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USCIB: 29.9/4

27 September 1954

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

[Redacted]

Reference: USCIB 29.9/3 dated 17 September 1954.

1. The enclosure describes in general the action taken by the Executive Secretary subsequent to the 19th Meeting of USCIBEC whereat the reference and associated matters were considered without arriving at unanimous agreement as to the best course of action.
2. The CIA, NSA, and State Department Members have now agreed to the terms of reference set forth in the enclosure. It is recommended, therefore, that these terms of reference be examined and if not objectionable to any member, that the Department of State be authorized to inform Embassy [Redacted] that the meeting requested by the [Redacted] Intelligence Coordinator will be arranged as soon as practicable.
3. Owing to the desirability for an early answer to Embassy Rome, members are requested to have the office of the Executive Secretary informed of their views in this matter by telephone as soon as practicable.


 RUFUS L. TAYLOR
 Captain, U. S. Navy
 Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s.

~~THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ENCLOSURE CONTAIN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.~~

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INTERCEPT BASE RIGHTS IN ITALY

1. In considering a request from the [redacted] [redacted] for a personal briefing from high level qualified U.S. Intelligence representatives on matters related to the U.S. request for [redacted] rights with particular reference to planned and present U.S.-[redacted] joint intelligence operations, the Executive Committee agreed that it would be desirable in the interest of preserving the integrity of U.S. base rights negotiations and exhausting all reasonable possibilities of obtaining desirable U.S. [redacted] to accommodate [redacted] insofar as practicable. It is the opinion of the majority of the Executive Committee that such an effort could be made without undue jeopardy to the valuable relationship existing between the CIA and the [redacted] which the entire Committee believes must be preserved, and that a military intelligence representative of flag rank should be supplied by the NSA to go together with a representative of comparable status, selected by the Director of Central Intelligence, and a representative from the U.S. Embassy in [redacted] to arrange a briefing of [redacted] to explain to him more fully the circumstances affecting the U.S. request for [redacted]

2. The CIA member of the Executive Committee was not fully in accord with the recommendation to call upon [redacted] owing to a feeling that such representatives would not be able to make the commitments which the CIA member feels are desired by [redacted]. The DCI has since indicated his belief that we should not be averse to further explanations to [redacted] under the conditions described above, provided the terms of reference of such a discussion were to include constructive suggestions calculated to allay [redacted] Intelligence fears. The DCI felt that the terms of reference should be approved in advance of making any commitment to hold such a meeting.

3. In view of the foregoing, the terms of reference¹ set forth below are suggested:

a. That arrangements be made through the Department of State for a delegation, consisting of: a representative of the Department of State (acting as host, and sponsoring the other two members); the Senior CIA Representative in [redacted] (representing the over-all intelligence interests of the U. S. Government); and a representative of the National Security Agency (representing the intelligence interest of the U.S. armed services in connection with the details of the requirements and negotiations for base rights and functioning of the [redacted] on those bases), to brief [redacted] at an early date.

b. That the delegation would make the following points clear to [redacted] in the manner indicated:

(1) The U.S. feels that [redacted] has misunderstood the purpose of these intercept bases and desires to emphasize that their purpose is a separate and distinct from somewhat similar [redacted] operations from which the U.S. is now receiving the benefit.

To be covered by the CIA Rep. with the support of the NSA Rep.

¹ With regard to COMINT Activities, the commitments indicated in these terms of reference are not intended to exceed the provisions of paragraph 4 of Appendix "B", UKUSA, except insofar as the provision of raw traffic to the [redacted] is concerned.

(2) The request for these sites is in no way intended to impugn the quantity or quality of the information currently being received from the [redacted] through the CIA, or to reduce the collaboration now existing between those services. On the contrary, it is hoped that the CIA [redacted] collaboration can be expanded along several lines which the competent technical people can discuss at a later date as required.

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(3) The [redacted] requested are primarily for military purposes, and for war insurance of operational intelligence in direct support of U.S. military operations in Europe.¹ It is U.S. opinion that the bases requested will materially enhance the allied potential in war and that [redacted] will understand that we cannot wait until war is upon us to establish these facilities. If [redacted] indicates he fears that the facilities may be directed against [redacted] he should be given reassurance that the U.S. will not [redacted]

To be covered by the NSA Rep. with the support of the CIA Rep.

(4) In order to maintain the indispensable security of such U.S. military installations, it is obvious that these stations must be kept under U.S. control and guard. [redacted] personnel would not have free access to these stations nor would there be any direct U.S. [redacted] collaboration in their operations. Nevertheless, in order to avoid placing political capital into Communist hands, it is expected that visits of inspection and courtesy will be arranged under conditions which would not expose the detailed workings of these installations.

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¹ If the question has not been raised before, it can be anticipated by the delegation that at this point [redacted] will ask what specific targets are to be covered by the U.S. [redacted] which are not already being covered by the [redacted] services. The NSA Representative should be prepared to deal in general terms with this query, stressing the military aspects of the [redacted]

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c. The NSA Representative, if pressed by [redacted] on the question of quid pro quo can indicate that the expansion of collaboration can include the furnishing to the [redacted] of (1) such [redacted] as might be of assistance or value to [redacted]; (2) additional guidance which may serve to avoid duplication of effort.²

d. If the U.S. representatives obtain the sense that [redacted] [redacted]'s reaction is essentially negative, or that further pursuit of the matter will damage the existing cordial relationships of CIA with [redacted] services, they are to withdraw, indicating that the matter will be discussed further in the U.S. and that [redacted]'s views will be presented to the pertinent authorities.

2 i. In its past and present dealings with the [redacted] Intelligence Services, the United States has not provided the [redacted] with any COMINT information beyond statements that the material was of high quality and that we desired its continuation. In all cases the statements have been based on material provided by the [redacted] services. To offer the [redacted] more than this is a distinct departure from previous United States practice.

ii. The bulk of the [redacted] material is received from three sources: [redacted] The delivery of Army material only is channeled through [redacted] or [redacted] representatives. Navy and Air Force material is delivered directly to a CIA Representative by an [redacted] of each respective service. It is not believed on the basis of evidence available to us that [redacted] is aware of the details of the types or the quantity of messages [redacted], but it is thought that he is only generally aware that such an arrangement exists. He is definitely informed in full detail, however, of the material provided by the [redacted]

iii. In view of the long-established policy of the United States in dealing with [redacted], namely, that no COMINT information was to be provided by the U.S. to the [redacted] may not request the products of the proposed [redacted] be furnished to him; thus, the initial promise of expansion or collaboration should confirm the intention of the U.S. to continue the support and subsequent expansion of the [redacted] Intelligence Services in the form of material assistance. Unless [redacted] specifically requests [redacted], or it appears that the [redacted] will be needed to obtain [redacted]'s acquiescence to the bases, no such proffer should be made.

iv. If, however, [] does [] it is suggested that the delegation query him as to the type desired and if appropriate, indicate their willingness to accede to his wishes if such material can be []. By following such an approach, the delegation will avoid being placed in the somewhat difficult position of having to define specifically for [] which they expect to be produced by the [].

v. As a final negotiating maneuver, that is, if [] does not himself make a [] and if it appears that the proffer of traffic will be of assistance in obtaining []'s acquiescence to the bases, it is suggested that the delegation indicate to [] that certain traffic of interest to him and his service might be provided by the U.S. installations and that he then be queried as to what types of material would be of interest to him.