<table>
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<th>MELO ROUTING SLIP</th>
<th>NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAME OR TITLE</strong></td>
<td>Mr. Friedman</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION</strong></td>
<td>S/AST</td>
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<td><strong>DATE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>COORDINATION</strong></td>
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<td><strong>FILE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>NECESSARY ACTION</strong></td>
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<td><strong>NOTE AND RETURN</strong></td>
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<td><strong>SIGNATURE</strong></td>
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**REMARKS**

**FROM**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAME OR TITLE</th>
<th>Mr. Gardner</th>
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<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION</td>
<td>AG</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DATE</strong></td>
<td>11 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TELEPHONE</strong></td>
<td>59235</td>
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**DD FORM 94**

REPLACES NAVY FORM 94, 1 FEB 96, WHICH MAY BE USED.
1. The fifth meeting of the NSA Classification Advisory Panel was called to order by Col. Geo. E. Campbell, Adjutant General, at 0830, 25 February 1954, in Room 19-232. The following were present:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Geo. E. Campbell</td>
<td>AG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. William F. Friedman</td>
<td>S/ASST</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. D. D. Crossley</td>
<td>C/SEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. F. E. Densmore</td>
<td>PROD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj. W. R. Carson</td>
<td>P/P</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. S. W. Reynolds</td>
<td>SEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj. W. T. Connor</td>
<td>SEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. L. D. Gallahos</td>
<td>TNG</td>
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2. Mr. Reynolds reported briefly on two proposed directives to be issued by the Secretary of Defense. The one is designed to protect trade information received from contractors and will control the use and preservation of Department of Defense information that does not fall within the purview of Executive Order 10501. This directive is permissive in nature and has been accepted by the Air Force and the Army. The other directive, which is being staffed now, is designed to get around the objection of having to store all CONFIDENTIAL matter in 3-combination safes. It will permit the use of a term such as CONFIDENTIAL/MODIFIED or CONFIDENTIAL--MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED and will deal with modification in transmission, safekeeping, and dissemination.

3. Review of the proposed guide lines for use by originators in determining the classification of materials was completed. It was agreed that the document, as revised, would be forwarded to the members of the Classification Advisory Panel for their concurrence and will then be forwarded to USGIB.

4. The meeting adjourned at 1030.

5. Declassified when inclosure is removed.

Incl:

Guide Lines for Security Classification
GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Section

GENERAL
TOP SECRET CODEWORD
TOP SECRET
SECRET CODEWORD
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. The classifying of information and material within the National Security Agency is an involved and complex problem. Every document to be classified must be considered as being unique and one whose classification is dependent on factors existing within that document alone. The decision as to the proper classification of a document cannot arbitrarily be determined by referral to other documents or to specific rules and regulations. Each item of information or material must be adjudged solely on its own merits and shall be classified according to its own content. There are, however, certain basic principles of classification which will be of assistance to individuals within NSA in the solution of their classification problems, and it is proposed to consider these basic principles in this document.

2. As a basis for classification, it is necessary that all personnel be thoroughly conversant with the security classifications established by the Department of Defense: TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL (it will be noted as of 15 December 1953 the classification category RESTRICTED...
was abolished by Presidential Decree). By definition these security classifications can be stated as follows:

a. Top Secret: Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification Top Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material which requires the highest degree of protection. The Top Secret classification shall be applied only to that information or material the defense aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation such as leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United States, an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war, or the compromise of military or defense plans, or intelligence operations, or scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense.

b. Secret: Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation, such as by jeopardizing the international relations of the United States, endangering the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the national defense, or compromising important military or defense plans, scientific or technological developments important to national defense, or information revealing important intelligence operations.

c. Confidential: Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification Confidential shall be authorized,
by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material the
unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense
interests of the nation.

3. Within the National Security Agency we must provide even more
safeguards to our activities than are provided for under the standard
security classifications. Before any official agency information is to
be disseminated it must be determined that the recipient has a need-to-know.
Even though an item of information may be unclassified it will not be
discussed with anyone unless that person has an official requirement for
the information concerned.

4. Beyond the basic classifications established by the Department
of Defense, we recognize that within the National Security Agency, there
are special classifications which must be considered separately due to
their inherently sensitive nature. These are the classifications pertaining
to communications intelligence and are identified by the assignment
of a distinctive code word.

