

USCIB: 29.9/11

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22 June 1955

24

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Intercept Base Rights in

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Reference: USCIB 29.9/10 dated 12 November 1954.

1. The enclosure has been received from the Director, NSA with a request that USCIB approval of understandings reached between U.S. and representatives be obtained.

2. It is requested that your views on the enclosed proposal be entered on the attached vote sheet which should be returned to this office by the close of business Friday, 1 July 1955.


A. D. JONES

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Declassified and approved for release by NSA
on 01-26-2015 pursuant to E.O. 13526

USCIB: 29.9/11

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 4283

20 JUN 1955

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1. Reference is made to USCIB 29.9/10 which contains a report of General Ackerman's talks with [REDACTED], in October 1954. During the negotiations, it was agreed that the understanding reached by the U. S. and [REDACTED] representatives would be formalized in a memorandum of specific operational responsibilities.

2. The inclosed draft "Memorandum of TOP SECRET Understanding Regarding U. S. and [REDACTED] Communications Intelligence Operations in [REDACTED] has been prepared by NSA. It is requested that the draft be circulated to the members of USCIB for approval. Upon approval, it is requested that the CIA member arrange to forward the memorandum to [REDACTED] through CIA channels.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

(Signed)
GEO. E. CAMPBELL
Colonel AGC
Adjutant General

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Incl:

Draft Memorandum of TOP SECRET
Understanding Regarding U.S. and
[REDACTED]

Enclosure with USCIB 29.9/11 dtd 22 June 1955.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum of TOP SECRET Understanding Regarding U. S.
and [redacted] in [redacted]

1. The U. S. will conduct Communications Intelligence operations in [redacted]. If the U. S. wishes to conduct additional operations of this nature in [redacted] the permission of [redacted] will be obtained prior to the initiation of negotiations with any other elements of the [redacted] Government.

2. In order to minimize duplication of intercept, there will be coordination of these activities. This coordination will be effected in two ways: (a) the tasking of agreed [redacted] facilities by the U. S., and (b) the selective exchange of intercept. The exchange of traffic will be effected, on a request basis, and will be carried out insofar as it is compatible with station operations.

3. To improve the timeliness of [redacted] for concerned U. S. authorities, arrangements will be made for the electrical forwarding of certain intercept material, selected from that presently received from [redacted], to U. S. stations for quick transmission forward to the U. S. If assistance is required in the establishment of communications for this purpose, the U. S. will endeavor to provide the necessary equipment or funds.

At each U. S. station provision will be made for inclusion of a small [redacted] unit, separate from the U. S. operations area but under U. S. operational control, for the assignment of intercept tasks. Each of these units will be commanded by an [redacted] liaison officer who will serve as the point of contact for all official [redacted] matters. No [redacted] unit at a U. S. station will exceed 30 persons in total complement without specific U. S. approval.

5. Knowledge of the contents of this Memorandum will be highly restricted in consonance with specific "need-to-know." Furthermore, both nations agree that the Principles of Security set forth in the SHAPE "Y" planning documents will be followed with regard to the handling of material exchanged, and the clearance of personnel involved in COMINT operations.

6. This understanding, as detailed in the specific operational responsibilities mentioned in the above paragraphs, is not intended to replace the arrangements which presently exist between [redacted] and CIA.

~~TOP SECRET CONTROL NO. NSA 551055-A~~
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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

Inclosure