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1 June 1951

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

DGC/1763

Enclosure 1

OUTLINE OF TALK ON GLOBAL STRUCTURE IN WAR
BY MR. [REDACTED] A.F.S.A. - MAY, 1951.

These views took shape at [REDACTED] only the day before I left. They have not been discussed with the Services and must not be regarded as the official views of [REDACTED], much less those of [REDACTED]. They deal only with some fundamental principles as a basis from which British thinking will now proceed.

2. Whether we like it or lump it N.A.T.O. makes some co-operation in Sigint with other N.A.T.O. powers inescapable. Indeed, some such co-operation may well be essential for the effective functioning of the N.A.T.O. commands. Furthermore, the security risks could be reduced by insisting on the adoption of [REDACTED] minimum security precautions. For the purposes of this co-operation Sigint should be sharply divided into two low-grade and high-grade. In some ways this division will be expensive and in some ways inefficient but we believe it to be unavoidable. It will be basic to this co-operation with N.A.T.O. powers that U.S. [REDACTED] relations should continue to be founded on the [REDACTED] Agreement.

3. By low-grade and high-grade we mean respectively those tasks which can be successfully exploited by the resources of field organisations and those whose successful exploitation requires the much greater and more highly qualified resources of a National Centre (A.F.S.A. or [REDACTED]). It is not necessary to be more precise at this stage. In the event, this rather vague dividing line will not be difficult to draw generally speaking field organisations will not fritter away their resources on tasks which can offer them no return, and if, exceptionally, they do, corrective measures can be found. For convenience in this context let us call low-grade, 'Y' and high-grade, 'Sigint'.

4. In 'Y' there should be whatever co-operation with other N.A.T.O. powers the military situation demands. In Sigint, co-operation should be limited to dissemination according to strict need in some disguised form. Let us take 'Y' first.

5. For simplicity in illustration I propose to take a purely army command structure of three levels and of three nationalities - one U.S., one [REDACTED] army with the appropriate international High Command. The principles would apply to other armed forces, to more or fewer levels, and to more nationalities.

6. Each Corps would have a 'Y' Unit under its command, intercepting and processing for and disseminating to the Corps H.Q. Each Army would similarly have a larger 'Y' Unit under its command, performing the same service for the Army H.Q. but also getting back as necessary traffic and material from the Corps Units, co-ordinating and studying the whole, and feeding back to these latter Units technical help such as callsign and crypt recoveries etc. At both levels these units would be national and nono-service.

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7. With the High Command there would be a 'Y' Centre, intercepting and processing for and disseminating to the H.C. but also, again, and probably as its primary function getting back as necessary traffic and material from the forward Units, co-ordinating and studying the whole, and feeding forward technical help. In certain circumstances the 'Y' Centre might rely entirely on the forward units for the interception of traffic. There would be provision for co-operation between 'Y' Centres in different theatres, either direct or through National Centres. The 'Y' Centre would be international and might be inter-service (including naval and air force elements as well as army). It would be subordinate to the High Command in the area (not to A.F.S.A. or [redacted]). At this level there would probably also be a 'Y' Committee, international and inter-service, and including representatives of the National Sigint authorities concerned, for the purpose of co-ordinating 'Y' activities in the area.

8. Behind these 'Y' Centres there would be the National Centres - A.F.S.A., [redacted] counterpart. Their function towards these 'Y' Centres would be that of technical help from their wider resources and studies, like the help fed forward by the 'Y' Centres themselves to 'Y' Units. For this purpose the National Centres should have the right to have sent back from all theatres whatever raw traffic and other material they require.

9. There remains one possible link in the 'Y' chain - a N.A.T.O. 'Y' Board for the co-ordination of 'Y' in all theatres, presumably located with the Standing Group in Washington (to become Combined Chiefs of Staff).

10. In Sigint, full U.S. - [redacted] collaboration as at present is assumed. In regard to other N.A.T.O. powers, however, it is proposed, as has been said, that collaboration should be limited to dissemination according to strict need in a disguised form, and that the processes of production should remain national secrets. Additionally, there would be arrangements for supplying undisguised Sigint to the N.A.T.O. Commands on a [redacted] eyes only" basis. So vast are the resources likely to be necessary for successful exploitation of Sigint that the comparatively puny resources of other N.A.T.O. powers are unlikely to have a quid pro quo to offer for U.S. - [redacted] secrets, and pressure for such an exchange should be resisted. It has, however, to be borne in mind that the pressure on behalf of [redacted] as a member of the Standing Group (to become [redacted] might conceivably be beyond successful resistance. Where justified, there might be limited co-operation with other National Centres in the collection of raw traffic (e.g. [redacted]). "

11. It is to be hoped that in the interests of the best overall effort, U.S. and [redacted] agencies will cut out unnecessary duplication both in production and dissemination that, as last time, A.F.S.A. will concentrate on certain tasks and [redacted] on others, and that U.S. and [redacted] agencies will in certain cases do the dissemination to the forces of the other. Sigint would be disseminated to intelligence staffs through GCU's or SSO's on similar lines to last time. It is hoped that there would be a free exchange of personnel between A.F.S.A. and [redacted] in this scheme of things.

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13. It is to be expected that information of technical value to 'Y' Centres would become available from Sigint, e.g. callsign rotas, keys etc. Within limits and subject to satisfactory safeguards, this should be sent to the 'Y' Centres without disclosure of the source by the National Centre concerned or possibly by its forward subordinate agency.

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



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