

~~TOP SECRET~~

USCIB: 29.16/8

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

28 October 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605Subject: COMINT Arrangements with References: (a) USCIB 29.16/5 dated 14 September 1954.
(b) USCIB 29.18/16 dated 29 July 1954.

1. The enclosures are circulated for information in connection with the references.

2. The sequence of events is as follows:

a. On Saturday morning, 16 October 1954, SUKLO contacted the Executive Secretary and conveyed the substance of enclosure 1.

b. At about noon Saturday the Executive Secretary as a result of enquiries to the CIA informed SUKLO in substance as set forth in enclosure 2.

c. On Thursday, 21 October, enclosure 3 was received in the office of the Executive Secretary. A meeting of NSA representatives, CIA representatives, the SUKLO and the Executive Secretary was immediately called. As a result of that meeting enclosure 4 was provided to SUKLO.


d. On Monday, 25 October, enclosure 5 was received by the Executive Secretary from the CIA.

e. On Tuesday afternoon, 26 October 1954, enclosure 6 was received by the Executive Secretary from SUKLO and the latter was informed of the substance of enclosure 5 by the former.

3. No immediate further action is contemplated.

Enclosures

1. App. A to MOP 4246.
2. App. B to MOP 4246.
3. MOP 4246 dtd 20 Oct 1954.
4. Msg. from SUKLO to GCHQ
dtd 21 Oct 1954.
5. Msg. from to Dir. CIA
dtd 22 Oct 1954.
6. Encl. with MOP 4255.

for 
RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

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EO 3.3(h) (2)
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APPENDIX A

(MOP 4246)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. On 15th October GCHQ learnt via Air Ministry that Air Attache [] reported that U.S. authorities had made approach to [] in accordance with recent [] findings.
2. M.I.6. say their representation in [] confirmed this and moreover have already told [] that U.S. approach and proposals had U.K. knowledge and consent.
3. This was a great shock since U.S. had not informed the U.K. beforehand of intended timing (see para 15(c)(iv) of conference papers). Actually latest information from SUSLO dated 7th October was that U.S. approach would be "some time in November".
4. Further informed that [] has agreed U.S. proposals subject to [] approval.
5. Since matter is already so advanced it is urgent that R.A.F. be authorised to inform [] in accordance with para. 15 (L). (DGC 4708 of 16th August to Director NSA and his reply - not with SUKLO - refer.)

I was asked to get confirmation that NSA and CIA were aware of events in 1, 2 and 4 above and seek urgent U.S. authority for R.A.F. to inform [] in accordance with para. 15(L) of Conference papers. Air Ministry are pressing for authority for Air Attache to tell [] / about future UK/USA intentions before he heard whole story through other channels. They would not take action before the 16th.

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.16/8 dtd 28 Oct 1954.

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APPENDIX B

(MOP 4246)

EO 3.3(h)(2)

1. U.S. representative (CIA) approached [redacted] informally with view to determining whether an agreement with the U.S. would be considered by the [redacted].
2. U.S. representative indicated that any [redacted] material received would need to be interchangeable with the U.K. and asked if that would be acceptable to [redacted].
3. [redacted] said exchange might be acceptable but he would have to obtain approval of [redacted].
4. No mention of direct U.K. or R.A.F. involvement was made.
5. Formal approach now planned for December.
6. U.S. would prefer R.A.F. not to get in at this juncture but feel you must be free to act if you feel your position jeopardised.

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Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.16/8 dtd 28 Oct 1954.

