

MR. CROSSKERN: I have a number of revisions, but I don't have them on paper. You can read them off. We are typing them up. It means adding CONSEC in a few places. I hoped to have ours out so that you could all see them.

COL. CAMPBELL: We have a series of questions from PROD which can be added after we make our determination on these things, because the determination of these things might answer some of PROD's questions. PROD has come up with a series of questions which are common everyday questions. I think we can answer them quite readily with this after we have gone through the other material.

Shall we proceed? Mr. Friedman isn't in yet.

As you know, we had contracts with IBM for computers during the war.

DR. SINKOV: I wasn't here during the war.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: That is for equipment over in Capt. Goodwin's shop which was specially developed. Now the contracts on those are unclassified, on the IBM equipment.

DR. SINKOV: If I understand correctly, these equipments were developed and later on IBM standardized on them and put them into commercial items. Some of the joint research which we were doing with IBM has actually been used by IBM to improve its own product. There are some of the items in 80 which were specially built out of IBM components and which have no use anywhere outside the Agency.

I don't think you could make any general statement to cover all these special items.

COL. CAMPBELL: The contracts now are unclassified. Some of the old contracts went back to 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1949. They want to downgrade them to unclassified. The present contract is unclassified.

DR. SINKOV: We would have to examine cases like those on their merits individually and make a decision on each one. I don't think I could make any general decision. I would attempt to say that a great majority of those items have no requirement for classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: They don't currently. The present contracts for the same equipment now are unclassified.

DR. SINKOV: There is no reason for failing to declassify the old contracts?

COL. CAMPBELL: No.
Jr. Sinkov: Why worry at all about the old contracts?

Col. Campbell: The firm still has the old contracts. They have to treat them as classified. IBM wants to knock them out.

Dr. Sinkov: I think IBM has come down on numerous occasions. They are very careful to adhere to all the requirements of classification that are put upon them. They are realistic enough to realize that on certain occasions some of these things need re-examination.

Col. Campbell: The contracts are the old contracts for equipment that are now unclassified. Their status is unclassified. They are for the same equipments that were classified back in 1946, 1947, 1948, or 1949. There should be no objection to our declassifying those old contracts at this time.

Dr. Sinkov: It would be a very strange kind of objection. I don't see how such a thing could happen. I quite agree with you.

Col. Campbell: In that case I don't see why the Panel wants to go through these papers. If there is any definite proof that these contracts are for the identical same equipments that are now unclassified and are negotiated for on an unclassified basis, there is no reason why the old contracts should not be declassified at this time.

Dr. Sinkov: I certainly agree with that.

Mr. Reynolds: We should get back to the definitions in Executive Order 10501. Occasionally there are conflicts with the definitions as set forth therein.

Col. Campbell: What Dr. Sinkov wants to make certain of is that over that period of years there isn't something in there which is not now in the new contract, where a piece of the equipment referred to is still classified. It might have been taken out of that setup and the machine modified and the old piece of gear might still be highly classified.

Dr. Sinkov: Even though we can demonstrate that it would still in the true sense of the word be an old contract, it might include some information which caused its classification the first time. If that has been omitted, it might result in a difference, but I am sure this kind of examination could very likely be made to determine whether the present contract and the past contract have any essential differences. Questions have been raised by IBM itself.

Col. Campbell: These were for electronic components and machine services. The fact that we were even in the business or even used that type of equipment was not to be known. Now we are using it and everyone knows it. They are coming up now with the old question of whether or not the fact that we have computers should be classified. That was the basis on which these things were classified, that we didn't want people to know that we were using mechanisms of computer machines.
DR. SINKOV: That point of view may have been valid at one time but it certainly is not valid now.

COL. CAMPBELL: That was the basis of the classification of these papers.

DR. SINKOV: That was the sole basis.

COL. CAMPBELL: The fact that we even use mechanical computers was classified.

DR. SINKOV: It is taken for granted now-a-days in any business that does more than $10,000 worth of business a year they are going to have some kind of automatic office equipment for statistical purposes. That means either IBM or Remington Rand and that fact is known.

Mr. Friedman entered the meeting at 0845.

COL. CAMPBELL: We have passed out the paper to everybody. Do you want to carry on from there?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I would rather somebody else did.

COL. CAMPBELL: I thought the best way to attack this was to go down the list starting with the highest classification and to proceed through the items and get agreement on them. You will notice that we have put notes on some of them. Is there anyone who objects to that procedure?

MR. REYNOLDS: It is a good procedure.

COL. CAMPBELL: The first one is the Top Secret Codeword, Special Intelligence Product. I think that needs a little further amplification. Am I correct or not?

DR. SINKOV: It is a question of the term. The term "Special Intelligence" is the term that was used in the early editions of the BRUSA Agreement. That term has since been changed. We very seldom now talk about Special Intelligence. Now we talk about COMINT end product. I think it is just a matter of clarifying the term. I personally prefer COMINT end product.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Crypto intelligence is in the BRUSA Agreement. I don't think it has been confirmed yet, has it? Legally speaking until that new agreement is ratified by the two Boards this is still the word.

COL. CAMPBELL: You are talking about this paper.

DR. SINKOV: This was discussed last March at the Planning Conference.

COL. CAMPBELL: There has not been final action on those yet, on the papers coming out of the Planning Conference last spring.

DR. SINKOV: This is only for guidance.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Put it in parentheses.
DR. SINKOV: Use words that our people are familiar with. "Special crypto" is a phrase we seldom use.

MR. FRIEDMAN: There are only a few people in the whole organization who know that.

DR. SINKOV: There is one additional point about this that I think should be made. It isn't true that all COMINT end product, all Special Intelligence product is Top Secret. We have by agreement with the UK an arrangement whereby certain specially listed systems mutually agreed on can be downgraded to Secret, so that a blanket statement that COMINT end product is Top Secret Codeword is not by itself an accurate statement.

MR. REYNOLDS: Aren't you a lot safer in wording it to arrive at some sort of guide here, to make a comment to the effect that COMINT end product, except as specified by agreement will be lower, but as a rule it will be Top Secret?

COL. CAMPBELL: A piece of intelligence product would not be codeword if it did not reveal your source of information.

DR. SINKOV: It is Special Intelligence in the meaning of those words as defined in the BRUSA Agreement, in the COMINT end product.

COL. CAMPBELL: Would "COMINT end product" be the better words to use here?

DR. SINKOV: I think so. Not all COMINT end product is Top Secret Codeword.

MR. FRIEDMAN: As to Special Intelligence product that is Top Secret Codeword. That according to the current agreement is the top most level of COMINT product.

DR. SINKOV: The agreement includes the fact that the two centers can and do by regular agreement maintain a list of specially selected systems.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Are you sure that one is ratified?

DR. SINKOV: We bring the list up to date every month.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Then this has to be changed.

DR. SINKOV: Along the lines that you have all indicated what I think we are required to say is: COMINT end product, except such as by mutual agreement with GCHQ is Secret Codeword, is Top Secret. It is all Top Secret unless it has been specially listed and by mutual agreement we have agreed that it will be Secret.

COL. CAMPBELL: When we get down under Secret Codeword we try to identify those areas.

DR. SINKOV: Special lists are kept of those exceptions.

COL. CAMPBELL: Where in NSA?
DR. SINKOV: In 06.

MR. FRIEDMAN: This subject is one which would be of considerable interest to the Security Committee of USCIB. Did you ask Mr. Douglas about it? This thing that we are going to talk about on the whole first page would be of interest, would have to be examined by the Security Committee.

DR. SINKOV: Appendix B of the UK/US Agreement deals with many COMINT subjects.

COL. CAMPBELL: We are going to submit this paper to USCIB. The Director has agreed on that.

No. 2?

DR. SINKOV: No. 2 is much too broad a statement, to say that all cryptanalytic and other processes peculiar to the production of Special Intelligence are Top Secret Codeword. Making a frequency count on the number of letters in a message is a cryptanalytic process which is peculiar to the production of COMINT. We can read about that in the magazine section of the Sunday newspaper.

COL. CAMPBELL: When you say cryptanalytic you might be talking about revealing the success or progress of the process. You are taking out "processing", aren't you?

DR. SINKOV: We might be talking about the process itself. There are many processes which by themselves do not justify a high classification or for that matter don't justify any classification. I agree that if it indicates success, certainly it is Top Secret Codeword, but the statement is much too broad.

