

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605NOTE 1:Excerpt from: DTG 191448 Jan 53, GCHQ to SLO Washington

1. [] told U.K. representative that to duplicate the supply of his traffic to both the U.S. and U.K. would be fatuous in view of the obvious US/UK coordination at some level on [].
2. He hinted that only samples were being given the U.S., and unless he got comments, appreciations, and expert assistance, he would be unwilling to continue the supply of raw material to the U.S.
3. [] then stated that [] should become a Tripartite affair and intelligence obtained therefrom by the US/UK should be made available to [].

NOTE 2:Excerpt from: Letter of 18 February 1953 from F.B. Rowlett to
ADM J. H. Wenger

1. [] requested specific information on [] from the [] despite his realization that the US/[] Agreement did not provide for the transmittal of such information.
2. He explained: "In some instances, [], for example, are moved to the [] and vice versa. When such moves take place the units retain the same call signs. This means that when a move takes place, his service is faced with the problem of attempting to identify the new call signs which have appeared in the []. This frequently takes a long time and results in a general slow-down of operations."
3. [] stated he could send some people to [] to monitor the [] to obtain the desired information, but he feels it would be too difficult and too costly for his small service.

[] did not get what he asked for.)