

USCIB: 29.9/3

17 September 1954

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~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject:

Reference: USCIB 29.9/2, dated 17 September 1954.

1. The enclosure is forwarded for consideration in connection with Item 4 of the agenda for the 19th Meeting of USCIBEC, to be held on Tuesday, 21 September 1954, at 1400. The reference contains a resume of earlier USCIBEC consideration of the problem (15 September 1954).

2. The Committee's primary interest in further consideration of this problem is to determine whether the national interest will best be served by withdrawing the U.S. request for in view of the information contained in the enclosure, and information on COMINT aspects of the problem which will be presented by the Director, NSA in advance of the meeting.

for *R. L. Taylor*
R. L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
Comments submitted by
the CIA Member

USCIB: 29.9/3

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. At its Special Meeting on 15 September 1954, USCIBEC decided that a team of high-level representatives [redacted] NSA should be sent to [redacted] for the purpose of fulfilling a request by [redacted] for a personal briefing with respect to the U.S. request for [redacted]

2. This USCIBEC decision has been carefully reviewed within the Central Intelligence Agency in light of the points made during the USCIBEC meeting and in light of statements on the subject by [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] This review has raised considerable doubt as to (1) whether the proposed briefing would in fact further U.S. efforts to secure [redacted] agreement to the [redacted] and (2) whether the need for the [redacted] if obtainable, is sufficient to justify the incalculable, and possibly irreparable, damage to U.S. intelligence interests which is resulting from continued military and diplomatic pressure for these base rights. It appears therefore that further consideration should be given to weighing the overall intelligence benefits expected from the U.S. [redacted] against those currently being realized through other intelligence arrangements, as described in paragraph 5 below.

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3. At the USCIBEC meeting, it was brought out that:

a) The requirement for [redacted] no longer has the importance that it did at the inception of negotiations.

[redacted]

c) The draft agreements, as they now stand, allow the [redacted] to station a liaison officer at one of the bases, and put the other under their command.

d) The U.S. is now unwilling to give the [redacted] any access

[redacted]

4. [redacted] and made the following statements:


a) U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force are requesting [redacted]

b) [redacted] is in the course of enlarging its own [redacted] and stands ready to give open and complete collaboration

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e) Therefore, U.S. efforts will not be advanced and may be retarded, by a briefing of [redacted] which neither answers his questions nor offers him any [redacted] quid pro quo.

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8. The issue therefore is whether the potential benefits to be derived from the U.S. [redacted], if obtainable, would compensate for the loss of other irreplaceable current and long-range intelligence benefits which will be jeopardized by any further U.S. pressure for establishment of these bases, particularly since there is substantial doubt as to whether efforts to obtain these bases will be successful in any event. Judging from the statements mentioned in paragraphs 3a and 3b above, the benefits to be derived from the proposed bases are somewhat in doubt; however, more complete evidence on this point should be produced in order effectively to balance the gains against the losses.

9. It is therefore recommended that USCIBEC reconsider the problem of negotiations for [redacted], with particular attention to the points raised above.

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Huntington D. Sheldon
CIA Member

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