COL. CAMPBELL: You want to take a, off entirely and add "which indicates success" to No. 2. Progress might not necessarily be cryptanalytic. It might not necessarily be Top Secret Codeword.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I would quarrel with the grammar: Cryptanalytic and other processes peculiar to the production of Special Intelligence which reveal success. That doesn't make too much sense.

DR. SINKOV: The point has been made. I am not sure whether this is the exact wording for the sentence. Should we take up the editorial phases at this time or just the classification? I am not sure that we need this in the first place.

DR. SINKOV: A cryptanalytic process which is indicative of specific success requires the classification of Top Secret Codeword.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: Specific success.

MR. FRIEDMAN: You will have to put that in.
COL. CAMPBELL: How about crypto systems used by other nations?

MR. FRIEDMAN: What we are trying to do is to cover cases where let us say Lower Slovenia uses PLAYFAIR and we are successful in handling the thing. It may be that every day the thing changes, so that the information in itself is not highly classified but the fact that Lower Slovenia is using PLAYFAIR and we are solving it would be what we want to protect.

DR. SINKOV: This in a sense is a general guide to the people in the matter of classification. What we are trying to do is to give them some guidance to answer questions. Reference to cryptanalytic processes requires Top Secret Codeword classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: This is a combination of yours.

DR. SINKOV: We have to rely on peoples' judgment. In stating guides we are not going to be able to spell out every consideration we have to introduce. These are the main principles. I think the essential principle is that any cryptanalytic process which permits us to solve communications of other nations must be classified Top Secret.

MR. FRIEDMAN: You are going backward again. Maybe we ought to have a copy of the BRUSA Agreement and look at the definitions they give there because they talk about high grade, low grade, etc. That is what we will have to use in here.

Here we have Category III. It is that COMINT for which the protection of source or content is the overriding consideration and which must, therefore, be given the highest degree of security protection. In general, it will include: Crypt Intelligence except that specifically included in other Categories, Special Weather Intelligence, Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security gradings as specified and mutually agreed by USGIB and LSIB, and other Traffic Intelligence as specified and mutually agreed by USGIB and LSIB.

DR. SINKOV: We have the problem of reading Slovenian PLAYTEX. It permits the downgrading to Secret Codeword of those low grade systems which are used tactically and those which are operational in character. In order to avoid the problems incident upon us, you list Top Secret Codeword information in the forward area. That is what the special list is all about. It takes care of the low grade systems, PLAYFAIR and all of those.

COL. CAMPBELL: How about the training aspects of these things?

DR. SINKOV: To try to spell out the second point in such a way that it will be perfectly clear what you mean is going to be extremely difficult. The whole problem is so broad. You have cryptanalytic processes which are applicable to the method of solution. By virtue of the fact that they
are very widely known, they can't be classified very high on their own merits.

MR. REYNOLDS: What we have to include in here I think is what the Director has said we should protect and that is what we are able to read and how we are able to read it.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is what I got from Mr. Friedman's remarks. The system itself is not so important as the fact that we are able to take foreign communications in that system and read them from day to day. That is what he is trying to protect.

DR. SINKOV: What we are trying to protect is the way we can read them and how we can read them. That isn't an over-simplification. Suppose we are now talking about one of the techniques along the line. This technique by itself might be something very elementary. You would have to realize that we don't always talk about things in complete form.

MR. REYNOLDS: There is the fact that you are able to read a particular system.

DR. SINKOV: You are discussing cryptanalytic processes.

COL. CAMPBELL: Could we qualify No. 2 by adding to it: Cryptanalytic processes which will enable us to read certain foreign systems? However, the teaching of that process by itself without connecting it to intelligence would bear a lower classification. That is what you are trying to do. You want to be able to teach some of the stuff at much lower level than you would if you turn around and use the same system with intelligence tacked on to it.

DR. SINKOV: Let me focus on the point of view that you are bringing to it. I look at this guide that we are drawing up as a document which the people throughout the Agency will have available to them. We might be writing about how we made a digraph or frequency distribution to enable us to solve some important systems. All we might be writing about would be the digraphs and frequency distribution. Then we pick up the guide and it says that cryptanalytic and other processes peculiar to the production of Special Intelligence have to be Top Secret Codeword. Then we use that guide and proceed to classify the description of how to make the digraph or frequency distribution Top Secret Codeword. That is not right.

That classification is entirely inappropriate for the particular item. The basic principle of classification is that a piece of paper has to be classified on its own merits. The mere fact that this procedure happens to be used in connection with a cryptanalytic solution doesn't affect the classification. We might have other factors which we would have to take into account.

COL. CAMPBELL: It might be Top Secret or even Top Secret Codeword depending on its specific application.

DR. SINKOV: I have one comment from the people in 06 which says, "We consider this much too broad and the question is incapable of being spelled
out. That is the very broad view of it. You can see what kind of concern they have. In talking about cryptanalytic processes, you have to have some kind of a definition of when and why it needs to be Top Secret.

MR. CROSKEY: How about adding: Which indicates success on a particular foreign system? Then everything else would be taken care of.

COL. CAMPBELL: The technique in itself need not be Codeword. The technique could be Codeword or it could have its own specific application.

MR. FRIEDMAN: What is wrong with what the book says now? Assign it to a COMINT category.

COL. CAMPBELL: No. 4 takes some of those up. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading.

DR. SINKOV: The way the book has it now, there is nothing wrong with the statement of principle with respect to classification of COMINT end product. What we are trying to do here is to see it put in a brief set of rules for the people throughout the Agency to guide them. Unfortunately this happens to be a subject that doesn't easily lend itself to abbreviation. We could take the context of Appendix B. There wouldn't be any problem.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I didn't read that. I am looking at it now. Assignment of COMINT to categories: In assigning COMINT to a category, the following general criteria will be considered: The intelligence value of its content; the difficulty of solution or intercept to include: Sensitivity of techniques employed in solution and exploitation; Sensitivity of source of intercept; Inter-relationships between cryptographic systems.

DR. SINKOV: All those things come in to this, you see.

MR. FRIEDMAN: In trying to abbreviate here we are getting ourselves into difficulty.

COL. CAMPBELL: I think we are doing more than abbreviating. I think we are trying to elaborate on some of those things which are rather broad in themselves. I thought we were trying to elaborate rather than to abbreviate.

MR. FRIEDMAN: So far I don't find the elaboration. We might do it by way of footnotes.

COL. CAMPBELL: We did that. These are the things that were submitted by other people, the things which were submitted in the past three months. We have added a few footnotes where we thought in itself it wasn't quite clear. I think the ones we are talking about came right out of PROC No. 2 did.

MR. DENSMORE: We didn't submit anything like that. Our proposal was to consider the question of whether we were going to be able to come up with
any concrete guide lines. We wound up by saying we didn't think we could.

DR. SINKOV: We in 06 have considered the whole subject of classification so difficult that we have talked about appointing within the office a special individual to handle it.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: Cryptanalytic and other processes peculiar to the production of Special Intelligence.

MR. DENSMORE: That is out of the Security Manual. It is not our information. We used it as a point of reference upon which we made our comments.

COL. CAMPBELL: What the Security Manual has now is causing us more trouble than if we took it out. We would be better off most likely. What is wrong with the way you put it?

DR. SINKOV: I think it could be put in a form which might be satisfactory so long as you stress the interrelationship between the cryptanalytic processes in your discussion on COMINT successes. Failing that, if that interrelationship isn't indicated, then you have a very difficult problem of classification.

MR. REYNOLDS: It would not be codeword necessarily. Still it would have to fit the definition of classification which has been promulgated. Some of it might well be unclassified. Some of it might be Confidential and some of it might be Top Secret.

DR. SINKOV: There are general principles that we have to apply to everything we do. The point of this paper is that it is intended as a guide over and above the general guides for classification which is to assist the people in NSA in being able to determine when a piece of paper needs classification and what classification.

DR. SINKOV: I am ready to say that if we include the thought that the cryptanalytic process that is being discussed must be discussed in connection with its product's success on foreign communications, then we are in the codeword field. Unless you insert that, it is very difficult.

COL. CAMPBELL: Will you buy that, Bill?