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BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION
MAIN NAVY BUILDING
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MOP 4246

20th October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

TO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Subject: [redacted]

I have been asked to communicate to you, for information of the U.S. authorities concerned, the following message received by me on 20 Oct. from Director, GCHQ:

" We (the U.K.) have felt obliged to authorise the Air Attache, [redacted], to make a limited disclosure to the [redacted] of UKUSA intentions. The reasons are as follows:

" A. Once [redacted] refers U.S. proposals to Mindef, [redacted] will almost certainly be asked for reactions. We are advised that, unless [redacted] is forewarned and convinced of the need to accept the proposals, he may well line up formidable [redacted] opposition. Hostility between [redacted] and [redacted] is well known and [redacted] is likely to oppose acceptance of proposals seeming to favour [redacted]

" B. The R.A.F. will be placed in a very difficult position if the [redacted] learn through Mindef that the U.S. has offered [redacted] which is substantially more than anything the R.A.F. has offered (or is now by Conference Agreement allowed to offer) to [redacted]. It is therefore essential that [redacted] be advised by the R.A.F. of ultimate UKUSA intentions in respect of the [redacted] as soon as possible.

" The following brief has been provided to the Air Attache for limited disclosure to [redacted]:

'A. An understanding has recently been reached between U.S. and U.K. for providing [redacted]. By this the U.S. will provide [redacted] on behalf of both itself and the U.K. [redacted] has been informed of this arrangement and technical assistance from the U.S. will be provided to his organisation.

'B. In accordance with this understanding any [redacted] will, at a future date to be decided, be provided by the U.S. instead of the R.A.F. This however only affects R.A.F. [redacted] arrangements in respect of [redacted]

Co-operation between R.A.F. and [redacted] will continue as at present.

Enclosure 3 with USCIB 29.16/8 dtd 28 Oct 1954.

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MOP 4246 (cont.)

'C. The R.A.F. has agreed this change on the clear understanding that the assistance to be provided by the U.S. to the [redacted] (probably through [redacted]'s organisation but otherwise directly) will be at least as complete as that hitherto provided by the R.A.F.

'D. [redacted] until such time as the U.S. is in a position to provide adequate assistance. '

" We (the U.K.) much regret having to take the action as above, but the unexpectedness and speed of events in [redacted] over which we had no control, forced our hand. We would emphasise that our main purpose was not only to facilitate dealings of the R.A.F. with the [redacted] but also to ensure success of UKUSA plans. In the circumstances of the U.S. approach we felt bound to ensure early [redacted] knowledge of and adherence to Conference agreement that the U.K. (R.A.F.) will withdraw in due course from [redacted] "

My Director also asks me to request the U.S. authorities to ensure that the U.K. are advised well in advance of future stages in the U.S. - [redacted] approach, as otherwise similar crises and possible misunderstandings may well recur.

/s/

[redacted signature box]

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P.S.

At Appendix A is gist of first intimation I had from GCHQ on Friday 15th. As you know we got together on this subject on Saturday morning. A meeting on Friday evening thanks to "Hazel" was not possible to arrange.

At Appendix B is gist of my reply after consultation with you.

At Appendix C are further comments to me from GCHQ, received on 20th October.

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An initial informal approach to the [redacted] was made in order to obtain agreement in principle to [redacted] adherence to the required security standards, to the placing of an NSA representative in [redacted] to the general plan of expansion and cooperation, and to set a date for the negotiations. No mention was made of the U.K. nor of the [redacted]

[redacted] subsequently agreed in principle and set a date of 6 December for the conference. He then raised the question of the UK position in this matter. With his hand thus forced, the CIA representative gave Colonel [redacted] the gist of paragraph 15c of the July Agreement. There was no mention of the [redacted] or RAF, and no discussion of the extent of UK-US collaboration or of future UKUSA intentions with respect to the [redacted]. The only points discussed by the U.S. representative were the fulfillment of the previous U.K. request for copies of [redacted] traffic and the possibility in return of incorporating technical comments from the U.K. within the materials passed by the U.S. to [redacted]. Colonel [redacted] stated that he thought that he could obtain permission from Ministry of Defense for the U.S. to pass his material to the U.K.

