TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: Security Standards for Negotiations with

Reference: WL-594, 4 Sept 54

1. GCHQ were interested to hear of the measures taken by USCIB to prepare for the negotiation and implementation of a new formal machinery for the same purposes in respect of the measures which the British have been taking (i.e., GCHQ in collaboration with Admiralty) are closely in line with those envisaged by NSA.

2. GCHQ agree with NSA that the security principles laid down in Appendix P, Annexure P1/F2, Exhibit 2 provide a sound basis for negotiations, and that adherence to such principles will satisfy the conditions of para. 15e of the NSA.

3. For negotiation with the Admiralty in conjunction with the Security Department GCHQ produced a set of security regulations closely based on Appendix P, Annexure P1, Exhibit 2. These are now being presented to the Admiralty as a statement of minimum standards applicable to the handling of COMINT/Y in the U.K. The are being asked to give assurance that they do or will apply minimum standards of at least equal or greater stringency, and no technical COMINT material will be supplied by the U.K. to the until such assurance is received. (This matter is now being negotiated with the but GCHQ are not yet aware of their reactions.)

4. In addition to these general standards, more detailed security practices for the classification, transmission, handling and usage of COMINT/Y are being or will be discussed and brought into effect as between the U.K. and the as negotiations develop. Thus, in answer to the specific questions in WL-594:

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-05-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526
a. The U.K. is introducing a series of codewords to cover all aspects of U.K. [blank]. The following are already in operation or are currently being proposed to the U.K.

If and when technical feedback starts the U.K. will wish to use a codeword to designate such material. It is not yet decided whether [blank] shall be proposed for this purpose also. GCHQ would prefer that this word should cover the [blank] but that individual items of

However, the introduction of such a codeword will need careful discussion with the [blank]. It is possible that, for security reasons within their own COMINT organization, they will wish not to have U.K. material marked in so distinctive a manner, in which case GCHQ shall not press the matter provided the [blank] give assurances regarding the detailed methods proposed for handling such material.

b. U.K. will classify [blank] either SECRET or TOP SECRET according to content. Material will normally be classified, for the [blank], with the [blank] might be applied in the U.K. It is not considered necessary or indeed feasible to classify COMINT materials as, for example, SECRET in the U.K. or for the purpose of UKUSA exchanges, but TOP SECRET for UK [blank] On the other hand it is considered that even such

c. At present the U.K. is intending to

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product. (See DGG/4691 to Director, NSA, Annexure R, Appendix, Document II.) If, in future, which may NOT be so integrated the U.K. would propose either to designate such material by a separate codeword (see (a) above) or otherwise to mark the material in such a manner as to indicate the special precaution required in its handling. The details of such handling will need to be discussed and agreed with the [illegible] if and when the need arises.

(signed)
WINN F. ZELLER
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Deputy SUSLO, London

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