MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Security Assessments of [Blank]

Reference: USCIB 29.18/7 dated 8 June 1954.

The enclosed U.K. security assessments of subject named countries are circulated for information in connection with the reference.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
DGC/4508 dtd 29 May 1954.
Security Assessments of

1.

Extract from JIC/2275/53:

Communist Activity and Influence

The [ ] is a legal organisation but its membership is only about 9,000 representing 0.3% of the electorate.

2. Communist influence in the police and civil service is negligible. As regards the armed forces, see below.

3. In the [ ] there are no Communists but Communist influence is marked in a number of local unions especially the Forestry and Agricultural Union, the Builder's Unions, the Chemical, Metal, Dockers and Shipbuilding Unions.

The Armed Forces

4. The [ ] authorities are satisfied that there are no Communists in the higher ranks, but assume that among the junior N.C.O.'s and rank and file there is a percentage of Communists comparable to the proportion of Communists in the electorate. It is the practice in the service headquarters to limit access to classified material to a very few senior officers.

Physical security in Government Departments

5. This is inadequate by British standards. Pass systems and guards are used but the application of the regulations is often perfunctory and ineffective.

Security Organisation

during the last war and therefore have little tradition or experience. Though their own security is fairly good they are still inadequate for their purposes and as they have now probably reached their limits in size and budget this situation is likely to continue.

General Attitude to Security

7. The greatest weakness of [ ] security lies in the fact that they are, by tradition and character, not security minded. The extreme frankness they show to British people may, however be moderated by natural caution in their dealings with people whose friendship they do not take for granted.

8. A considerable degree of risk must attend the communication of classified military information to any [ ] authority other than a very restricted list of senior officers and public officials. The discretion of these senior officials may be generally relied upon.

Enclosure with USCIB 29.18/13 dtd 13 July 1954.
II. 

Extract from JIC/(53)41:

Communist Influence

Security measures have since been taken and Communist political influence in the regular cadres of the Armed Forces may be considered negligible. Any penetration now is certainly covert but previous experience and its exposed position to Soviet espionage must lead to the conclusion that it probably exists.

33. Communist influence in the Police is very small and in the Civil Service is also negligible except in the Customs Service Trade Union.

Security Organisation

35. The Security Service is well qualified professionally. It has not suffered any discontinuity in records as have those countries occupied by the Germans, but the fact that its records are not centralized means that there is a weakness in the vetting system.

36. appears to exercise some control in vetting and physical security, over Defence Industry. They have a fair grasp of the principles of protective security. On the other hand, the Government have no powers to require a firm to remove a Communist from secret work.

37. A more favourable impression has been given by representatives of the Air Ministry and Ministry of Supply who inspected Security in February. They concluded that "security in is of a high order" and that "it can be assumed that U.K. information passed to the Government will be adequately protected".

III. 

Extract from JIC(53)41:

Communist Activity

28. There is some evidence of Communist propaganda activity in the Armed Forces. Some attempts have been made to provoke incidents among the Police. The Civil Service is swollen by temporary officials and the Civil Service branch

SECRET
Security Organisation

29. Though the Security Service is enthusiastic, it lacks experience and is not fully effective. It appeared from the 1950 assessment of handling of N.A.T.O. documents that official security was weak. This was partly due to the unusual freedom of access to officials enjoyed by the press, and the uninhibited disclosures by officials of all matters of alleged public interest. There is no evidence that the have system of industrial security.

Conclusion

30. We consider that the standard of security is low and that no information which it is vital to keep secret should be released to the

31. The risk of loss of information or material given to must, unless security is radically improved, be considered a practical certainty.