MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: U.S.

References: (a) USCIB 29.5/2 of 7 October 1954.
(b) USCIB 29.5/3 of 27 October 1954.
(c) USCIB 29.5/5 of 15 November 1954.

1. Reference (a) setting forth certain recommendations regarding was considered by USCIBEC on 22 October 1954 and with certain additional recommendations forwarded by reference (b) to USCIB for final approval under the interregnum procedure. Reference (c) was the notification of USCIB approval of the action proposed in references (a) and (b).

2. In accordance with the references the Army member has submitted the enclosed plan for consideration prior to taking any further action.

3. It is considered that vote sheet action on the enclosures would be helpful in arriving at a decision. Therefore, it is requested that the members indicate on the attached vote sheet their views with regard to the enclosures and return the vote sheets to this office by the close of business Monday, 31 January 1955.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U.S. Navy

Enclosure
A.C. of S. Serial 22262
dtd 18 Jan 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: Proposed (TS)

1. In accordance with the USCIB recommendations set forth in USCIB 29.5/3, 27 October 1954, and as approved by USCIB (USCIB 29.5/5, 15 Nov 1954), it is understood that the present informal arrangements which exist between various COMINT units and U.S. military COMINT activities in the Army are unsatisfactory and that it is now desirable to formalize these arrangements at a government-to-government level in the form of a third party agreement within the limitations prescribed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix P to the UKUSA Agreement.

2. In a memorandum from the Chairman, USCIB, for the Chairman, LSIB (CIB 00049, 30 April 1953), subject, "U.S. COMINT Arrangements with units or Personnel in..." LSIB was informed of the principles and procedures governing U.S. COMINT arrangements with units or personnel in... and advised that Director, NSA, would consult with Director, GCHQ, on technical problems involved. The principles and procedures agreed upon were contained in USCIB 13/331, 16 April 53. One feature of these arrangements was that all equipment issued to units was to be on a loan, except that equipment which had been issued up to that time on other than a loan basis which was exempted from this requirement. In other respects the provision of assistance and limits of operational support were not to exceed the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix P UKUSA Agreement. Accordingly, it is felt that the proposed Third Party Agreement can be negotiated without LSIB approval provided that prior to implementation GCHQ is consulted on the technical problems involved, such as sterilization of raw traffic. However, in view of previous notice to LSIB of the existing arrangements, it is considered advisable that prior to negotiation of the proposed agreement, Director, NSA, inform GCHQ in general terms of the U.S. intention to effect a... and the extent of the U.S. assistance and support contemplated.

3. Coordination between the Army and NSA has resulted in the understanding that after the initial approach by General Hull to... has been effected, the technical guidance to be provided by the Director,
G2-ASA

SUBJECT: Proposed NSA, as agreed by USCIBEC and approved by USCIB, will include the responsibility to determine that the Agreement is:

a. in consonance with the Terms of Reference, and

b. appropriate for implementation.

This understanding was based on the assumption that implementation of the Agreement, coordination of Service participation, and direct contact for the provision of technical assistance, liaison and guidance to the COMINT Authority will be the responsibility of the Director, NSA.

4. In consonance with the above, the following papers are inclosed for consideration and approval by USCIB:

a. Statement of broad objectives and general terms of U.S. position on U.S. collaboration with the

b. Aide Memoire for use by General Hull in his approach to

c. Minimum Security Standards for the classification, dissemination, transmission and physical security of COMINT.

d. Suggested organization of the COMINT effort.

e. Terms of Reference for use by U.S. negotiating team.

(SIGNED)

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Major General, GS
Deputy G-2 (Fgn Opns)

5 Incl
1. Statement of Objectives and Terms
2. Aide Memoire
3. Minimum Scy Standards
4. Suggested Orgn of COMINT Effort
5. Terms of Reference

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
General Hull will attempt to obtain approval in principle from authoritative representatives of the for a formal and stable U.S. COMINT Agreement. The U.S. position will be stated along the following lines:

a. Relations between the U.S. and the various have been quite satisfactory and, it is believed, mutually beneficial to all parties concerned.

b. With the new situation arising from the the U.S. believes it desirable that the several arrangements and understandings which have developed over the past several years with each of the COMINT activities be placed on a stable and authoritative basis.

c. In the interests of maximum benefit to both countries, it is requested that the designate a single COMINT authority with whom effective arrangements and procedures can be developed.

d. With a mutual agreement on basic standards of security, the U.S. is prepared to furnish certain equipment and information including advisors, to enable the establishment and maintenance of an efficient COMINT service.

e. The U.S. would expect to receive the product of the COMINT activities to satisfy its needs for intelligence. In certain cases where the U.S. had specific requirements for information which could be satisfied by the COMINT service, it would be expected that every effort would be made to provide the data.

f. These arrangements are supplementary to those concerning U.S. COMINT which are essential to the security of U.S. forces and the provision of certain immediate and high priority material of U.S. national interest.

g. There will be no disclosure of these arrangements or resulting agreements by the to any other party, and all materials will be exchanged only with the U.S.

h. The above principles are reflected in the Aide Memoire for General Hull and the terms of reference for the negotiating team.
AIDE MEMOIRE

ON

UNITED STATES - RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

1. During the close cooperation and teamwork was developed between the communications intercept units of the American Military Services. This spirit of cooperation has continued into the and serves to keep both our nations alerted against the possibility of future acts of aggression by potential enemies.