[redacted]

In a cable to Director, GCHQ, dated 25 August 1954 answering DGC 4078 of 16 August 1954, DIRNSA said that initial approach would not be made before late September or early October. It was actually made in early October. As of this time the U.S. has not yet been able to determine whether the question of the [redacted] would be brought up at the main conference, or whether it is preferable to leave it until a later date. DIRNSA's cable of 25 August stated that he expected the RAF to continue its [redacted] or even increase it if necessary. It was understood that paragraph 15(L) of the conference paper would pertain.

Revelation to the [redacted] of a U.K./U.S. agreement concerning [redacted] and in particular intentions regarding the [redacted], go far beyond what has yet been revealed to [redacted] and will put the U.S. in the untenable position of withholding information from him if he should hear of it via [redacted] and the MINDEF prior to U.S. briefing him on the whole problem.

Because of the known [redacted] conflict, the timing and substance of any discussions is critical and the brief outlined in your MOP 4246 of 20 October might well jeopardize the main course of the

Enclosure 4 with USCIB 29.16/8 dtd 28 Oct 1954.

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proposed [] -U.S. COMINT agreement. In this connection, it should be emphasized that the COMINT produced by the [] is a relatively minor portion of that required by the U.S./U.K.

In the light of the above, the strongest representation is made that nothing be said to the [] until a specific request to this effect is made to the U.K. by the U.S.

If the briefing can be withheld from [] who may later approach the U.K. Air Attache with questions, the latter, might state that according to his information the agreement under discussion between the U.S. and [] should not effect the support supplied to the [] by the RAF.

If the [] has already been briefed according to MOP 4246, it will become necessary to inform [] immediately of the whole situation with the hope that this can be done before he is so informed by the MINDEF or the [], so that the adverse effect on [] and the U.S. plans can be minimized.

U.S. representative [] and SUSLO, London are being fully informed of circumstances with former instructed not to say anything to [] unless approached in which case he is to be guided by his own judgment.

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Enclosure 4 with USCIB 29.16/8 - CONT.

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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

22 OCTOBER 1954

FROM: []

1. REGRET CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED MENTIONING CONTENT OF PARA 15-C WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER, FARRELL AND CARR WERE FULLY AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY BEFORE THE FACT. PRESUMED THEY WOULD HAVE INFORMED APPROPRIATE U.K. AIR INTERESTS AS REQUIRED. THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE WAS PREVIOUSLY UNAWARE OF THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL U.K. AIR ATTACHE.

2. U.K. AIR ATTACHE BRIEF CONTAINED ESSENTIALLY THE FOLLOWING:

a. NOISE LISTENING ACTIVITY TO REMAIN AS AT PRESENT BETWEEN THE RAF/ []

b. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO BE AS COMPLETE AS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED.

c. U.K. TO CONTRIBUTE TO U.S. RESPONSE TO []

EO 3.3(h)(2)

d. RAF TO CONTINUE PRESENT ROLE RE [] UNTIL THE U.S. IS IN A POSITION TO TAKE OVER THE ASSISTANCE. TO DATE, ONLY MOST GENERAL ORAL STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE TO [] IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT HE BE SLIGHTLY KNOWLEDGEABLE IF AND WHEN CALLED BY [] RE THIS SUBJECT. U.K. AIR ATTACHE FEELS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH [] WILL NECESSITATE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ITEMS IN BRIEF SHORTLY, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, [] WAS BRIEFED WITH LIGHT REFERENCE TO PARA 15-K, AS REQUIRED. RESULTS AND OVERALL SITUATION RE [] ARE COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY AND UNCHANGED. NO CRITICAL SITUATION DEVELOPED AND THE U.S. POSITION IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.

Enclosure 5 with USCIB 29.16/8 dated 28 October 1954.

