1955.

SIGINT RELATIONS WITH CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN LONDON, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1954

I. INTRODUCTION

During a visit to in September 1954, D.N.I.'s representative took the opportunity, with the concurrence of Director G.C.H.Q. and Director N.S.A., to begin implementation of the arrangements in respect of agreed at the L.S.I.B/U.S.C.I.B. conference on held in July 1954. It was planned that discussion of further and more detailed implementation should await a conference in London between U.K. and representatives. This conference was held from 29th November to 4th December 1954 and was attended by representatives, and at various stages by a number of representatives of G.C.H.Q. The following is a brief summary of the results.

II. SECURITY

2. The tabled a printed draft containing general Defence Intelligence security instructions with a paragraph stating that in each Department a special office will be set up to handle secret intelligence and the results of interception. The U.K. representatives expressed their surprise and pleasure at the speed with which this security measure, based on U.K. practice, had been assimilated and initiated.

3. The question was raised of the employed in the organisation, volunteered to provide details and, pending U.K. reaction, not to show them any material received from us.

III. TECHNICAL RADIO AND EQUIPMENT MATTERS

4. Detailed discussions took place on technical radio matters, in which the again showed their sound knowledge and ability. The were initiated into technical search, but revealed a lack of knowledge of . It was agreed that G.C.H.Q. should send them a paper on technical search.

*Reported in DGC/4952.
5. The information sought on what types of aircraft were suitable for probing flights and whether such aircraft could be supplied to them. The U.K. representatives undertook to examine their requirements and make recommendations. They said that (a) they were not allowed to make penetration flights; (b) they could occasionally overfly; (c) they thought that might prove profitable.

6. A discussion took place on types of equipment required by the organisation, and a list of requirements was prepared for consideration by the U.K. and U.S. authorities.

IV. CONFLICT.

7. The U.K. representatives agreed to provide the from other stations. It was agreed that the further exchange of technical Comint material should be developed slowly; the limits of such exchange, in both directions, were discussed and agreed.

8. A discussion took place on the type of material which might be exchanged over the proposed U.K. communications channel. The emphasised that the number of officers who would be authorised to handle such traffic would be strictly limited and that groupage should be kept at a low level.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

9. The discussions were most cordial. In the final stage, expressed the hope that cooperation between the U.K. and would be developed to the extent that traffic could be supplied by the U.K. and close coordination of cover could be achieved. In view of restrictions within their own organisation of knowledge of cooperation with the U.K., it is however not clear how such traffic could be handled by them; and this suggestion will be given further consideration by the U.K. before any action is taken.

10. Since the conference, by agreement between Director G.C.H.Q. and Director N.S.A. the U.K. has provided the with certain limited information which will assist them to maintain the continuity of their interception after the 1st January 1955 change in the system.