MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL REICHELDERFER
ADMIRAL AMMON
GENERAL BASSETT

I have reviewed the recommendations received from the Technical Management Board for TMB Projects Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. Additional information concerning these projects is available in TMB documents TMB 11/4.5, TMB 11/4.6, and TMB 12/6.1 copies of which have been furnished each member.

Attached for your information is a listing of the action which I have taken in respect to each recommendation.

I appreciate the interest which you have evidenced in the activities of the Technical Management Board. I know that you share my belief that the results obtained from this Board will more than compensate for the time spent by your executive personnel serving as principal members or by other personnel serving as specialists on the working groups.

Your continued suggestions of projects for study by the Technical Management Board are invited.

This memorandum may be declassified upon removal of the inclosure.

/s/ Ralph J. Canine

RALPH J. CANINE
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director

Incl: a/s
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT BOARD

LISTING OF ACTION ON RECOMMENDATIONS

1. TMB Project No. 1: A study of the requirements for and utilization of COMINT traffic.
   a. Recommendation: Discontinue study since no raw traffic utilization problem exists.
      AFSS, in a minority recommendation, recommended action to determine whether a study of the require-
      ments for and utilization of semi-processed material (TECSUMS) by the TMB is justified.
   b. Final Action: (1) Study discontinued. (2) DD/PROD assigned project to resolve TECSUM problem with AFSS.

2. TMB Project No. 2: A study of NSA and cryptologic agencies' reports.
   a. Recommendation: That a reports committee be established under the direction of NSA to study, and report to the TMB on a continuing basis, reports and report requirements of NSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies; and that the members of this committee preferably be those individuals charged with the reports control activities, using the plans and procedures developed by the working group as the basis for conducting the study.
      Majority of the Board concurred with this recommendation. NSA members nonconcurred with the recommendation as written and proposed, that NSA establish a reports control program for the cryptologic effort. This program would be accomplished by a joint effort of the Reports Control Officers and operational personnel of the cryptologic agencies.
   b. Final Action: NSA Comptroller assigned project.

3. TMB Project No. 3: A study of the various job codes in existence to determine the possibility of establishing a uniform and satisfactory code for use by all Services.
a. **Recommendations:**

(1) That the following conclusions of the working group be adopted:

(a) If the Services were required to adopt a joint uniform job code and the formation of such a code could be completely coordinated with the security agencies and NSA, it is likely that some of the problems would vanish.

(b) The required adoption of an Ajax Job Code as a unique job code not related to the existing system does not appear to have great utility now particularly from the point of view of the individual services.

(c) Since NSA desires to establish a job code for NSA billets, one of the existing job codes should be used as a basic system in order to avoid the cost and confusion of establishing a fourth job code, with cross-referencing to the codes of the other services.

(d) The survey of military billets in NSA now in progress should provide valuable data regarding the job code required there.

(2) That the NSA Personnel Division establish in conjunction with the Services' cryptologic agencies, a program to develop job descriptions applicable to the members of the cryptologic agencies.

b. **Final Action:** Chief, NSA Personnel Division assigned action, as recommended.

4. **TMB Project No. 4:** Determination of the adequacy of the antenna fields at intercept stations in fulfilling the COMINT mission.

a. **Recommendations:**

(1) Services obtain more complete technical information on the current status of the antenna systems at the field stations and forward this information to NSA. NSA prepare a circular requesting specific information and requiring periodic engineering problem reports. (Providing that duplication of existing reports is not required.)
(2) Maintenance procedures for field station antenna personnel be established by a joint meeting of cryptologic service representatives to be called by NSA. Simultaneously, procedures should be established to check on the effectiveness of station personnel in maintaining the antenna systems, with reports being provided NSA for information.

The majority of the Board disapproves this recommendation since they consider this to be a Service problem. NSA members dissented and recommended adoption of the recommendation.

(3) Standards for maximum noise levels and appropriate measuring procedures be established for intercept stations by NSA.

The majority of the Board concurred with this recommendation. NSA did not concur since the maintenance of electronic material and establishment of maintenance procedures are not under their cognizance, although they interpose no objection to submitting recommendations to cognizant Navy authorities.

(4) NSA give greater consideration to the technical capabilities of the antenna field at the intercept stations when making assignments. There be a representative of NSA Intercept Facilities Division on the Intercept Priorities Committee to provide advice on the available antenna facilities to accomplish mission assignments.

(5) NSA should review their method of assigning missions in order to better utilize available antennas and real estate. The stations in turn should make recommendations back to NSA thru appropriate channels when they believe they can improve their operation by more appropriate mission assignments or by better utilization of antennas or real estate. An NSA Circular should be issued to set up a procedure for the flow of information up and down the line concerning mission assignments vs. station facilities. ASA did not concur since they consider that #1 above covers this.

(6) NSA and AFSS - NSA direct that a study be made of the utilization of the antenna fields by each service to determine whether the antenna fields are adequate in relation to the coverage being attempted.
ASA and NSO - A further study be made of the utilization of the antenna fields by each service taking one of their stations as a sample and attempting to determine whether the antenna fields are adequate in relation to the coverage being attempted.

(7) The Services, supported as required by NSA, should insure that appropriate clearances are obtained for the antenna design engineers so that they can be given a complete knowledge of the problem. Coordination should begin when a new station is first anticipated by NSA and continue throughout the planning, design, and construction of the station.

The majority of the Board concurred. NSA concurs provided the following sentence is added: "Closer coordination should be insured by a scheduled reporting procedure between NSA and the services concerned." (ASA, NSG, AFSS, non-concurred with this sentence.)

(8) NSA prepare a periodic review of estimates of anticipated mission assignments for each station and provide this information to the services for guidance in their station planning.

(9) The cryptologic agencies should come to NSA for support in their efforts to obtain real estate for erection of additional antennas.

The majority of the Board concurred. NSG did not concur since the recommendation is considered to involve matters outside the purview of the TMB.

(10) NSA coordinate the VHF/UHF/SHF antenna requirements of the three Services and forward the information to the ITC where joint military characteristics can be prepared. (for COMINT only)

(11) NSA undertake a study of existing antennas to determine their adequacy for COMINT in terms of optimum performance, minimum size, etc.

b. Final Action:

(1) DD/PHOD assigned action to accomplish recommendations Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10.

(2) R/D assigned action to accomplish recommendation No. 11.

(3) Recommendations Nos. 2, 6, and 7 are still being considered.
5. **TMB Project No. 6:** Determine the requirement for on-the-job training by NSA of Service personnel for specific jobs at Service field installations.

   a. **Recommendations:**

   (1) Cryptologic agencies consider eventual reduction of the requirements for on-the-job training by application of factors mentioned in paragraph 4b of the Working Group's Report for TMB Project No. 6.

   (2) NSA provide facilities for on-the-job training of service cryptologic agency personnel as indicated in Annexes I and II to the report.

   b. **Final Action:** Chief, NSA Training Division assigned action to implement recommendations.