5. The classification of COMINT involves two distinct considerations:
the security of the information contained within an individual document and
the security of the source from which this information was secured. Either
or both considerations may affect the classification, dependent upon
whether the information or the source is the more sensitive. Initially,
COMINT comes to this Agency as raw traffic which has been intercepted by
field station activities throughout the world. This traffic is classified CONFIDENTIAL until such time as any analytical processing is begun.
From the processing of this raw traffic, we derive three types of information:

a. Crypt intelligence which results from successful analysis and solution of the systems which were utilized by the originators to protect the traffic during its transmission.

b. Traffic intelligence which results from the successful analysis of the external characteristics of the enciphered or encoded message.

c. Information that is derived from analysis of plain text traffic.

6. Information derived from these three processes (crypt-intelligence, traffic intelligence and plain text analysis) is divided into three security categories.

a. Category III COMINT is of the highest classification and most sensitive category and is applied to that material whose source must be protected at all costs. In general, this will include information derived from crypt intelligence (except for certain specifically exempted categories), and traffic intelligence of certain high level systems which have been predetermined by existing directives to fall within this category. It is this material in Category III which is considered to be TOP SECRET Codeword.

b. Category II COMINT is less sensitive than the preceding category and is one whose material can by acceptance of a calculated risk be disseminated without over-riding concern for the security of

-SECRET
the source. This category will include traffic intelligence which has not been specifically placed into other categories and crypt intelligence resulting from the solution of certain low level codes and other security systems. It is this material in Category II which is considered to be SECRET Codeword.

c. Category I COMINT is subject to the least restrictive regulations of the three categories and will include certain types of low level COMINT that will be predetermined by existing directives. Material in this category will be classified CONFIDENTIAL without the use of any codeword. Extreme care must always be utilized in placing COMINT in this category. (See paragraph 7, Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL.)

7. In addition to these categories, there are certain other basic statements that are acceptable as guide lines in determining classifications.

a. COMINT will normally be considered as falling within Category III except for such specific systems as have been mutually agreed upon by GCHQ and the U.S. to be down-graded to Category II. This list is available in PROD (NSA-0621).

b. Standing operating procedures, personnel reports, organizational charts and instructions manuals governing respective COMINT organizations will be classified according to the information contained therein; those indicating operational capacity or success will be classified at least SECRET.

c. The problem of classifying organizational charts is considered to be sufficiently sensitive to merit review by the Security Classification
Panel. Charts which are proposed for publication will be sent to the AG for reference to this Panel as required.

d. In reference to type crypto systems, the terms "low grade", "medium grade" and "high grade" are often used. Definition of these categories are as follows:

(1) low-grade, adj. Pertaining to a cryptosystem which offers only slight resistance to cryptanalysis; for example: (1) Playfair ciphers, (2) Single transposition, (3) Unenciphered one-part codes.

(2) medium grade, adj. Pertaining to a cryptosystem which offers considerable resistance to cryptanalysis; for example: (1) Stradd ciphers, (2) Polyphase transposition, (3) Unenciphered two-part codes. (Cf. low-grade and high-grade.)

(3) high-grade, adj. Pertaining to a cryptosystem which offers a maximum of resistance to cryptanalysis; for example: (1) Complex cipher machines, (2) one-time systems, (3) Unknown two-part codes enciphered with an additive book. (Cf. low-grade and medium-grade.)

8. As a means of further assistance to personnel within NSA the following classification guide lines have been established. Remember, however, they are only general in nature and cannot be applied to specifically each classification problem. Utilization of these guide lines can only be done through analogy, comparison and evaluation. In any event the classification of a given item of information, such as training publications, will be SOLELY ON ITS OWN MERITS.
SECTION II - TOP SECRET CODEWORD

1. A cryptanalytic process which is indicative of specific success on a particular foreign system.

2. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading. Exceptions would be listed separately.

3. Intelligence derived from the study of

SECTION III - TOP SECRET

1. The detailed mission of a COMINT agency or a major component thereof.

2. The existence of peace-time collaboration in COMINT matters between U.S. agencies and other foreign governments, except the U.K.

3. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of high-grade foreign cryptosystems during World War II, provided the reference cannot lead to inferences as to the specific systems involved. (See exceptions, paragraph 5, Section II - TOP SECRET CODEWORD, and paragraph 12, Section VII - UNCLASSIFIED.)
4. Codewords applicable to Special Intelligence and Special Weather Intelligence.

5. Disclosures of both the identity and details of the cryptanalysis of low-grade enemy military cryptosystems during and after World War II.

6. Material involving sensitive collection procedures or the revelation of success against unusual or sensitive transmission procedures and devices.

SECTION IV - SECRET CODEWORD

1. Traffic Intelligence derived from the analysis of foreign communications after 2 September 1945.

2. Texta information.

3. Intelligence derived from study of [REDACTED] except as noted in paragraph 4, Section II - TOP SECRET CODEWORD, and paragraph 6, Section III - TOP SECRET.

