The CHAIRMAN opened discussion on this item by inviting comments by the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, Mr. Friedman.

MR. FRIEDMAN expressed his opinion that the conference report spoke pretty well for itself, and added that he thought the report should be approved as rendered. At a meeting on 6 July he said the Executive Committee approved the conclusions and recommendations of the report with exception of the CIA member who reserved his position on one or two points.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR replied that the CIA position had been circulated to the Members of the Board as USCIB 23/69.

MR. FRIEDMAN went on to say that there are some loose ends remaining to be tied up by a sub-committee or an ad hoc committee. He suggested that an ad hoc committee composed of some members of the U.S. delegation constitute such a group. He added that specific points to be worked out are the preparation of certain appendices and schedules of the communications security technical details, for which a small group should be set up in Washington. Also he said there were certain other matters to be considered, such as what might be done with regard to improvements in commercial machines which might interfere with our future work. He further stated that he was prepared to try to answer questions that might be raised by Members of the Board.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that USCIB 23/69 be taken up since some question had been raised by the CIA representative, and asked Mr. [___] if he would like to speak on that.
The CHAIRMAN said he thought there was some strength in the CIA position and that until negotiations have been concluded with the French it will be difficult to tell just what the best procedure would be. He inquired if it would be agreeable to approve the report and to have another look at the question of the best method of proceeding with the other NATO powers, after we conclude with the French. He asked Mr. Friedman if he had any comment on that point.

MR. FRIEDMAN said he thought the important thing to do is to start and see how the French react, and if the French react favorably we could then consider the other countries one by one.

The CHAIRMAN said that CIA would not be estopped by this action from raising the question of other possible means of procedure.

agreed.

MR. KEAY said he thought that was inherent in the report and he believed that the approach to the French was on the basis of further NATO approaches.

MR. FRIEDMAN said the French had already approached with the statement that they were very much concerned about the insecurity of the communications of certain NATO countries.

The CHAIRMAN said he thought the report is approved unless there was any other comment.

CAPTAIN ROEDER said that the Navy approved the report. He added that they felt that since five years have elapsed since the problem was first presented that it might be desirable to agree at this time to vote a deadline on when the problem would be re-examined rather than let it go on for another few years. He suggested the time limit of one year if that was agreeable and added that the problem could then be re-examined to see what progress has been made.

The CHAIRMAN inquired of Captain Taylor if there was any objection to Captain Roeder's proposal.
CAPTAIN TAYLOR replied in the negative.

The CHAIRMAN then stated the proposal was approved.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the first matter for implementation was the appointment of the cognizant U.S. authority. He asked for suggestions.

MR. FRIEDMAN stated that in the deliberations of the conference, the conferees had originally definitely suggested that the Department of State and the Foreign Office be made cognizant authorities for making an approach to the French. He added that the specific reference was taken out at the suggestion of the CIA delegate who thought it was presumptuous of the conference to try to tell LSIB and USCIB whom to appoint.

suggested the Department of State.

MR. ARMSTRONG said that the State Department was perfectly willing to undertake it on the part of USCIB. He added that he assumed that LSIB would appoint the Foreign Office. He added that he understood this to be the case and that the actual person to approach in the Foreign Office had been agreed in the early stages.

The CHAIRMAN inquired if there were any other nominations and added that the job requires a high degree of diplomacy and skill. He said he would look to the State Department for that diplomacy. He added that he hoped Mr. Armstrong would take a personal interest in the matter.

MR. ARMSTRONG said he would indeed. He said he would see that the Ambassador, upon whom we would have to rely very heavily, would be fully briefed on the matter as to how and when, etc.

The CHAIRMAN inquired if the matter would be handled in Paris or London.

MR. ARMSTRONG replied that Paris would be best because it would prevent the French from having to communicate and it could be done with less attention drawn to it in Paris than London.

The CHAIRMAN stated that that would mean getting into higher diplomatic circles.

MR. ARMSTRONG said he thought we should start at the top. The first approach, he said, presumably would be to the Minister...
The CHAIRMAN stated that if there were no other nominations, the designation of the State Department as the Cognizant U.S. Authority is approved. He pointed out to Mr. Friedman that he thought the U.S. element of the Combined Working Group would be the State Department and technicians from NSA.

MR. ARMSTRONG stated that with respect to paragraph 32b, the State Department would have to rely very heavily upon NSA and the others.

The CHAIRMAN noted that paragraph 32a stated that "Agreement on the terms and composition of the Combined Working Group to be set up in Washington to facilitate coordination of this action" is required.

MR. FRIEDMAN said that was referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 2l. He then proceeded to read this sentence, and added that he assumed that the Group would assist the State Department and the U.S. members of this Combined Working Group.

The CHAIRMAN said it could be left up to the Cognizant U.S. Authorities to see that the Combined Working Group is set up.

MR. FRIEDMAN said he thought that many of these details could be worked out by the Executive Committee.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR asked if it was the sense of the Board that the initial action on the Combined Working Group will be referred to the Executive Committee by the Cognizant U.S. Authorities.

MR. ARMSTRONG replied that it was his understanding that it would be.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the above action was approved.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Executive Secretary advise the British of the action taken at this meeting.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR said he would prepare a suitable document.

DECISION: (10 July 1953) USCIB approved the final report and papers of the US/UK conference on Allied (NATO) communications security as a basis for negotiations with the U.K. and agreed that U.K. authorities would be so notified.

It was agreed, further, that:

(1) The Department of State would be the "Cognizant U.S. Authority".

USCIB: 23/70
(2) As "Cognizant U.S. Authority" the Department of State would take action as necessary and appropriate to refer to the Executive Committee the problem of initial action in the establishment of the Combined Working Group in Washington.

(3) No member would be estopped from raising the question of desirability of using other than NATO channels after negotiations with the French have been undertaken.

(4) That this problem will be reviewed by the Board at approximately one year from date.