2. In the present period of relative calm, we have been able to review many of our wartime arrangements, including this cooperation in the field of Communications Intelligence, with a view to improving such arrangements and affecting economies wherever possible. Since the success of the Communications Intelligence effort is of vital importance to the future security of both the United States and the any improvements which can be made in our joint effort in this field should receive the careful attention of both Governments.

3. The continuing success of any communications intelligence effort, however, is predicated or based in a large part on keeping all knowledge of any success gained away from the enemy. Otherwise the enemy might take measures to change his codes or ciphers and communications security procedures. Such measures could result in the loss or cancellation of gains which had been achieved prior to initiation of these measures by the enemy. The sensitivity of the communications intelligence effort and the necessity for the utmost security in all aspects of this effort is therefore evident. The importance of security is such that the U.S. looks upon its communications intelligence effort as something which normally must be kept strictly within its own national framework, controlled by one central authority, to the exclusion of collaboration even with friendly foreign governments, and as something which must be established, guided, and operated separately from other or general intelligence activities. However, in view of the unique and friendly relations which exist between the and the U.S. and taking
into account the historical association and common objectives of our two govern-
ments, I have been authorized to suggest a closer liaison between the [ ] and the
U.S. in this important field of intelligence activity. In this respect the U.S.
recognizes the valuable contribution which the various [ ] COMINT activities have
made to our common effort [ ] as the result of the
arrangements and understandings which have developed over the past several years
with each of these [ ] COMINT activities. In order to foster, develop, and pro-
mote this relationship and thereby achieve the maximum possible benefits to both
countries, it is suggested that collaboration in the COMINT field be established
on an authoritative basis in the form of an agreement which would set forth the
extent of the collaboration and the technical details thereof. To this end, the
U.S. is prepared to furnish certain equipment, logistic support, information, and
advisors to bring about the establishment of an effective, integrated, and centrally
controlled [ ] COMINT service.

4. It must be emphasized that the United States is unwilling to invest its
resources in separate agreements with your individual Military Services which
would bind us to provide a pre-determined amount of assistance but would not
guarantee a profitable return. In return the U.S. would desire the product of
the [ ] COMINT activities and in certain cases where the U.S. has specific
requirements for information which could be satisfied by a [ ] COMINT service,
it would be expected that every effort would be made to provide the data. The
matter of security, as mentioned before, is of paramount importance; it would
therefore be expected that mutual agreement on the basic standards of security
necessary would be an integral part of the agreement. In addition, it would be
expected that there be no disclosure of the arrangements or resulting agreements
by the [ ] to any other party or government and that all materials
and products will be exchanged only with the U.S. It is the intention of the U.S.
that these proposed arrangements be supplementary to any arrangements or agree-
ments which now exist or which might be proposed concerning the establishment or
operation of U.S. COMINT bases in [ ] and which are essential to the security
of U.S. forces and the provision of certain immediate and high priority material
of U.S. national interest. If this proposal is acceptable, the U.S. is prepared
to discuss the details and specific terms of the agreement which it is hoped can be achieved. Discussion of these details would be handled, on the U.S. side, by representatives speaking for the organization which maintains the central control of the entire U.S. COMINT effort. It would be expected that the counterpart representatives of the presumably the Minister of Defense, would also speak for the government as a whole or for the central authority within the government which is established or can be established to maintain overall control of the COMINT effort. I would appreciate your consideration of this proposal and an indication of your approval to proceed with the subject in more detailed discussions between personnel of the government who will represent a central authority within the government and U.S. personnel representing the U.S. central authority in this field.

5. I will leave with you for consideration two papers, one containing the minimum security standards for the handling of COMINT materials, which, as I mentioned, must be an integral part of the agreement, and the other containing suggestions on what we believe would result in the most effective and efficient organization of the COMINT effort.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
MINIMUM SECURITY STANDARDS FOR THE CLASSIFICATION, DISSEMINATION, TRANSMISSION, AND PHYSICAL SECURITY OF COMINT

1. COMINT, as used herein, refers to all information derived from the processing of traffic procured by listening to foreign communications, including voice transmissions, for the purpose of producing intelligence. It includes raw traffic, end-products, technical material, methods and techniques, working documents, and other special material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports and summaries based on COMINT unless the information is so generalised that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of COMINT or to COMINT in general.