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Encl. to MOP 4255
26th October 1954

1. The following are points which emerge in an answer from the Chairman of the UKUSA [redacted] held 12th July - 21st July 1954 to a signal composed in your office on 21st October.
2. Air Attache, [redacted], has been signalled asking (a) whether [redacted] has already been briefed (b) if so what reactions from R (c) whether R has said anything to [redacted] or Ministry of Defence. EO 3.3(h) (2)
3. If by chance R has not been briefed Air Attache has been asked to refrain until further orders.
4. If R has been briefed and has said nothing to E or Ministry of Defence, Air Attache will request him to keep information to himself.
5. It is more than possible that all above is now too late and that next action will have to be the informing of E of the whole situation as per the penultimate paragraph of the signal referred to in my paragraph 1 above.
6. The Chairman is not surprised at U.S. concern at the turn of events but he must point out that the difficulties have arisen by reason of the unannounced approach and failure to consult with U.K. before it was made.
7. At the July Conference there was no suggestion of an "initial informal approach" nor of intended first approach in which no mention would be made of U.K. or [redacted]
8. U.K. had fully expected:
 - a) To be informed before any approach took place so that they could warn [redacted] and also consider what, if any, action to take about [redacted] at that juncture.
 - b) That Conference paragraphs 15(b) and (c) would be implemented by U.S. as part of first approach to E. ((c iv) very relevant.)
9. After conference discussions - which stressed need for U.K. position with E to be safeguarded right from start of new approach to him - the U.K. had not expected U.S. hand to have to be forced by E before they mentioned the U.K.
10. DGC/4078 made clear U.K. particular concern about date of U.S. approach because, although fully aware of critical need to wait until after that approach, the U.K. urgently needed to say something to [redacted] to safeguard R.A.F. interests.

Enclosure 6 with USCIB 29.16/8 dated 28 October 1954.

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Encl. to MOB 4255 (cont.)

11. Latest information U.K. received was NOT in DIRNSA reply to DGC/4078 but in later DIRNSA signal (received via SUSLO) which began "it has been learnt that U.S. negotiations with [] cannot begin until some time in November." (Context SHAPE Y approaches.) U.K. had not been advised of subtle difference between "approach" and "negotiations" and were therefore totally unprepared for news from [].

12. This news placed U.K. in respect of R precisely in position in which U.S. now find themselves in respect of E. U.K. could not take any risk and were seriously perturbed that R would first hear of UKUSA plans for [] through back door.

[] U.S. must appreciate how hard it was at conference for R.A.F. to agree [] Therefore how important it is that withdrawal should be by means fully acceptable to R.A.F. and [] and without detriment to other R.A.F./[] relations, and therefore U.K. is bound to be guided by Air Attache about best means and time to effect delicate negotiations with R.

13. Had U.S. given U.K. pre-warning of approach to E and frankly explained limits of what they intended to say in that approach the U.K. could have discussed situation with Air Attache beforehand and by agreement with U.S. fully coordinated action in respect of E and R.

Not knowing what U.S. had said to E, the U.K. felt obliged to take urgent action to ensure R did not get back-door information to prejudice R.A.F. [] relations.

14. Chairman adds that paragraph 7 of the signal referred to in my paragraph 1 above representing "that nothing be said to the [] until a specific request to this effect is made to the U.K. by the U.S." is in any case quite unacceptable.

In the now only faintly possible event that nothing has been said to [] the U.K. could certainly NOT leave initiative in this matter to U.S. The U.K. feel they must be free to determine best time and method of handling R.A.F. withdrawal from [] - even though in normal circumstances they would consult fully with U.S.

15. No news from [] yet regarding whether brief carried out or not, but Chairman is inclined to believe penultimate paragraph of signal referred to in my paragraph 1 above re necessity of informing E of whole situation etc., etc. is best solution in any case. All cards will then be on the table.

16. The Chairman adds finally that U.K. expects notification will in advance of any "initial informal" U.S. approach to []

- a) To ensure complete co-ordination of cover story as in Conference paragraph 17(B)iv.
- b) To avoid episodes such as this.