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REF ID: A61073

19 March 1954

Friedman

OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE AND TOPICS
FOR US TSWG REPRESENTATIVE

I. Discussions with UK TSWG Representative:

1. Allow for two days discussions ~~in London if possible~~ before the talks with the French TSWG nominee.
2. The topics that should be covered in these discussions include:
 - a. General agreement on the functions to be performed.
 - b. Agreement on the manner of dealing with the French on those matters.
 - c. Exchange of information on the French COMSEC organization.

II. Points to be explained to the French Representative:

1. Reason for undertaking the program:

Essentially an ^{exposition} expansion of the Aide-Memoire. Our realization of the need for secure communications and of the great effort necessary to achieve this, our experience with NATO COMSEC, the belief that some members have not made the effort necessary plus such requests for assistance as those of Italy and Belgium (which were addressed to NATO) all show a need for action on a common problem.

2. Reason for the TSWG phase:

Essentially an expansion of the Aide-Memoire. The subject is so technical that the talks will produce nothing unless the representatives are competent. The subject is so sensitive that lack of confidence in the security of any representative will greatly inhibit conversation. These matters are difficult to work out at a very high governmental level. The prior work of the TSWG and the mutual confidence of the experienced members minimize these difficulties.

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3. Purpose and scope of the Technical Talks:

- a. If possible, the US and UK TSWG representatives should avoid interpretation of the Aide-Memoire or explanations beyond its terms, justifying this on the ground of their own technical incompetence, the limited function of this TSWG phase and the impossibility of carefully outlining the scope of the talks in advance.
- b. It can be said further that the Aide-Memoire makes the primary purpose an agreement on a Standing Group memorandum. The outline of the proposed memorandum in para 4 of the Aide-Memoire and the references to cryptographic and transmission practices in para 2 show the general scope.

III. Explanations of Points Which the French May Raise:

1. Reason for Approaching French First

Their position on the Standing Group and their sophistication in this field require their participation in order to be sure the plan is sound and to maximize its effectiveness.

2. Assurances:

If pressed on the "shortcomings" and "assurance" sentences, the US and UK representatives can say that they indicate a desire that none of the Standing Group powers should be in the position of advising other NATO members to do something they are not doing themselves. It can be said further that the language used does not mean that each of the three countries must prove they are not following condemned practices. On the other hand, it does not say they may not do so. Presumably this matter will be something the technical representatives will work out.

3. COMINT:

If asked whether the technical representatives intend to discuss intelligence or intelligence results, the US and UK representatives should reply that they assume not.

~~TOP SECRET~~4. Extent of US-UK Collaboration on this Program:

If this is raised, any answer should be confined to the necessary implications of the Joint Aide-Memoire. This shows agreement on the existence of the problem, the need for French assistance, and the points covered in the outline of the Standing Group memorandum, including a draft of suggested bad practices (since this would be tabled early in the technical talks as a US-UK agreed draft). If necessary, the original idea might be attributed to SECAN, and EUSCO.

5. Relationship of this program to the French request for equipment:

Unless informed that the French have mentioned this request during the ambassadorial approach, the US and UK representatives should indicate that the UK does not know of it. The answer is that it did not inspire the program, but did reinforce the US opinion that some mutual program was desirable. Presumably there is no reason why the French should not bring this up at the technical talks if they so desire.

IV. Selection of French Technical Delegates (Preferably not more than three)1. Technical Criteria: (Note Exhibits "A" and "B")

- a. The delegates should be the most experienced and technically competent communications security experts available.
- b. They should have a broad knowledge of the entire field; should be capable of discussing the technical security aspects of cryptographic systems.
- c. They should have prestige within the French COMSEC organization so that their conclusions from the discussions will carry weight.
- d. They should be of the caliber of Black, Arnaud and Kyraud.
- e. They should be of the stature of the other delegates. (Austin and Raven believe it would be helpful to give their names early in this discussion.)
- f. Should not be intelligence specialists unless they are also COMSEC experts.

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605**2. Security Criteria**

- a. They should be cleared and vouched for by the SSFA.
- b. The standards of clearance should be comparable to those applied to the US delegates (need not have equivalent clearances).

3. Qualifications of US delegates.

- a. Both are US COMSEC specialists and are connected [redacted] They have the highest regular Civil Service grade and many years experience in the COMSEC field. They are fully conversant with all the technical security aspects of NATO and US cryptographic systems.
- b. They have the highest clearance status, including COSMIC clearance. They have the standard TOP SECRET clearance in terms of the TSWG standards and also a cryptographic clearance.

4. Action on French nominations:

It is not anticipated that the US will be able to provide further information on the French nominees, so that the principal reliance for technical competence and security is placed on the TSWG representatives. However, the names of the French nominees, together with the recommendations of the US and UK representatives, should be passed promptly to the GUK for such checking as is possible.