MR. FRIEDMAN: No, I am sorry. I have been looking at this thing while he was talking. I confess again that I don't know why we need this. We are getting ourselves in hot water. People have been troubled by this thing for a long time. Every word in the thing has been carefully weighed. I start right off with the very first paragraph, Special Intelligence product. Then I find myself in hot water right off because it says here that it is Top Secret Codeword. Special Intelligence product, when we read that we find that there are two categories of COMINT which require codeword protection. What we are doing is attempting to duplicate what is in here.
Let this stand as the authorized Holy Bible and wherever we think we have to spell it out a little more in detail, we can. Let's say, for example, that if we adopt this, we don't need paragraph 1. We don't need paragraph 2. As for paragraph 3, I wonder about RUPRD standing alone.

DR. SINKOV: I would like to toss the thought in that cryptanalytic short titles by themselves have to be Top Secret Codeword.

MR. FRIEDMAN: It says two or more.

DR. SINKOV: The whole difference is in the level between ourselves and OCHQ. What is codeword about RDAM?

COL. CAMPBELL: I can't buy that. I don't agree with this one either. When you add the words "two or more", when you have more than one system and you mention short titles, this came out of the book again. We said that it must mean when you have more than one and its association with a short title, when you take one thing by itself, it has no classification. When you are talking about the field activities, you talk about NSA, Europe, in the clear. When you say NSA, Far East, and NSA, Alaska, and you give the location, it has a classification because again we are showing the network. That is what we thought they meant here. The "two or more words" was added by me. These things here are not any one particular person's ideas. They are just what we have gathered up and we are throwing them in to you people to accept them or to knock them out. Nobody has any brief for any part that is in here.

DR. SINKOV: We recommend. I am speaking for a number of people in C6 and recommend that an adequate classification for cryptanalytic short titles is Secret.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: That is the way it stands now.

DR. SINKOV: I think that is the present rule.

COL. CAMPBELL: We will take it. Put that down as Secret.

MR. DENSMORE: How about the man at the working level?

COL. CAMPBELL: The General has maintained that short titles should be unclassified. The purpose of short titles is to permit you to be able to talk freely about something. The person has to have knowledge of the short title's meaning to know what you are talking about.

MR. CROSKERY: We could have a consolidated listing or something like that.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: RUFF doesn't mean anything. If you say that you are reading RUPRD, that means something else.

DR. SINKOV: The problem becomes involved in this sense. If you understand our system of cryptanalytic short titles and you see a long list, then you can begin to appreciate that we are going to have to distinguish between
Military. We can break down the communications into a number of distinct systems that we are having some success on. This might produce a very specific break, but it requires an understanding of a great deal about the systems. We have agreed in actual practice that Secret seems to provide all the protection you need.

MR. CROSKEY: One or more.

DR. SINKOV: Independently of. Where you have self-evident features, short titles with self-evident features, then I would recommend that they be completely unclassified. Where you have there is no reason for classifying it unless you write down the meaning of it.

COL. CAMPBELL: You want then to put down that Cryptanalytic short titles involving two or more is Secret?

MR. DENSMORE: Unless you can produce definitions down at the working level, you are not going to do our people much good.

DR. SINKOV: If we accept Appendix B as a guide for classification or certain parts of it, we can make the necessary arrangements for dissemination of that. That is our thought.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I don't know how one would classify extracts of this thing. Here is a Top Secret Codeword document and we want to take out the definitions on categories and that information. Wouldn't that mean that this guide would be classified Top Secret Codeword?

DR. SINKOV: We have to go back to the standard principle. The mere fact that you are extracting something from a document of a certain classification doesn't require that the extract be of the same classification. It has to be laid on on its own merits. This doesn't call for as high a classification as the original document.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is one of the questions that the people have asked.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I am just considering in my own mind what I would classify an extract like that. If it is classified Secret, it would be much easier to use than if it is classified Top Secret Codeword. What you want is a guide, something you can hand around.

COL. CAMPBELL: Right. What you want to do is take the guide out of the BRUSA Agreement and elaborate on some of the points which we are now bringing up. It could well be added to those parts. I would like to get your ideas on these things, what we will keep, what should be changed, and how we can add to them, to the over-all guide which BRUSA has laid down.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Wherever I would select something to quote, I would omit any reference to USGIB or ISI and make this a Director, NSA, document.

COL. CAMPBELL: If we do that, we can pick them out as our own. We might rephrase them a bit so that they don't sound like a lift out of the document. That would protect them.
MR. FRIEDMAN: That is a good way of doing it. You will note that Category III COMINT comes first. That is at the level you would expect.

DR. SINKOV: In the early days in the drafting of this paper Category I was the highest. For some reason it got rearranged.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I can tell you why it got rearranged. Let's suppose it was the other way around. The highest level is Category I. The lowest level is Category III. If the fellow is indoctrinated for Category III only, he says, "This is Category III. There must be two higher ones." We wanted to disguise the fact that there were other categories. We turned it around.

COL. CAMPBELL: He might say, "There must be more or why number it."

MR. CROSKERY: Seven is the highest Command and One is the lowest Command.

DR. SINKOV: At a later date we might get into even higher categories than we have now. If one was the highest, there wouldn't be room for a top one.

COL. CAMPBELL: We have knocked out No. 3. Whatever we do here today will be reconsolidated and sent to you for confirmation. We will attempt to do at that time what Mr. Friedman suggested, lift the things out of the BRUSA Agreement and tag on some of these things to them so that we may all have amplification of the general rules. Right? We will endeavor to reconsolidate this and send it out to you again. We will send the thing back for concurrence. If there is no disagreement, then we won't have to meet again and maybe we could wind it up that way. I know that that is very optimistic.

DR. SINKOV: Since we are making such slow progress, I don't want you to think that we are just trying to be contentious about the matter. The whole subject is a very difficult one. Because there is considerable concern in different directions, this is not going to be easily settled.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is one of the reasons why I wanted to have some guide line so that it would help everyone to do some thinking.

MR. CROSKERY: It is not all-inclusive.

COL. CAMPBELL: We got a request for orders the other day to send a man overseas to NSA, Europe. It was classified Top Secret Codeword. There was no codeword in it. The end result of his visit, for the TDY, will probably wind up in codeword. Your people over there stuck the code word on it.

DR. SINKOV: I would be the first person to say that there is a lot of over-classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: I don't think they do it willy-nilly. They are doing the best they know how to do. If there is anything we can do to help them, that is what we are trying to do.
COL. CAMPBELL: Can you accept No. 4?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Oh, sure.

DR. SINKOV: The Appendix gives some appreciation of what we mean by codes, ciphers, or high security grading. Here the phrase doesn't tell the story. Appendix B goes into the description of what kinds of codes and ciphers are made.

MR. FRIEDMAN: That was copied directly from here.

DR. SINKOV: In a good many cases you are going to have to depend on the good sense and judgment of the people who are putting the classification on these things.

COL. CAMPBELL: We could amplify "high security grading." Does that need amplification to understand what you mean by high security grading?

DR. SINKOV: It does, but I am not sure we want to go into that.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I was thinking about that being the place to add, after grading, a phrase something like this: As determined by the Chief of Classification, Office of Production. If you put one person in who has the authority to say, at least you will get some semblance of homogeneity about what is being done. If everybody has to use his own judgment, then you get all kinds of answers.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: Everybody has to classify things in the name of their Chief.

MR. CROSKERY: It is up to the originator.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I was thinking about this particular thing. Who can better define or specify that a certain system is of a certain classification?

DR. SINKOV: How about just the opposite approach just like the one we used on paragraph 1? Except for those which by specific examination have been given the lower classification, and these will have to be specifically indicated in a list somewhere.

MR. FRIEDMAN: They are all codes and ciphers. What is wrong with having somebody in 06 responsible for that particular?

DR. SINKOV: We have already asked Mr. Densmore, who is an authority on classification, to answer just such questions.

MR. CROSKERY: There are so many people involved in the business. Many of them should be qualified to determine what the classification should be rather than just one individual. I like the Doctor's reading of it.

DR. SINKOV: Is not No. 4 in very large measure contained within paragraph 1?
MR. CROSKERY: One is cryptanalysis and the other is traffic analysis.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Why not leave it as it is? Are we having a great deal of trouble with it now?

COL. CAMPBELL: No, I don't think so.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: Let's leave it. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs will be in the Top Secret Codeword level unless specified otherwise in separate lists. Then our people won't be in ignorance. If they don't know whether it is Top Secret Codeword, then they can go to the list.

