MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: COMINT Activities Involving [Redacted] to UKUSA

1. The enclosed statement of LSIB views has been received in reply to USCIB's request for additional information on this subject, per decision at the 115th USCIB meeting.

2. In the belief that the views of the members primarily concerned with this problem will facilitate USCIB consideration of the enclosure, the Department of Defense member has been requested to prepare, in coordination with Department of State and NSA representatives, recommendations and/or comments for distribution to USCIB.

3. It is suggested, therefore, that USCIB consideration of the enclosure await the action indicated in paragraph 2, above.

Enclosure
Copy of MOP 4649 dtd 13 June 1955.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, U.S.C.I.B.

Subject: 

I have been asked by the Chairman, L.S.I.B., to pass you the following message:

"Receipt is acknowledged of your message dated 16th May, and of CIB 000132 dated 24th May, both of which have been considered by LSIB.

It feels however that this essential difference may make it impossible to find a common solution which will suit the requirements of both countries.

"3. Reference paragraph 3, the main considerations which led LSIB to its present conclusions were as follows:

a) the existence of purely national military units employed on such work in a foreign sovereign state in peace time without the agreement of that state is incompatible with the political integrity of the country concerned. The existence of such units would only be politically acceptable as defence troops deployed there under NATO auspices.
c) With the entry of West Germany into NATO, LSIB is advised that juridically the NATO resolution to implement section IV of the final Act of the London Conference applies, whereby all forces within the area of SACEUR's command must either be placed under the command of SACEUR, or the North Atlantic Council be asked to approve of their exemption. It is considered that the first of these two courses presents less administrative and security difficulty. While placing units overtly under SACEUR's command, it should be possible to make a covert stipulation that they will not actually be controlled by him up to the reinforced alert stage of a war emergency.

d) LSIB would welcome USCIB's early comments on the above, and a statement of U.S. plans in this matter, the urgency of which is likely to be intensified as a result of the pending ratification of the Austrian treaty and the related problems arising therefrom.

"4. LSIB notes USCIB's suggestion that personal discussion may later be desirable, and suggests that a decision on this should await the development of this exchange of views. "

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