

~~TOP SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRIEDMAN

On 18 March 1954 a meeting of the NSA Classification Advisory Panel was held at the request of Dr. Sinkov.

The following were present at the meeting:

Mr. W. F. Friedman	(S/ASST)
Col. G. E. Campbell	(A/G)
Dr. A. Sinkov	(PROD)
Mr. L. Callimahos	(TNG)
Mr. F. E. Densmore	(PROD)
Mr. D. D. Croskery	(C/SEC)
Maj. W. R. Carson	(P/P)
Maj. W. T. Connor	(SEC)
1/Lt. I. T. McDonald	(S/ASST)

The first item in question for the meeting was a message from NSA to CBNRC and GCHQ with Headquarters USAFSS as an information addressee. The message was classified CONFIDENTIAL; but by the strictest interpretation of existing directives, it should have been TOP SECRET because of the relationships shown in the heading. The classification of the subject message had been queried by USAFSS. It was agreed that this message should be upgraded to TOP SECRET in accordance with existing USCIB policy, but that the problem itself went considerably further.

In the subsequent open discussion, the following ideas were expressed:

1. If it is insisted that the mere fact of collaboration be classified, then there are many inconsistencies in other areas such as the communications links themselves, the black car used by certain couriers, existing liaison arrangements, and visits to the respective headquarters by personnel from others.

2. To have the proper security for problems that must be classified, a realistic view must be taken.

It was recommended and agreed that steps should be taken promptly to prepare a paper for submission to USCIB with the intention of modifying the existing classification of the fact of collaboration between NSA, and the Canadians, British, and Australians. The following ideas should be considered in drafting such a paper:

1. Since it is impossible to hide the existence of communications circuits between NSA and its collaborators, it is impossible to hide the fact of collaboration. Hence the classification should realistically be reevaluated.

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2. NSA should strive to have the fact of collaboration declassified. If too much objection by LSIB is encountered, it would be more consistent for NSA to agree to a classification of CONFIDENTIAL than to perpetuate the existing inconsistencies.
3. Only the fact of collaboration should be declassified.
4. This does not imply that even a single piece of paper must be declassified, nor does it mean that any existing cover procedures will be affected.
5. Every electrical communication going overseas will continue to be classified for transmission purposes.
6. The countries concerned are Canada, Britain, and Australia, and they should be named specifically in any such proposal.
7. It is the intention of NSA to make it possible to communicate with Canada, Britain, and Australia with realistic classifications, i.e., to be realistic and not to degrade existing classifications.

Mr. Friedman informed the group that SLO, Washington, had received a message from GCHQ questioning (1) the classification of a portion (¶6.54) of "Current Cryptanalytic Techniques" (NSA-72-1678), and (2) the classification of parts V and VI of NSA "Military Cryptanalysis." GCHQ feels that the portions in question should be TOP SECRET CODEWORD.

It was suggested that this may represent an unrealistic view on the part of GCHQ and that a draft of comments should be prepared for discussion with SLO, Washington. Mr. Callimahos and Lt. McDonald were nominated to prepare the draft comments.

It was recognized that the proposed paper to USCIB would require certain changes in the proposed guide lines established by the Classification Advisory Panel. Colonel Campbell (A/G) agreed to make these changes.

It was suggested that Capt. Dyer, as NSA Historian, would have an interest in the proceedings of the Classification Advisory Panel and that he be invited to attend subsequent meetings.

*I. T. McDonald*  
I. T. McDONALD