DR. SINKOV: Just put an addition on No. 4 without any change of phrasing. We are talking about the fact that any exceptions would be listed separately, except those which are specifically listed as Top Secret.

MR. FRIEDMAN: To what does the word "those" refer?

DR. SINKOV: Except those codes or ciphers which are specifically listed as Secret Codeword.

COL. CAMPBELL: No. 5 reads: Traffic Intelligence involving such combination ("fusion") of separate Traffic Intelligence or other Secret Codeword sources as produces information whose value is so great that security of content becomes the overriding consideration.

DR. SINKOV: The reading out of Appendix B is highly acceptable.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes.

COL. CAMPBELL: No. 6.

DR. SINKOV: It seems to me that this plain language itself is classified Top Secret Codeword. That is really a contradiction. It doesn't begin to receive any higher classification than that until we have done something to it. We have to have it analyzed and evaluated.

MR. FRIEDMAN: That is treated in this document. Does anybody know the reference right off?

MR. CROSKERY: It isn't the actual plain text itself. It is the information.

COL. CAMPBELL: The process could result in Top Secret evaluation. It is not Top Secret Codeword.

DR. SINKOV: The reason for Codeword is this. Let us say that we have Russian Plain Text. We frequently come upon proforma abbreviations and other items of information, special technical terms whose meanings and identifications are to be made available as a result of COMINT.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: We have the fusion of Plain Text and COMINT.
MR. FRIEDMAN: This business of Russian Plain Text being rated Top Secret Codeword has arisen from the fact that pretty nearly all the information we have about Russia comes from that. It is in there somewhere. This wasn't lifted out.

DR. SINKOV: The statement needs some modification. We might have some kinds of raw traffic which are not Russian which in some instances don't get a classification of higher than Confidential. We have plain text on

COL. CAMPBELL: We have plain text in Category II.

DR. SINKOV: Russian Plain Text is all evaluated. In analyzed form it is classified Top Secret. The majority of it is.

If there are no other considerations, I think I must point out that the wording here needs modification. Plain text which is passed on and is of such high intelligence value or sensitivity as to require assignment to this classification, that is not correct. It is the Top Secret Codeword intelligence that is derived from the study and analysis of it.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, I think that is correct.

Here where it talks about Category III in paragraph 4.d. it says:

which is established under sub-

paragraph 5.b.(2) below. That is quite different.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is added in 6.a.

MR. FRIEDMAN: It seems to me that Category III is what we have in here. Why wasn't it lifted out intact?

COL. CAMPBELL: We could take a. off and add it right to the paragraph.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Plain-text which is passed on and is of such high intelligence value or sensitivity as to require assignment to this Category.

DR. SINKOV: Combine 6. and 6.a. into one statement.

MR. FRIEDMAN: How about paragraph 7? That is a lift out of here too.

DR. SINKOV: The revelation of success against unusual, sensitive or complex transmission procedures. If we are able to demodulate a number of high frequency transmissions that is Top Secret Codeword. I don't think so. That is a communications engineering problem, a straight communications engineering problem.

MR. CROSBY: It says "unusual and sensitive."
MR. FRIEDMAN: My quarrel is not with us but with the people who wrote it.

DR. SINKOV: Unusual, sensitive or complex transmission. Sensitive or complex, how do we define that? I would be very happy if you said "and".

MR. REYNOLDS: You can't touch that.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is going to be hard to live with.

DR. SINKOV: Transmission procedures, I would interpret that to mean that we have successfully intercepted what has been transmitted. That is very seldom deserving of Top Secret Codeword classification. When we are just able to intercept and analyze the signal, that very seldom is as high as Secret.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think they are thinking of complicated in answer to procedures.

DR. SINKOV: In normal procedural handling.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: Could it be successful traffic analysis?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I suppose so.

DR. SINKOV: There is no problem about the first half of the sentence. Those have the highest priority. The second part is the peculiar part. If we could rephrase the second half to include what I have given, then in effect we mean successful intercept of a complex transmission. That is not even a cryptographic problem, a cryptologic problem.

MR. FRIEDMAN: We either have to live with it and say nothing or we could make a recommendation to the Director that he refer this to the Board and the Board discuss it with LSIB with a view to modifying it.

DR. SINKOV: We would be putting the staff into the tough position of failing to appreciate what the right answer is. Suppose we talk of intercepting a Lower Slobovian facsimile transmission?

MR. REYNOLDS: It might be Top Secret. There is nothing about it that comes in the codeword category. I doubt if that would be Top Secret.

MR. FRIEDMAN: What is the classification that we give to information from the demultiplex, the most complicated one, the 9-channel?

DR. SINKOV: I am not sure that it has any classification. I think what we are doing now on the demultiplex doesn't have any classification because it isn't a cryptologic problem in any sense. It is a straight engineering problem.
MR. FRIEDMAN: There is nothing we can do about it here. We have to live with it.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: It could be referred.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Refer it to the Security Committee of USCID and let them struggle with it. How about paragraph 8?

DR. SINKOV: Let's back up just a moment. I wasn't quite clear. I don't know what the phrase at the end of paragraph 6 "designated by a separate codeword" means. I don't believe we have any such thing as a separate codeword in this connection.

MR. FRIEDMAN: That isn't quite what this says. Russian plain-text of this sort shall be assigned to the sub-category which is established under sub-paragraph 5.b.(2) below. Paragraph 5.b.(2) says:

(whats done here was to condense the thing).

DR. SINKOV: If we keep the phrase, one might make the decision that information which isn't designated by a separate codeword doesn't come under the general heading. There are other special codewords which apply to Russian plain-text.

MR. FRIEDMAN: There is another thing that you have to call attention to and which they haven't done.

DR. SINKOV: I am pleased that somebody was going to do something about it. The only special codeword that I know of is the one that we apply to Weather.

COL. CAMPBELL: If it is in the Top Secret category, there might be another codeword for it.

MR. FRIEDMAN: There is a possibility of having such a thing.

COL. CAMPBELL: On the question of designating it by a separate codeword, we could explore that and find out what the status is. We will put a question mark after "separate codeword" and look into it to find out what it is.

Next is Special Weather Intelligence. This is paragraph 8.

Next is plain Top Secret without the code word.

DR. SINKOV: The detailed mission of a COMINT organization could possibly be codeword depending on what is said.

COL. CAMPBELL: We have a note that this requires clarification and elaboration.
DR. SINKOV: You will use the method that we have already established? If we read all the messages which Lower Slobovia sends in, that is Codeword.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: It still might not be all-inclusive. You have broad outlines. The ASA Manual is at the Secret level.

COL. CAMPBELL: What about COMINT organization?

MR. CROSKERY: It is Top Secret Codeword.

DR. SINKOV: What do we mean by COMINT organization? Suppose it is just a small D/F team or an intercept team whose mission consists solely of taking bearings on intercept? That is not a COMINT organization. Who is to provide clarification and elaboration?

COL. CAMPBELL: We are.

DR. SINKOV: We will pass on to Point No. 2.

COL. CAMPBELL: We will arrange for elaboration. You brought out, somebody brought out, about small intercept stations. If we are writing the mission or an operations order for a small station, does that automatically carry with it the Top Secret classification?

MR. CROSKERY: I wouldn't be surprised that it would if you get down into the detailed mission.

COL. CAMPBELL: Most of them have. If I remember correctly all the operations orders are at least Top Secret.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: How is that compatible with the ______ products being Secret Codeword? If the detailed mission itself is Top Secret, its success would be Secret Codeword. Maybe we should say: Detailed mission of each major COMINT organization.

MR. REYNOLDS: We might have a small outfit working on something that is a lot more important.

DR. SINKOV: I don't know the answer to No. 1. Whenever we write down the mission of a COMINT organization, we would use all the rest of the principles in this guide for classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: Take for example when you write down the mission of PROD or put out the functional organizational chart that shows your Branches or your Divisions and all their functions, you people have raised the question of classification on that chart. That is a COMINT organization. That is the COMINT end of NSA.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Why don't we put in: The Detailed mission of a major COMINT organization?
DR. SINKOV: Providing the mission does not include Codeword information.

MR. CROSBURY: Take Berlin for instance. The radio station there was considered as of very high classification at one time.

COL. CAMPBELL: It still is, isn't it?

DR. SINKOV: I don't know that it is operating right now.

MR. FRIEDMAN: There might be a footnote to the effect that at the time they agreed to grade the mission of a small COMINT unit as high as Top Secret depending upon its sensitivity.