V. Physical Security and Other Arrangements to be Made in TSWG Talks**1. Location of the technical talks:**

Paris is preferable as a convenience to the French who will have to make rapid preparations for the discussions. London is our second choice.

2. Meeting place for the technical delegates:

Les Invalides, the Palais de Chaillot (NATO Headquarters), and SSFA Headquarters have been suggested, and we should

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be ready to offer the US or UK Embassies. SHAPE is undesirable. The meeting place should be as secure as possible. It should also be convenient.

3. Arrangements for a secretariat for the talks and the handling of paperwork:

Presumably the French are the ones to handle this, but the TSWG representatives must be certain the arrangements are secure.

4. Interpreter:

If English is not to be spoken by all the delegates, the US representatives desire an interpreter. If secure arrangements for this cannot be made with the French, NSA or GCHQ must be approached on this.

5. Contacts after the technical talks:

The security of the group papers and contacts between the COMSEC organization after the talks should be emphasized. If reasonable, it should be suggested that later contacts be made through SECAN subject to different but equally secure arrangements by the technical delegates.

6. Date of technical talks:

When it appears that the French will come up with acceptable nominees, the time of the talks should be broached. The US and UK delegates will be ready by 1 April, but will need at least 8 days notice. Extended delay is undesirable. Reasons for speed include (a) the broad scope of the program, (b) the fact that the problems of the present stage of the program do not warrant long delay, and (c) the danger (indicated by prior requests for action) that other NATO members might initiate a different and less effective program.

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EXHIBIT "A"

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INFORMATION ON FRENCH COMSEC ORGANIZATION

The following points summarize the information on the French COMSEC organization available on the above date. The sources are 2 messages from [] on 10 October and 12 November, the CIA report of the first conversation with de Vosjoli and comments by Austin and Raven on 17 March 1953. This information may not be accurate; any additional data will be helpful.

1. The Commission Interministeriel de Chiffres is the top group, but its powers and relations within the government are not known. Its chairman was thought to be a M. Segala, but he may have been replaced by a M. MonE, who has a high position in the Ministry of National Defense. Its members include representatives of the SDECE and the Ministries of National Defense, Foreign Affairs and Overseas France and perhaps some others. Col. Black is the SDECE member and we have been told (but doubt) that the SDECE is supposed to guard the security of French cipher systems.
2. The Controle de Chiffres is an administrative body for the Commission; its head is a M. Mueller.
3. The Sous-Comité Cryptographique is a group, probably under the Commission, which allegedly concerns itself primarily with cryptographic security. Its president is M. Ollier, an ex-PTT man, now in the SDECE under M. Boursicot. Its vice-president is Col. Black. The members include cryptographic representatives from the Army, Navy and Air Force and a non-specialist representative from the Quai d'Orsay.
4. A subcommittee working on communications security which presumably is not the same as the Sous-Comité Cryptographique. Its members include Arnaud for the Army, Eyraud for the Navy and Rafaeli for the Air Force.

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EXHIBIT "B"

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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The persons listed below are considered by the US technical representatives to be technically competent on the subjects to be considered at the third stage of the approach to the French. All would know Austin by name . The only name they could supply as a nominee to be avoided was Veryon le Croix.

1. Col. Black of SIECE; head of French COMINT organization among other duties; knows Raven.

2. Arnaud works under Marchand in the Ministry of Defense; an Army representative; knows Austin.

3. Eyraud works for the Navy.

4. Rafali believed to work for the Air Force; may know Austin.

5. Mueller heads the Controle de Chiffres.

6. Le Marchand is new head of communications staff organization in the Ministry of Defense; he replaces Veryon le Croix.

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FRIEDMAN

19 March 1954

OUTLINE FOR US TSWG REPRESENTATIVEI. Discussions with UK representative:

1. Allow for two days discussions before seeing the French representative. In London, if possible.
2. Points to be covered include: agreement on the functions to be performed; working arrangements; and exchange of information on the French COMSEC organizations.

II. Points to be explained to the French representative:

1. Reason for undertaking the program is essentially an expansion of the points made in the Aide-Memoire.
2. Reason for the TSWG phase is that set out in the Aide-Memoire, that is the need for (a) competent and secure technical representatives and (b) adequate physical security for technical conversations.
3. Purpose and Scope of the Technical Talks:
 - a. The Aide-Memoire sets the purpose. (The TSWG representatives cannot interpret any ambiguities.)
 - b. The description of the proposed Standing Group memorandum and the statement in para 2 of the Aide-Memoire indicates the scope.

III. Explanation of points which the French may raise:

1. Need for French participation: Reason for approaching the French first is their position on the Standing Group and their prestige in this field.
2. Assurances. There is no intention either to require each to prove to the others his compliance with the draft memorandum or to forbid anyone from offering such proof.

