NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT.

This paper is the first to bear the "USCIB 29.20/" file designation.
The subject of this file is:

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: 

1. The enclosed proposal by the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, D/A, which contains detailed background information, is forwarded herewith for consideration by vote sheet.

2. It is requested that vote sheet replies be returned to this office not later than 1200 Wednesday, 2 March 1955.

Enclosure

G-2, D/A memo dtd 9 Feb 55, control # 546290.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: Continuation of Activities

1. For more than two years, discussions have been underway with officials concerning the post-treaty status of the intercept activities presently conducted in by the

2. which consist of

The actual intercept is performed by specially selected who are cleared to handle material classified Confidential, under the supervision of U.S. Army officers and Department of the Army civilian personnel. The products of constitute a vital contribution to the security of U.S. forces in Europe and, as a reliable and

3. Although the unit was activated by the U.S. Army on the basis of an assumed the continued success of the operation has been largely due to the cooperation of This cooperation must be maintained if the operation is to continue in such a manner as to be of facilities or personnel necessary to conduct these activities as long as the operation is under U.S. control. Without the use of either, continuation of the operation would be most difficult if not impossible.

SECRET PIVOT
SUBJECT: Continuation of [ ] Activities (Continued)

4. In discussions to date concerning the continuation of [ ] activities, the [ ] authorities have maintained a reasonably cooperative attitude. There is no assurance, however, that this attitude will continue, type material, by one means or another, for their own purposes. Such being the case, any one of the following situations may develop to the detriment of U.S. interests:

a. The [ ] may attempt, in spite of the obvious difficulties involved, to pass legislation permitting surveillance of post and telecommunications. Passage of such legislation would satisfy the provisions but would not, per se, authorize U.S. participation in the project. With the operation under [ ] control, both the volume and timeliness of the material received by the U.S. would be greatly reduced. Moreover, any attempt to pass such legislation, whether successful or not, would probably receive publicity which would be detrimental to future activities and might well be used as a Communist propaganda weapon.

b. The [ ] may make an unsuccessful attempt to pass legislation which would permit surveillance of post and telecommunications. In such a case, the fact that the [ ] Basic Law prohibits examination of communications could be used by the [ ] as a basis for insistence upon discontinuance [ ] activities, regardless of the provisions of the treaty and regardless of the fact that they might be planning to implement a similar operation, themselves, without the participation or knowledge of the U.S. Such a situation would necessitate a re-evaluation of all aspects of [ ] operation in light of the overall [ ] U.S. relationship to determine the feasibility of enforcing the provisions.

c. The [ ] concluding that it would be politically unwise to attempt passage of enabling legislation, may decide to implement a pre-conceived parallel operation without legislation. In most cases, a parallel operation would duplicate the U.S. effort and would greatly increase the possibility that the U.S. operation might be compromised. In any case, the present good will and cooperation on the part of the [ ] could be expected to be supplanted by passive resistance by [ ] officials and the indigenous intercept operators.

5. In order to insure the continuation of [ ] activities in the manner most beneficial to the U.S. and to minimize the possibility of post- [ ] it is considered necessary that the U.S. initiate action designed to encourage continued cooperation by [ ] officials. A comprehensive study of the problem has resulted in the...
SUBJECT: Continuation of Activities (Continued)

closure that this can best be accomplished by the release of for the following reasons:

a. This action might well preclude the necessity for invoking

b. This traffic would satisfy the security requirements at little or no cost to the government.

c. It would preclude any necessity for the to rely upon legislation as a means to effect the procurement of this material

d. Under this arrangement, there would be no need for the to plan a parallel operation.

e. The authorities, fully aware of the above factors, could be expected to accept U.S. control of the examination of communications as a politically expedient and mutually beneficial arrangement.

6. In view of the above, it is recommended that:

a. Authorization be granted for release of government prior to ratification of the treaty.

b. Department of the Army be named executive agent for the with authority to determine:

(1) The most propitious time to release the traffic.

(2) The procedure to be followed in releasing the traffic.

(3) The amount and types of traffic to be released.

(4) Coordination to be effected with other U.S. agencies.

/s/ Robert A. Schow
/t/ ROBERT A. SCHOW
Major General, USA
Deputy ACofS, G-2