MR. REYNOLDS: First of all you have to determine what the mission is. After you determine what the mission is, then you determine the classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: Detailed mission of a major COMINT organization. Take out the footnote. We might say: To some minor segment, or to a supporting unit which might have especially high sensitivity or an important mission.

DR. SINKOV: The minute you describe the mission and include codeword information however that has been written out, you get into the codeword classification. All of the teams are going to have to use this as a guide.

COL. CAMPBELL: If the detailed mission should contain any material that is properly classified Top Secret Codeword, that classification shall be used for the mission as a whole.

We should make a very general statement at the beginning that these are guide rules and that they should be used as much and not be taken as the over-riding authority, that on the text and material furnished they will have to determine whether or not it takes that classification or a higher one.

MR. REYNOLDS: My concern in that is the fact that there are certain words which in themselves are subject to interpretation. What do we mean by "detailed"? When is it detailed and when isn't it? When is it major and when isn't it major? Everyone knows that we must have guidance as to what constitutes a COMINT organization and what doesn't constitute a COMINT organization.

DR. SINKOV: The only people who use the guide are those people who have authority to classify papers. That automatically puts them in something of a key position. If by that time they don't know what a COMINT organization is, they are in a bad way.

MR. CROSBURY: When we have to spell out the phrases and clauses, we get into that all the time. We have to leave some initiative to the individual.
DR. SINKOV: Why can't it be a statement of general principle? We are going to have to require people utilizing these principles to use common sense and judgment as well as applying the basic principles of classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: If we mean just what the dictionary definition of it is, early in this paper there will have to be an over-all written decision on whether or not the fact that we are in the communications business or in the cipher business is classified. In other words, if the statement came out that NSA was in the COMINT business and established for that purpose, then when you go on from there you get into trouble if you add that you are in it for the purpose of intercepting and breaking codes of foreign countries. You begin to raise the classification right away.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Sure.

COL. CAMPBELL: When we said "detailed" here we meant detailing exactly how we go about it and what we are trying to accomplish, what our purpose is. The statement that NSA was in the COMINT business and located at a certain place and was furnished with so many people, I don't think that would take the Top Secret classification in my opinion.

DR. SINKOV: We have never promulgated in any form information as to who within the Agency is authorized to determine what classification a thing gets. How low down in echelon may we go?

COL. CAMPBELL: The document should be associated with the people who should use these principles. That should be the preamble of the document. That starts it out generally I would think. We are required by the Executive Order to do that very thing, to appoint certain people who are authorized to place a classification upon the paper. That is something which we have never done.

DR. SINKOV: We have an indication that the general principle is in that direction today.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think we just have to live with certain words, that we can't spell them out. I know what is troubling you. It looks like you are running into difficulty there. There is no other way that I know of. Say that it is in the mission of the COMINT organization and leave it up to the good judgment of the fellow who is going to have to operate under this guide.

DR. SINKOV: It only comes back to that point.

MR. REYNOLDS: The General says to get one model and to come up with your brilliant ideas in the future. Yes, I can see confusion in NSA and in the Cryptologic Services and a misunderstanding of the term. COMINT itself is one which is used in many different interpretations. I have here a paper put out by ASA on 19 January. It is most confusing.
DR. SINKOV: Even after we get all the principles laid down, we get into the problem in 06 of having three or four people at the top most level, wondering what the classification is. There might be two or three different answers.

COL. CAMPBELL: Are we too high on that?

MR. REYNOLDS: I think not at all. The only thought I had in mind was that the general statement might lead to confusion. I realize that you can't devise a system that will totally eliminate the confusion.

COL. CAMPBELL: We are consistent with present regulations which establish NSA and ASA and give the mission.

MR. CROSKERY: It doesn't give the detailed mission. It doesn't go into detail about it.

COL. CAMPBELL: You would say then that this was the broad mission of each COMINT unit. You won't agree with Top Secret?

MAJ. CARSON: The broad mission of ASA is unclassified.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: Not the broad mission. When Marshall was in office he published Reg. 10-125. That has been upgraded.

MAJ. CARSON: I withdraw.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: Col. Campbell has asked that all copies of this be destroyed.

COL. CAMPBELL: You can always downgrade much easier than you can upgrade. If you have already given certain information out and it is unclassified, how can you upgrade it later?

MR. CROSKERY: Still the damage has been done, but that is no reason why we should contribute to something like that.

COL. CAMPBELL: You would up it on the basis of associating the broad COMINT function with the specific activity or organization by name.

MR. CROSKERY: There is question about the name.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Over and over again I am not too happy with the words "major COMINT organization." Let's take the detailed mission of PROD. It is spelled out in the SOP of the Agency. What is the classification?

COL. CAMPBELL: Top Secret. When you say "detailed", you are talking about the organization manual. That has to be Top Secret.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Why shouldn't it read: Detailed mission of a COMINT agency or a major component thereof?

MR. REYNOLDS: What about the Branches of one Division?
COL. CAMPBELL: If you take the Russian Section out by itself and give its detailed mission, Bill says that it is Top Secret. If you take out the Processing Branch of Feeney's outfit and give its mission, which doesn't have anything to do at all with codeword, you could spell out Feeney's operations without revealing anything at all practically. In fact you could word that so it would be Confidential and maybe even Unclassified.

MR. REYNOLDS: Doesn't it depend on what the mission is as to its classification?

DR. SINKOV: That is the basic point.

COL. CAMPBELL: In the Security Division, which is considered a major component, you could put your job in the clear if you worded it right. Yes, you could. If you mentioned your name, I will admit that you might have to classify it.

MR. FRIEDMAN: How about the fact that we are running certain kinds of gadgetry?

COL. CAMPBELL: You mean the polygraph?

MR. REYNOLDS: We have told Senators that we use it. We don't publish it.

COL. CAMPBELL: As long as you say that you don't demand that everybody use it, he doesn't say that. There again it is a play on words. I could write up P/P's work sheets, their job descriptions and put them in the clear practically.

MR. REYNOLDS: The detailed mission of each COMIN' organization or major component thereof may not necessarily.

COL. CAMPBELL: Maybe we ought to say "detailed mission" and spell out our COMINT function a. Would you buy that, Bill? The detailed mission of a COMINT function, of a major COMINT activity is.

MR. REYNOLDS: If you put that in there, I will buy it.

MR. FRIEDMAN: You don't want to classify the CONSEC activity. You want to say detailed mission of a COMINT agency or a major component thereof.

COL. CAMPBELL: Which reveals COMINT functions is, which reveals information pertaining to. We are adding more confusion. I think it is clear if we put "major" in there.

MR. CROSSERY: Delete the part that we added before.

MR. REYNOLDS: Strike it altogether.

COL. CAMPBELL: PROD has raised the question on their charts primarily. Their charts giving just the names of their outfits, they have put at
Secret. They raised the question whether Secret was adequate or even too high. They have raised the question within PADD themselves. Their organization charts show nothing except down to Division level, if I remember rightly. They have raised the question whether Secret is the proper classification.

MR. REYNOLDS: When you are preparing a paper which reveals the detailed mission of a COMINT organization, don't you determine the classification of that by just deciding what the detailed mission is? Then you go back to the basic guides for classification and put the proper classification on it. If we can set forth the detailed mission and then go back to the guide, you can say what definition fits it—Secret or Top Secret.

MR. DENSMORE: That answers the problem.

COL. CAMPBELL: If they follow the remaining rules, they will be able to classify that Top Secret.

I will try to read the rest of the Secret section.

Let's leave No. 1 and go on to No. 2. Then we can come back to 1. We will see if the rest will answer 1 if we left it out.

MR. REYNOLDS: In the final preparation of this document I would like to suggest that particularly on the Top Secret and Confidential sections, we set forth the classification guides as promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.

DR. SINKOV: There are clear guide lines laid down on the basis of which we would be expected to give examples from our own activity.

COL. CAMPBELL: That would be in Executive Order 10501. That would be the main guide line with further implementation and association of certain facts with NSA and like activities. Right?

MR. REYNOLDS: The guide lines set down by the Executive Order are too broad.

COL. CAMPBELL: Do you want to leave 1 out for the time being? We will take 2 then. The thing is vague and doesn't satisfy any purpose.

DR. SINKOV: I have a note from 70 that it is too vague and should be omitted.