SECTION V - SECRET

1. Intercept assignments.

2. Intercept and D/F plans and over-all operational effectiveness of intercept and D/F organization as a whole.

3. General reference to the fact of cryptanalytic success against low-grade enemy military crypto-systems during World War II and the Korean conflict, without any detailed description of the cryptanalytic methods used.

4. Details of traffic analysis as applied to enemy communications during World War II.

5. Description of equipment peculiar to intercept stations.

7. Existence of peacetime collaboration between the US and UK (GCHQ) in the COMINT field.

8. All personnel reports for the entire Agency, civilian or military, which indicate authorized or actual strength by organizational element, short title or symbol, or by function.

9. Codeword applicable to Traffic Intelligence.

10. Information relating to an entire system of cryptologic (R/D) equipment.


SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL

1. Association of operational COMINT functions with specific activities and organizations by name (except as provided under paragraph 1, Section VII - UNCLASSIFIED).

2. Individual intercept and D/F station products and statements of operational effectiveness.

3. Intercepted raw traffic that shows no evidence of "processing" for COMINT purposes. Processing does not include case notations, frequencies, or call signs.

4. Intelligence relating to D/F mission assignments, bearing reports and fix reports (i.e., target frequencies, call-signs, "piped signals," other signal information, bearings and fixes), provided that no complex changing call-sign systems are included.
5. The terms "United States Communication Intelligence Board" and "U.S. Communication Security Board" (abbreviations "USCIB" and "USCSB" are unclassified).

6. Plain-text tactical or operational traffic provided that no interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems, enciphered map references, or results or advanced traffic analysis are included. This material shall include local procedural and local grid and zone systems used for artillery direction, tactical control and movement of front line units, early warning and exercise of tactical combat control of aircraft.

7. Intelligence derived from analysis of radar tracking reports and visual observation reports as found in tactical or operational traffic, provided that enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems are not included. Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local procedural codes used for brevity and plain text interspersed with cover words is permissible.

8. GOMINT concerning weather derived from the sources described in paragraphs 6 and 7, above.

9. Special Intelligence from Naval tactical maneuvering codes and brevity codes.

10. Special cryptologic features of and magnitude of effort with computers.

11. Detailed references to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against specific military cryptosystems used by foreign powers between 11 November 1918 and 1 September 1939.
12. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of the
between 11 November 1918 and 1 September 1939.


14. The extent of production of cryptomaterial

15. The fact that NSA is assigned

16. Diagrams and descriptions of COMINT and COMSEC communication networks or related communication plans including cryptographic arrangements except where higher classification is justified by the listing of sensitive intercept stations.


SECTION VII - UNCLASSIFIED

1. Association of NSA with cryptology; non-specific or hypothetical references to Communication Intelligence or Communication Security without any association of that function with specific activities and organizations other than the National Security Agency as a whole and Service cryptologic agencies as a whole, and association of NSA with the latter.

2. Identification with NSA of NSA authors of technical papers on matters already in the public domain.

3. The terms NSA Field Activity Far East (NSAFE), NSA Field Activity Europe (NSAFEUR), NSAAL, NSAUK, NSA-FWPU (LANT), and NSA-FWPU (PAC).
4. Civil Service Job Titles and NSA "Classification Standards Manual".

5. NSA's possession of or interest in computers or rapid analytical machinery, except as noted in Paragraph 10 under Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL.

6. Specific components of equipment under research, if use of component is not revealed.

7. Report of inspection trip to uncleared company that is a prospective contractor, if no mention is made of actual applications of components.

8. Short titles, cover names, and code words. (See the following exceptions: Paragraph 4, Section II - TOP SECRET CODEWORD; paragraph 4, Section III - TOP SECRET; paragraph 9, Section V - SECRET; paragraph 11, Section V - SECRET, and paragraph 17, Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL.)

9. Communications giving a person's security clearance and type of indoctrination.

10. Projects number and titles used in justification for purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified.

11. Detailed reference to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against World War I military cryptosystems.

12. References to intelligence derived from cryptosystems in which successful cryptanalysis has already been revealed by official U.S. action (e.g., the Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack).

13. Any reference to intelligence or cryptanalytic success against operational cryptosystems as disclosed by foreign publications appearing in the public domain. These references should be accompanied for the purpose of clarity by the source and be without further elaboration or amplification.
14. The fact that NSA produces and procures cryptomaterial including rotors, key lists, one-time tapes, one-time pads, codes, discs and other broad categories of keying materials, and employs special equipment to produce some of this material.

15. The fact that the US collaborates with other NATO powers on CONSEC matters.