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USCIB: 29.11/8


~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

24

3 November 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:Subject: References: (a) USCIB 29.11/7 dated 12 July 1954.
(b) USCIB 29.11/4 dated 15 March 1954.

1. The enclosures are circulated for information.
2. The NSA serial 000318-S mentioned in the enclosed letter of the Director, National Security Agency was circulated as an enclosure to reference (a) and was based on the policy set forth in the enclosure with reference (b).


 RUFUS L. TAYLOR
 Captain, U. S. Navy
 Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures

1. DGC/4916 dtd 2 Oct. 1954
2. NSA Memo TSC#54-2829-B, dtd 29 Oct. 1954

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

USCIB: 29.11/8

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GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS
Oakley, Cheltenham, Glos.

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DGC/4916

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2nd October, 1954.

Director,
National Security Agency.

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In the autumn of 1953 [redacted]

[redacted] informed the local representative of the corresponding organisation in U.K. that he was anxious to obtain:

(a) the output of the British organisation which dealt with [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted]

(b) cryptographic and cryptanalytic training for 3 or 4 selected [redacted] cypher officers.

2. A visit [redacted] was then due to pay to London was postponed and apart from a first reaction to [redacted] from the U.K. local representative that the matters raised were outside his control but he anticipated considerable difficulties in meeting requests of such a nature, the approach was not answered by London and was not followed up by [redacted]

3. It is now learned however that [redacted] is about to visit both Washington and London officially; and it is understood that the same demands are on his agenda for both places.

4. It is believed that both U.S. and U.K. authorities are anxious to be as helpful as possible to the [redacted] authorities, but clearly [redacted]'s demands, precisely as enumerated above, are unacceptable to the Comint and Comsec authorities of U.S. and U.K. It seems desirable however that a common agreed U.S./U.K. Comint/Comsec policy towards these demands should be established and that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. attitude in reply should be more accommodating than the other.

5. The advice being tendered by G.C.H.Q. and L.C.S.A. to those concerned with answering [redacted]'s demands when he arrives in London is therefore as follows:-

(a) Comint End Product U.K. Government policy lays down that such product cannot be divulged to other nations and the General will doubtless realise that in view of the sensitivity of the source this is an entirely reasonable restriction. If however current negotiations in [redacted] between H.M. Ambassador and the [redacted] authorities for the [redacted]

[redacted] were to be brought to a successful conclusion, the results of this station's activities would be reflected in due course in the general Intelligence reports which are made available to [redacted] both direct from U.K. and via SHAPE. (It is of course not intended that any Comint-graded material shall

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be included in such reports and in fact no real concession is envisaged. It is suggested however that the U.S. could offer similar notional "concessions" through the activities of their intended [redacted].

- (b) Cryptographic Training It is regretted that the U.K. is not able to offer courses on this subject. U.K. advises that assistance should be asked from the Standing Group of N.A.T.O. which has recently set up an organisation the Standing Group Communications Security and Evaluation Group SECAN in Washington and the European Communications Security Agency (ECSA) in Paris to deal with Communication Security matters.
- (c) Cryptanalytic Training It is regretted that no specialised courses on this subject exist in U.K.; training is done "on the job" and the restrictions mentioned in para (a) above naturally preclude the presence of foreign nationals. Subject however to an indication of present [redacted] knowledge in this sphere (which could be obtained by the visit of a U.K. cryptanalyst to [redacted]) it might prove helpful to [redacted] if U.K. were either:-

- (a) to provide to the [redacted] authorities a number of cryptanalytic pamphlets specially prepared in the U.K. to train new entries,
- or (b) to organise a special course for not more than 4 [redacted] officers (which would be based on the pamphlets mentioned above) provided that not less than 6 months notice is given. It is intended that either of the two alternatives above which are proposed purely in order to keep U.K. and [redacted] [redacted] on a satisfactory basis, would be strictly confined to the limits of the present published bibliography of cryptanalysis. There would be no mention of any sophisticated or machine techniques. The course in alternative (b) would be conducted in London by a member of G.C.H.Q.

6. I should be most grateful for your comments. I hope that you are in general agreement with the above plan and that any proposals made by U.S. in response to [redacted]'s requests in the Comint/Comsec sphere will not exceed in scope the limited offers described in the intended U.K. replies above.

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/s/ [redacted]
Director.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29 OCT 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, GCHQ

SUBJECT: Visit of [redacted]

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1. I have received your DGC/4916 of 2 October 1954 on the above subject, and I appreciate the advance information which you provided me on the UK position with regard to answering possible demands by [redacted] during his forthcoming visit.

2. The maximum concessions which the US is willing to make in order to obtain [redacted] have been determined by USCIB and were forwarded to you by means of a memorandum to [redacted], Serial 000318-S, Subj: [redacted]

[redacted], on 6 July of this year. Thus far, however, the subject of possible COMINT quid pro quo has not been broached by either side in our base rights negotiations with [redacted]

3. At the time USCIB agreed upon these maximum concessions, the members expressed a desire to review the circumstances, before any commitments were made, in each instance in our negotiations where a request for information, material, or other assistance was made or the desirability of offering a concession seemed evident. Accordingly, I will refer the matter of [redacted]'s visit to the Board for consideration and for the preparation of each member Department or Agency who may have occasion to confer with the General during his visit to Washington. I will endeavor to inform you immediately when the USCIB decision has been made.

4. Because of the Board's expressed desire to maintain a continuing review of our negotiations with the [redacted], I do not anticipate that the terms of reference to be agreed upon by USCIB will exceed, in any respect, the US position outlined in my 6 July memorandum to [redacted]

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RALPH J. CANINE
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director

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