COL. CAMPBELL: If you follow the detailed instructions, that will normally take its proper classification.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Right.

COL. CAMPBELL: We have added something there that might be confusing.

DR. SINKOV: Strike it.

COL. CAMPBELL: No. 2 goes out.

No. 3, I don't think we can do anything with it.
DR. SINKOV: The intent as it now reads is very clear. What you want to distinguish between is the fact that UK/US collaboration is Secret and UK/Canada, UK/Australia is Top Secret. It might be better if it were spelled out. It is also true that we are already discussing the idea, and I think it is true, that we will downgrade collaboration with Canada and collaboration with Australia to Secret.

COL. CAMPBELL: The British are the ones.

DR. SINKOV: The others were made Top Secret as a consequence. We have agreed with the UK to downgrade collaboration with them to Secret. The other two are not yet downgraded.

MR. CROSKERY: US/Australia collaboration is downgraded to Secret.

DR. SINKOV: The US proposed the change at the Melbourne Tripartite Conference. We think that collaboration should be classified Secret. The UK and Australia have not answered that question.

MR. FRIEDMAN: What about collaboration of the UK/US in CONSEC matters?

DR. SINKOV: Even before we go to CONSEC, we think the wording in paragraph 3 is perhaps a little strong. Would you say the exchange of raw traffic is Secret?

MR. REYNOLDS: Raw traffic determines the classification.

DR. SINKOV: It depends upon the extent of collaboration. Some aspects of collaboration by themselves might not warrant a very high classification.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Is the classification because of the fact that we exchange

DR. SINKOV: It is Top Secret between the US and Canada. The Canadians upgraded it. The general principle will be that any time you talk about collaboration with the UK it is Secret. Collaboration with Canada and Australia is Top Secret.

MR. CROSKERY: This should be spelled out then, collaboration between the US, Australia, and Canada then.

MR. REYNOLDS: Could you explain to me the basis of the high classification?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Collaboration in wartime is obvious. The emphasis here is on peacetime apparently. I suppose the general feeling is that cryptanalytic work in itself is highly secret. Collaboration in peacetime with foreign governments is the most secret of all.

DR. SINKOV: If you follow the basic JCS principle which defines Top Secret as information the disclosure of which would cause grave damage to security information, I am quite sure you can justify calling collaboration with
Canada Top Secret. The loss of that information causes grave damage to the nation. It is Top Secret for such information, the disclosure of which will cause grave damage. However, I think we will with time get it downgraded to Secret since peacetime collaboration with the British Commonwealth is considered Secret. It will take a while to get that.

Strike "any" out of 3. The classification of collaboration with the UK is Top Secret.

MR. CROSKERY: It has been down lower than that for some time.

COL. CAMPBELL: No. 4?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Is that correct? I could use that information this afternoon.

MR. CROSKERY: In the Combined Cryptographic Panel we deal with the British on certain Top Secret information.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is what most of their papers come out in. It depends on what they reveal.

MR. CROSKERY: Canadian/US JCOC.

COL. CAMPBELL: It is practically in the clear. I think it should be considered unclassified for all purposes.

MR. FRIEDMAN: It is a curious thing.

Mr. Friedman spoke off the record.

COL. CAMPBELL: On most of the papers the highest they can go usually on overall classification, until we get down to telling them what we are giving them, is Confidential.

No. 4.

DR. SINKOV: It contains 12 unnecessary words.

COL. CAMPBELL: If we follow the guide lines, we don't need 4.

No. 5

DR. SINKOV: We have such interesting things as the fact that the Pearl Harbor investigation was spilled all over the newspapers. The cryptanalysis of those systems, that is no longer considered Top Secret. In the second place I am not quite sure what we mean by the phrase "highest".

COL. CAMPBELL: Systems of high grade. That is not my wording. I bow out to you cryptanalysts on that.

MR. CROSKERY: We are getting into the detailed part of it again, the fact that we have done such a thing.
DR. SINKOV: If it is cryptanalysis of the highest grade systems and if that cryptanalysis as such has not been disclosed, that information as we know it then is Top Secret Codeword. If on the other hand, it is unclassified because we have talked about the success against Japanese communications in investigations like the Pearl Harbor investigation, we continue to call it Top Secret.

COL. CAMPBELL: That came out of the BRUSA Agreement.

MR. FRIEDMAN: What do we do about the reference to COMINT in minor police actions like the Korean menace?

DR. SINKOV: Secret Codeword throws us into another contradiction. There might be things we put on the Secret Codeword list that would be disseminated to the front lines without having the problem of Top Secret Codeword.

MR. FRIEDMAN: This tactical COMINT is quite important.

COL. CAMPBELL: It was put into the last Security Manual which is one part of it. During the war it provides for references leading to interference with the specific systems involved.

MR. CROSKERY: There is a similar paragraph under Secret.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is low grade. The first one refers to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Friedman spoke off the record.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is from Adm. Wenger's paper of 1947. That is a quote right out of the papers of his, that and that other one.

MR. FRIEDMAN: It is about time to change that.

MR. CROSKERY: Put 5 and 7 and maybe this one together. Take 5 on page 4. Pull all the No. 5s together.

MR. FRIEDMAN: You are talking of some low grade military cryptographic system used before World War II and you call it Secret. Yet you can buy it.

MR. DENSMORE: How many people need to use the information on our business?

DR. SINKOV: How many people need guidance? Shouldn't the guidance be realistic? How many people are ever going to write about reference to cryptographic subjects?

COL. CAMPBELL: That is the guy right there.

DR. SINKOV: That is something which probably wouldn't apply to a very large number of people.

MR. REYNOLDS: I have a problem in the same way on publications that come to my attention in determining whether or not they should be classified.
DR. SINKOV: You would refer that?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Who is the person setting up a division for giving relief, aid, and succor to NSA personnel who have to spend some time in a Government Penitentiary for violating the law? I learned yesterday that the Technical Manual 11-380 which deals with keying arrangements for converting the M-209, which was published years ago, ten years ago, as a Restricted Manual is now Confidential. I was looking through my books at home and in my literary collection I found the 11-380. I don't have any three-tumbler safes at home to put that in. It is classified Confidential today. Here I am harboring a Confidential document in my home which if Mr. McCarthy finds out about, I am sure going to spend some time in jail. Will somebody bring me cookies?

MR. REYNOLDS: We can make arrangements to bring you cookies and tea, providing that I go with you.

COL. CAMPBELL: I don't know that we need to worry if he goes right from here to there.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I am worried about this. There must be several score documents in the Restricted category that I have had at home.

DR. SINKOV: Suppose as a result that a piece of paper is now Confidential which previously was Restricted? Copies of it which dated to the period when it was in the Restricted classification in effect must be changed to the Confidential classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: That is the only trouble with 10501. It should never have changed the classification of any document. From 15 December on there is no Restricted material. Other material that has been classified as such still is treated as classified. They should never have tried to go back and make the thing retroactive.

MR. CROSKER: We all have these things to determine.

COL. CAMPBELL: The easy way out when you change something is don't go back and change the old system all the way back. That is what they did. The directive says that unless a document has been upgraded it is Unclassified. The Executive Order says that they will all be declassified. It put the responsibility on the originator to notify everybody that the thing has been upgraded, in my opinion.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: The earlier 380 had been superseded by the last one which is now in effect. It says that all previous copies have been destroyed.

MR. CROSKER: The AFSAG says the same thing.

COL. CAMPBELL: The test would be whether he had the "need to know."

' MR. FRIEDMAN: I bought it.

COL. CAMPBELL: Did someone have the right to sell it to you?

MR. FRIEDMAN: The thing came out with the M-209. I wanted the M-209. I
didn't want to steal Government property. I bided my time until it came out on some surplus sales market.

COL. CAMPBELL: The Executive Order is weak on that point. It declassifies everything unless action was taken by the originator to upgrade it.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The action has been taken.

The Signal Corps is operating in Confidential.

MR. REYNOLDS: They have to prove it meets the definition of Confidential set forth in Executive Order 10501.

MR. FRIEDMAN: There is another ticklish question. I was asked by letter by the Editor of the American Cryptogram Association to reply to an article. I wanted to turn them down gently, but it occurred to me that they could republish the article. I dug up the name from the ASA Review. The document itself was classified Restricted but the article was marked at the top Unclassified. Now the article was in two parts. The first part was taken from the original which was published in the Journal of American Literature. Part 2 was published in the Signal Corps Bulletin.