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3. COMINT. The TSWG representatives assume that the US and UK technical representatives do not intend to discuss intelligence.
4. Extent of US-UK Collaboration on this Program. As shown explicitly by the Aide-Memoire and includes a draft list of bad practices.
5. French Request of Equipment from the US. This is not known to the UK (unless mentioned to the UK Ambassador or by the French TSWG man) and did not inspire this program - although it did reinforce the US opinion that some mutual effort was desirable.

IV. Selection of French Delegates (preferably not more than three)

1. Technically the French delegates should be the most competent and experienced communications security experts available, of the caliber of Black, Arnaud and Eyraud and the US and UK delegates.
2. They should have security clearances comparable to those of the US and UK delegates and should be cleared for these discussions.
3. The US delegates are COMSEC specialists, are connected [redacted] and hold the highest regular US Civil Service grade. They have the highest US security clearances, including clearance for COSMIC, US TOP SECRET and US cryptographic.
4. The names of the French nominees together with the US and UK recommendations should be passed promptly to the CWG for any possible checking on their qualifications.

V. Physical Security and Other Arrangements to be Made in TSWG Discussions:

1. Location of technical talks - Paris preferred; London next.
2. Meeting place for technical delegates - as secure and convenient as possible. Les Invalides, the Palais de Chaillot, or SSFA headquarters are preferred. The US Embassy should be available, but is not preferred.

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3. Arrangements for a secretariat for the meetings and for the secure handling of the paperwork - presumably the French should do this.
4. Interpreter desired by US delegates, if English is not spoken by all.
5. Contacts after the technical talks should be put on secure basis.
6. Date set for technical talks should allow at least 8 days notice to the US delegates, but subject to that limitation, should be as early as possible.

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	<u>DIPLOMATIC APPROACH</u>		<u>TSWG PHASE</u>		<u>TECHNICAL DISCUSSION</u>	
	<u>London</u>	<u>Paris</u>	<u>London</u>	<u>Paris</u>	<u>London</u>	<u>Paris</u>
	1. Brief US Ambassador. (Polyzoides)	1. Brief US Ambassador. 2. Arrange for TSWG phase. 3. Arrange for US technical representatives. (Polyzoides)	1. Discuss with UK TSWG representative. (Elliott)	1. TSWG discussions. 2. Arrange for technical discussions. (Elliott)	1. Discuss with GCHQ and UK technical representatives. (Austin, Raven)	1. Technical discussions. (Austin, Raven)
Executive agent for USCIB.	US Ad Hoc Comm and CWG					
Liaison assistance	SUSLO - per request from USCIBES to NSA	Army SSO - per request from USCIBES and State to G-2	SUSLO - per request from USCIBES to NSA.	Army SSO - per request from USCIBES and State to G-2	SUSLO - per request from USCIBES to NSA	Army SSO - per request from USCIBES to G-2
Radio communications	Army SSO - By State per request from State to G-2	Army SSO - By State per request from State to G-2	Army SSO - By State per request from State to G-2	Army SSO - By State per request from State to G-2	NSA/SUSLO - By NSA	Army SSO - By NSA per request from USCIBES to G-2

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	<u>DIPLOMATIC APPROACH</u>		<u>TSWG PHASE</u>		<u>TECHNICAL DISCUSSION</u>	
	<u>London</u>	<u>Paris</u>	<u>London</u>	<u>Paris</u>	<u>London</u>	<u>Paris</u>
1. Pouch transmittal	NSA/SUSLO - By State per request from USCIBES to NSA	Army SSO - By State per request from USCIBES and State to G-2	NSA/SUSLO - By State per request from USCIBES to NSA	Army SSO - By State per request from USCIBES and State	NSA/SUSLO - By NSA	Army SSO - By NSA per request from USCIBES to G-2
2. All arrangements for TSWG and Technical discussions with French.			Elliott - per instructions from Ad Hoc Com.			
3. Travel authority and arrangements	State - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	NSA - - - - -	- - - - -
4. Accommodations	State (by Embassy - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	SUSLO by instruction from NSA.	Polvaidea or Army SSO - by request from State or NSA to G-2

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3. Local transportation.

SUSLO - per request from USCIBES to NSAState (by Embassy)

SUSLO by instruction from NSAPolyzoides or Army SSO - by request from State or NSA to G-2

9. Secure storage facilities

SUSLO - per request from USCIBES to NSAArmy SSO - per request from USCIBES and State to G-2SUSLO - per request from USCIBES to NSAArmy SSO - per request from USCIBES and State to G-2SUSLO - By instruction from NSAArmy SSO - per request from USCIBES to G-2~~TOP SECRET~~