2. Each Government will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of COMINT security and to enforce these principles.

3. Before an individual in any capacity has access to COMINT, he must be screened in accordance with standards and procedures established by the national authority and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to TOP SECRET information of similar sensitivity. In addition to such clearance, these individuals must be specifically nominated by the national authority to have access to COMINT information.

4. Prior to being given access to COMINT, each individual will be indoctrinated for COMINT by a special warning on the sensitivity to compromises of COMINT sources and will be required to sign a document drawing attention to his special responsibility for safeguarding COMINT information and to the consequences provided if, either by intent or negligence, he allows COMINT information or material to come to the notice of unauthorised persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit for protecting COMINT information, in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.

5. Distribution of COMINT must be based on the need-to-know principle, i.e., each item of COMINT information or material shall be made known only to those COMINT-induced individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. Control lists of individuals indoctrinated for COMINT will be maintained by each government. The number of indoctrinated individuals will be kept to the minimum consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs.

TOP SECRET
6. All possible steps will be taken to prevent the risk of capture or interrogation of COMINT indoctrinees by enemies or potential enemies. In general, no risks should be taken by COMINT indoctrinees other than those necessary for the efficient performance of their duties.

7. The greatest care must be taken not to betray COMINT success by actions based on it. The source should on no account be needlessly risked.

8. All COMINT resulting from this Agreement will be classified as agreed between the COMINT authorities of both nations and will be distributed only to those COMINT-indoctrinated individuals who require it in the performance of their duties.

   a. The US will classify COMINT materials provided to the as SECRET or TOP SECRET, according to content.
   b. The US will accept COMINT materials from the classified in accordance with US agreement on application of paragraph 8, above.

9. The COMINT authorities of each nation will insure against revelation of the source of COMINT resulting from this Agreement by carefully controlled handling procedures for every sheet of paper containing results from, or disclosing the existence of, this Agreement. If deemed desirable, special codewords also will be used.

10. The US and the will use agreed exchange designators (codewords) to cover the following aspects of COMINT liaison under the terms of the Agreement:

   a. COMINT materials (including results derived therefrom) provided by the US to the (regardless of source) which can be integrated into COMINT products.
   b. COMINT materials (including results derived therefrom) provided by the US to the which must be given special handling and which cannot be passed to other than personnel without prior specific consent of the US.
   c. COMINT materials provided by the to the US. (If the agrees to use special codewords as in paragraph 9, above, such codewords may be used to cover, insofar as practicable, these aspects of COMINT liaison.)

11. If the desires to use some device or special handling procedure for the protection of the COMINT source instead of codewords and does not want individual sheets of material marked with special exchange designators, it shall...
permissible to use the designator on the cover sheet(s) only for each shipment of material. In this event, the US must be assured that all such material will receive limited and controlled handling and distribution within the COMINT activity.

12. Documents containing COMINT information must be double-wrapped and addressed to a COMINT indoctrinated officer by name, not by function. The inner envelope will bear the appropriate security classification. As a minimum security requirement, such documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure courier service. There shall be a senior US COMINT advisor in who shall be a representative of the Director, National Security Agency. This officer will be responsible for all US COMINT liaison with the

a. Documents from the US to the will be addressed to a designated COMINT recipient and will be transmitted to such recipient through the US Liaison Officer in mentioned above. He will receive from the recipient properly executed receipts for all materials delivered.

b. Documents from the to the US will be addressed to and delivered to the US Liaison Officer in He will receive for all materials so received.

13. If COMINT material is transmitted within either nation by electrical means or by any physical means not completely secure, it must be encrypted in a secure cryptographic system reserved exclusively for this requirement.

a. Electrical communications between the US and COMINT organizations will be affected through the US Liaison Officer in and will be so arranged that it will not be possible to identify such communications as being between the respective COMINT organizations.

b. The US will establish a private cryptosystem for direct communications between the US Liaison Officer in and US COMINT authorities in Washington. This system will be the exclusive channel for passing communications which must be handled in COMINT channels only.

c. Messages from the COMINT organization to the US Liaison Officer will be passed via channels specifically agreed upon between the US and the

14. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to the custody of COMINT by all persons authorized to receive it. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, COMINT materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be: 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

a. under the direct surveillance of a COMINT-indoctrinated person responsible for their safekeeping.

b. locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to COMINT-indoctrinated personnel, or

c. stored in a locked compartment which is under constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to COMINT-indoctrinated personnel.