When they lifted it out of the Signal Corps Bulletin and put it in the ASA Review they should not have put down Unclassified at the top of the article. It was classified Restricted. Now then the Editor of the American Cryptogram Journal can't use that without violating the law as I see it. I didn't send it to him.

COL. CAMPBELL: We are getting off on Bill's problems.

MR. FRIEDMAN: If anybody wanted to get me, they could, and I don't take chances like that.

Something has to be done to 5.

COL. CAMPBELL: What do you propose?

MR. FRIEDMAN: There is no time limit for safeguarding COMINT as defined herein. It is of the utmost importance that complete and absolute silence be maintained by those who have ever been indoctrinated in it at any time. When matters referring to COMINT are broadcast or published by the proper people or those in authority, it doesn't free other persons who are or ever have been indoctrinated for COMINT from their continuing obligation to maintain silence.

COL. CAMPBELL: On that basis if something was made unclassified and at the time that you were indoctrinated it was treated as classified, you wouldn't even talk about it. I don't think they meant that.

DR. SINKOV: Let's let Mr. Callimahos write it.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: I don't mind writing 7.
COL. CAMPBELL: No. 5 and 7. On page 4 No. 5 again creeps in. Six creeps in there—4, 5, and 6. You will take care of 5 and 7 under Top Secret and 4, 5, and 6 under Secret. No. 6 we skipped.

DR. SINKOV: The law says that Codeword by itself, without any indication of what it means or what you do with it, if I am correct, that is Top Secret.

MR. CALLIMACHOS: The Army safeguards the dissemination of Special Intelligence. It is Codeword for Special Intelligence and Top Secret Codeword. When it comes to Codeword, if you write it and leave it on your calendar at night, you can be picked up for a violation. This is one that is not well known among Agency people.

COL. CAMPBELL: I can’t agree with you more.

MR. DENSMORE: In the Navy they always left it out.

MR. CALLIMACHOS: You can be gigged for the word.

MR. FRIEDMAN: That is the rule.

MR. REYNOLDS: It would simplify things terrifically. What are the chances of getting a modification of that thing?

DR. SINKOV: We ought to try.

COL. CAMPBELL: The Codeword requires a classification when it stands by itself.

MR. FRIEDMAN: That is what it says now. The codeword when used as such is codeword. When it designates Category III and II COMINT and sub-categories which are established within these categories it will bear the Top Secret classification. According to the category, these code words and their implications shall only be made known to non-indoctrinated personnel, nor shall the code word be used in the codeword sense in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons. The code word when used as such shall bear the Top Secret classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: I say that I have certain codeword reports down on my desk which I would like you to see. I have used it in that sense. Therefore, I should not even make that statement to you with someone in the room whom I don’t know and if I don’t know whether he is cleared.

MR. REYNOLDS: You mentioned only the document with the code word on it.

COL. CAMPBELL: Your people won’t let me leave Codeword paper out.

MR. CROSBERY: How about the printed paper over in PROD with nothing on it?
DR. SINKOV: If it is associated closely with Top Secret, it indicates that there is some connection even though to my mind it is no more in need of protection than the meaning of the words Top Secret.

COL. CAMPBELL: For example, we received a skin from one of the outfits that said, "Your Top Secret Codeword paper was forwarded under such and such a date to so and so." It had nothing to do with the material that was in the paper. He had classified the thing Top Secret because of the fact that they had used Top Secret Codeword. He gave no information, but his paper was classified Top Secret because he had, as I understand the definition in its meaning, not the dictionary meaning, associated it with the definition as set forth in the BURA Agreement which has a special connection. He would have to write on that Top Secret Codeword paper such and such is forwarded.

DR. SINKOV: If he left out the specific codeword.

MR. CROKERY: If he identified it by serial number.

COL. CAMPBELL: It should still have Top Secret Codeword on top of it.

MR. REYNOLDS: Not according to this.

MR. FRIEDMAN: It carries the classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: You can't divulge the word to anyone else. The paper here says that you will not reveal it to other than those who are indoctrinated.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: I think we should keep them and let them be known.

DR. SINKOV: That has been proposed more than once. It seems to me that if we could agree on a set of code words and let them remain indefinitely, it would save us a lot of headaches. I think we ought to have a general classification and change the phrase Top Secret every so often.

COL. CAMPBELL: I read PROD's comments on Codeword. Reference was made to a proposal such as for Top Secret Codeword.

When reference is made to a phrase such as Top Secret Codeword and it is otherwise unclassified, should the document be classified Top Secret Codeword, Top Secret, or is some other lower classification permitted?

What is the procedure for classifying material that contains a combination of classified information such as Secret Codeword and plain Top Secret? Does or does not that require Top Secret Codeword?

Does the presence of an individual page among several pages within a document of Codeword material necessitate the application of a Codeword to all pages or only the page required?
Is not undue emphasis being placed upon the cover sheet bearing the legend
that the material contained therein is of Codeword level?

Should not some requirement be established that the notation of the existence
of Codeword material be included on the cover and the first three or four
pages of any given document?

This came out of PROD and there is to my mind quite a bit of confusion within
PROD as to what is proper.

DR. SINKOV: A lot of his questions are kind of long-winded. He goes into
several different things.

COL. CAMPBELL: The information in this paper was Secret Codeword, but there
was some additional information that had to do with COMINT that raised the
classification to Top Secret. This thing is a very small and innocuous
statement but I will run over it. It is evident that it is not clear in a
lot of peoples' minds.

MR. CROSKIS: They might have to classify individually every paragraph in a
particular document.

MR. GALLIMAHOS: It is classified Top Secret in the original. It says Top
Secret Codeword.

COL. CAMPBELL: The instructions should not carry the Codeword. It is
nothing more or less than an indication of the transmission channels. If
I send a Top Secret document to someone, I can send it in double wrapped
and labelled inside Top Secret. The Top Secret Control Officer can open it and
he may or may not be indoctrinated. When he opens it up, he can see that
it is Top Secret Codeword and say, "What do I do with it?" You aren't
supposed to see it. You send something through the wrong channels. It
should have gone in COMINT channels. I don't mean to imply that the Codeword
is only a transmission indicator. I didn't mean that.

It also protects the channels, the indication of the channels. Bill read
that you may not reveal the word in its codeword sense to un-indoctrinated
people. The letter will reveal it in this sense to some degree.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Let's take the case of a paper where you use Top Secret Codeword. Just a plain sheet of paper if found on the street. What inference
would you draw?

DR. SINKOV: That it is some kind of subordinate associated classification.

MR. REYNOLDS: It would be no more significant than if it were Top Secret.

MR. CROSKIS: It would be used in NSA.

COL. CAMPBELL: I don't have that on it. It is Top Secret Codeword.
MR. REYNOLDS: It means that the particular piece of paper or form was printed by NSA. I would like to see it changed.

COL. CAMPBELL: We must live up to the spirit of this. If this means the use of the word in a letter, the classification of the paper must be Top Secret Codeword. Is that correct?

MR. CALLIMAHOS: You then reveal the existence of codeword to anyone who is un-indoctrinated.

COL. CAMPBELL: It should be kept in COMINT channels only. I think that would prohibit the mailing of the document.

DR. SINKOV: I propose that we get up and stretch our legs for a few minutes.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I am going to have to leave soon.

The meeting recessed at 1100 for ten minutes.

DR. SINKOV: I would like to finish the section we are on.

MR. CROSBERY: What did we do about 6?

MR. REYNOLDS: I don't see what you can do except to keep it with the situation that exists.

MR. DENSMORE: The code word by itself out of context is Codeword?

MR. REYNOLDS: Yes, I am afraid as of now it is. We should do something, if we can, to get the wheels started and to get something which is more realistic. Just because the Prohibition Law was unpopular was no reason for keeping it.

COL. CAMPBELL: The code word out of context is applicable to Special Weather Intelligence. I think we should aim for Unclassified.

DR. SINKOV: The code word no matter how it is used has to be classified.

MR. REYNOLDS: It goes back to the wording of the BRUSA Agreement. We can interpret that to mean....

COL. CAMPBELL: We are stuck for the present. When we submit this to USCIB, we should ask for specific clarification of that point. Right?

MR. REYNOLDS: And recommend that consideration be given to making code words unclassified.

