1. These plans represent general principles. Their implementation will be conditioned by theatres of operation involved, by international agreements in specific cases, and by enemy military communications and cryptographic practices. These factors will affect such important particulars as geographical locations, the responsibilities of the COMINT units involved, and the degree and scope of exchange and COMINT distribution. The may propose an allocation of responsibilities on a geographical basis. Such allocation may be desirable and feasible if applied in accordance with principles now in effect. They may further propose that they provide a national sub-center for the Middle East and that the U.S. establish national sub-centers in the Far East and North Africa should wartime requirements make this necessary.

I. PLAN FOR COOPERATION AMONG NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS* IN WARTIME

2. Wartime cooperation will follow the peacetime pattern. One or more parties may find it necessary to establish one or more national centers overseas to ensure timely processing of certain high-level COMINT intercepted there. Where necessary or desirable, working parties of one nation may be assigned as mutually agreed to centers of the other nation. Exchange of end-products, raw traffic, and technical material among centers will be as complete as required. Dissemination of end-products will be via national channels, except where cross-servicing is mutually agreed.

3. In view of the geographical location of with respect to the European Theater, and in consideration of the U.S. Forces involved, the U.S., in the event of a general war in Europe or the Middle East between the Western Powers and the Russian bloc, will immediately undertake to augment the resources of by the provision of a substantial number of COMINT processing personnel, at all levels.

* National COMINT Center as used herein is intended to mean any center of one nation not provided solely for direct support of a single service, regardless of the authority or agency responsible for local management of such a center.
and of such equipment as may then be determined to be both feasible and profitable. The U.S. would expect to participate in the determination of priorities and allocation of resources with respect to the COMINT processing problem in the \[ \text{insofar as they affect military requirements. The intercept resources of the U.S. and} \]

\[ \text{which are essential for coverage of Europe and contiguous areas in-the-Western-Hemisphere would become available to the combined COMINT effort in the} \]

\[ \text{except for those required and reserved for direct support of the field forces of either nation and for the requirements of AFSA in the U.S. The latter would be coordinated with those supporting the combined effort in the} \]

\[ \text{traffic from all sources would be made available to both centers to the extent required and possible. The complete end-products of the combined effort in the} \]

\[ \text{would be made immediately available to the service intelligence organizations of both nations. Dissemination of these end-products would normally be via national channels but any other means of dissemination mutually agreed upon by the two national authorities would be possible and authorized.} \]

II. PLAN FOR COOPERATION AMONG U.S., AND SERVICE COMINT UNITS
PROVIDED FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF COMBAT FORCES (INCLUDING SERVICE OR THEATER CENTERS)

5. Normally, lateral exchange and other direct lateral cooperation among U.S., Service COMINT units provided for direct support of combat forces will be carried on at the highest levels that will meet essential operating requirements as mutually agreed.
6. National centers will provide appropriate technical support for, and obtain necessary material from, Service units of other nations as required and as mutually agreed.

7. Local coordination of exchange and cooperation will be effected in accordance with the policies of the National COMINT authorities concerned.

III. PLAN FOR WARTIME COOPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES

8. Wartime cooperation between in a theater of war outside SACEUR's command will depend upon the circumstances involved, and the experience gained as a result of COMINT cooperation in SACEUR's command.