15. COMINT documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to be of use. This is particularly important under hazardous conditions.

16. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain agreed types of low-level tactical COMINT (such as direction finder bearings and plain text messages) on which immediate action must be taken in combat operations, the US or national authorities may permit the dissemination of such COMINT at a classification not below CONFIDENTIAL, to unindoctrinated recipients who need to know.

17. In exceptional instances where it is essential for immediate operational purposes, information based on COMINT may, as specifically authorised by the appropriate National COMINT Authority, be disseminated to unindoctrinated individuals, provided the source is not disclosed. If possible, names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from the original text must be omitted or, if the retention of such an item is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information must be passed by a secure dispatch service, by a secure line, or in a cipher system approved by the National COMINT Authority for this requirement. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radiotelephone).

18. Each nation will report immediately to the other any compromise or possible compromise of COMINT materials produced or exchanged under the terms of this agreement.

19. Each nation will expand these standards into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the COMINT security regulations so developed will be exchanged through COMINT channels.
Suggested Organization of the COMINT Effort

The suggestions which follow on the organization of a COMINT effort are based on the premise that both COMINT and the associated COMSEC are directly related to and affect the national security and welfare of the government. Accordingly, policies, procedures, and operations in these two fields should be established and conducted in a manner to permit immediate responsiveness to national requirements and objectives. It is highly desirable, therefore, that the various departments, agencies, and services of the government engaged in these activities be established under a central control or authority so that each individual activity is part of the overall effort and so that the total effort can be integrated into an effective and efficient organization which can maintain continuity of the effort in accordance with national requirements and priorities.

In accordance with the concept mentioned above, it is suggested that a framework be established to organize and control COMINT and COMSEC activities along the following lines:

a. The Minister of Defense will control the overall COMINT, COMSEC effort and shall be the Executive Agent of the Government therefor.

b. For the purpose of formulating top level policies and procedures in COMINT and COMSEC, provision should be made and a means established whereby the national requirements can be reconciled with the facilities and resources of the present and/or proposed cryptologic units. At the same level COMSEC policies and procedures should be established to protect communications against the efforts of enemy COMINT activities. This objective could be achieved by the establishment of a national policy group with representation by the principal producers and consumers of COMINT and the communication services.

c. Immediately below the national policy level group, it is advisable to have an operating agency or service acting for the Minister of Defense to receive, process and evaluate the total COMINT product, with dissemination thereof limited to the representatives of the government on the aforementioned policy group, and in accordance with the security standards submitted.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
This agency or service should also have the responsibility to determine the specific missions, assignments, or COMINT targets and have the authority to allocate and place these mission assignments on the units actually engaged in the intercept of enemy communications. Integration of policies and procedures for both COMSEC and COMINT in accordance with National policy can be accomplished by this operating agency or service and it should have authority to issue implementing directives associated therewith.

d. The cryptologic activity of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should be established below the Chief of Staff of each Military Service and be under the staff supervision of the Chief of Intelligence of each Military Service. The missions and functions of these cryptologic activities will be in accordance with the broad policies developed by the National policy level group and with instructions and procedures issued by the operating agency or service previously mentioned.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATION OF US/PRC COMINT ARRANGEMENT

1. There are a number of important US COMINT requirements which the PRC may be expected to fulfill:
   a. A limited intercept general search and development program from advanced sites in the ... to discover new or unknown transmissions. This search should be particularly directed against Communist voice and VHF communications in the ... area.
   b. 
   c. Intercept and processing of the following Chinese Communist communications:
      (1) __________________________
      (2) Military communications in Manchuria and possibly East China.
      (3) Local merchant shipping.

2. In exchange for the above raw material and the products derived by the US from its analysis, the US would furnish assistance as follows:
   a. Ownership of the equipment now on loan to various COMINT units will be transferred to the ... Thereafter the total cost to the US should not exceed $150,000 during the first year of implementation; subsequently the yearly cost or contribution to the ... cryptologic effort will be based on US determination of the value of the product received.
   b. The US will provide technical advisors to the ... to assist in the installation and maintenance of their intercept facilities. This assistance will include the necessary training for intercept station personnel.
   c. The US will provide guidance to the ... COMINT effort in the form of targets. This will include the provision of technical information to the ... where required, but not to exceed the limitations set forth in paragraph 5 of appendix 2 to the US-PRC agreement. Further, technical assistance will be provided to the ....

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
3. There are two special considerations which must be fulfilled by the parties before collaboration as outlined above can be established:

a. The must agree to adhere to the minimum security regulations outlined in Appendix I attached.

b. The must designate a control authority to control their activity and permit effective US support to their effort. A suggested organization of the COMINT effort is outlined in Appendix II attached.