COL. CAMPBELL: When used out of context.

MR. CALLIMAHOS: You get no indication of the meaning of a COMINT code word.
It might be a Top Secret Codeword paper pertaining to Special Intelligence derived from whatever system it might be. You have got then what your definition of the word is.

MR. REYNOLDS: Then it is no longer a code word.

COL. CAMPBELL: You have tied the code word to some meaning.

MR. REYNOLDS: Other than in the dictionary sense.

DR. SINKOV: The piece of paper is Top Secret Codeword and contains Top Secret Codeword information. Then we can discuss from that piece of paper probably what the code word means.

MR. REYNOLDS: If we have a piece of paper carrying the Top Secret Codeword and we forget that it is required to be kept from certain people, that is the danger.

DR. SINKOV: That is all you mean.

MR. REYNOLDS: You could identify that piece of paper as coming from Communications.

DR. SINKOV: However, I submit to you that most of the time it isn't necessary. You want to appreciate that it is COMINT because COMINT is usually of such a type that just by reading it you can guess that it came from Communications. You see the point that I am raising.

There are exceptions. Generally speaking COMINT is a special kind of intelligence. If you have an item of COMINT set down, you can normally tell that it came from some kind of communications. Therefore, I don't see the serious danger that might result in the case of a person having determined let's say that this is a particular code word. Then he comes upon a paper which has Top Secret Codeword and it has the information on it. He has to go back to some other place to find out what that means on a piece of paper.

Col. Campbell read the portion of the EURUSA Agreement having to do with code words.

COL. CAMPBELL: I read that to mean maybe not what you just thought. If I see the code word by itself, it doesn't carry the classification, but if I use the code word and there is implication—whether it says so or not—it cannot be made known to an un indoctrinated person.

MR. DENSMORE: It is implied right there in and out of context.

DR. SINKOV: We have used Appendix B, as I said earlier this morning, as our guide because this has not been clear.

COL. CAMPBELL: We should ask for clarification.
DR. SINKOV: Can we use this interpretation to accomplish what we are after?

COL. CAMPBELL: We are going to present it to USCIB for approval. The "Old Man" agreed that he couldn't set down classification without the over-all approval of USCIB, which would in itself put it on other Services, don't you see?

MR. CROSKERY: The Navy must be going by some rule or regulation or interpretation.

MR. REYNOLDS: If you use the code word in its codeword sense.

MR. DENSMORE: As given under Category III or II COMINT.

COL. CAMPBELL: If I call you up tomorrow and say that I have got a Top Secret Codeword paper that we discussed yesterday and that I will send it to you, if I say that over the black line, it is a violation.

MR. CROSKERY: You would have to read the originator's mind there.

COL. CAMPBELL: This is not approved in final form. It is a good point to raise with USCIB. We will have to live with it until it is clarified.

MR. DENSMORE: In or out of context.

MR. REYNOLDS: As long as we are pointing in the right direction,....

COL. CAMPBELL: Let's live up to it until we get clarification.

DR. SINKOV: I think we are at a good stopping place. Can we agree now as to an appropriate time for the next meeting?

COL. CAMPBELL: Say a week from today, Friday at 0630.

DR. SINKOV: Fine.

COL. CAMPBELL: We have a number of corrections which have come through C/SEC, additions that they have to get in, plus the usage.

DR. SINKOV: I want to state as a general observation that the problems we are confronted with in this Agency most often are problems of over-classification. I am personally convinced that even more errors are made in over-classifying papers than in under-classifying them.

MR. REYNOLDS: From the Security point of view if you only had one piece of paper to protect you could do a fine job. Where you have 20,000 of them to protect, you can't protect them as well. If we could reduce them to a minimum, I think we could do a better job of protecting them.
DR. SINKOV: I have designated myself a committee of one over at AHS to regularly gig the people for over-classification. Every so often I will hold up a piece of paper to somebody and say, "Look at this thing and look what it is classified." I looked at a a receipt just yesterday. It was nothing but a blue receipt for a document. The receipt said nothing, but it was classified Confidential. There wasn't any excuse for it at all. We say, "Look, why is this thing classified?" Then we begin to have disregard for anything coming out from that fellow with a classification.

COL. CAMPBELL: I am getting a lot of material out of your place asking for travel requests and it is codeword. They are pure and simple travel requests that talk about the mission in general. You use these words as a part of your daily vocabulary.

DR. SINKOV: If everybody is somebody, then no one is anybody.

COL. CAMPBELL: I think we have made some progress on it. I think it is something we need. At least I am convinced of it. I hope you fellows are going to take a little time to come up with something. We are going to get a difference of opinion. Someday we ought to be able to get to the point where we can lay down rules which will be all-inclusive. Since we can't define everything, we are going to have to leave it to somebody's good judgment. If we can clear up some of the areas with the people, we have accomplished a lot.

MR. REYNOLDS: Step 1 is this. Step 2 will be the revision.

COL. CAMPBELL: There is one thing I would like all of you to think about before we come back next time. That is the association of the National Security Agency in the COMINT field and in the COMSEC field, generally speaking, not in detail at all. Can we put out anything that says that we are in the COMINT business, in this business of making codes and ciphers? We have always told them they can't put that in writing.

MR. REYNOLDS: Here is a problem that has come to me. You may not have heard of it. Omaha is having a conference on student guidance, getting high school seniors and college freshmen and guiding their studies along certain lines to make a career. They are going to have various industries attending that conference set up booths. The people who interview the high school seniors are the placement officers. They will have pictures and diagrams which would be of value in helping sell their program.

PERIS wants to set up a booth showing the various jobs that we have here, pictures of the new site. When it comes right down to it, I don't think it is classified, but I think it is pretty poor practice. The questions that are asked would focus national attention on the operations over in Virginia.

COL. CAMPBELL: How are you going to attract new blood into the organization, if you don't do it through that method? How is PERIS going to obtain
analysts? How is C/SEC going to obtain people? How is R/D going to obtain people?

MR. REYNOLDS: By going out and talking to them.

MR. CROSSKEY: There should be discreet handling of the information.

COL. CAMPBELL: Not on an international basis.

MR. REYNOLDS: They would have reporters out there with cameras.

COL. CAMPBELL: Let's bear down on the recruiters. Have them go out and tell them we are interested in traffic analysis people who have a mathematics background. That is the primary thing that we can tell them to say about the jobs. They can't go into a lot of detail of what we read and how much we do with it. You have to give them some idea. We have always told the recruiters that at no time could they put that in writing. It is a question of how far we can go in telling people what business we are in. The General has made the statement that we can say that we are in the COMINT business. In fact he does it himself.

DR. SINKOV: Most of the people get by by just saying that they are connected with communications. It is matter of what the purpose is of the information that is being disclosed. If you are setting up a charge account downtown or dealing in matters of that sort, you might say that your official activity is with the Department of Defense in communications work.

COL. CAMPBELL: Communications involves making codes and all that.

MR. REYNOLDS: Isn't it a question of people using the utmost discretion? It is up to us to realize the significance of certain disclosures. As far as those people are concerned, if you let the bars down completely for one, you have to do it for all. You can't let down the bars for one particular group. You have to let them down all across the board. Some guy might get drunk and start bragging, "I am a big shot. I can read Russian."

COL. CAMPBELL: There is one other question in connection with languages. That will come out to you and you can figure on that one too, the fact that we give courses in Russians. Training is bothered with the problem of classification of their language courses, knowing how much they can tell.

DR. SINKOV: The classification of training in languages is Unclassified.

COL. CAMPBELL: If you want into the fact that you are training in Russian for the purpose of translating intercept material, that is something different again. If I say that we are going to train ten people in the Russian language next year, that is different. It is just that we want to train them.

MR. REYNOLDS: It is much more serious to indicate that we are training people to read languages of friendly foreign countries.
COL. CAMPBELL: If you need people to translate at one of the centers, it is just how much you say and what words you use again. You are bound to have to classify it on context, on how much you reveal.

DR. SINKOV: We have got to ask ourselves, "How much information is in this paper or what will the statement give away?" When we answer that question, we are prepared to say what the classification ought to be. That is the big problem with regard to what we are doing now. We are trying in a very general sort of way to say what the classification of a piece of paper ought to be. Very seldom can you have such simple rules. The person has got to use his good judgment in looking at the paper. Once he answers the question, then it has such and such a classification.

The meeting adjourned at 1130.