MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Revision of the UKUSA Agreement.


1. Pursuant to USCIBEC decision on the referenced proposal at its 22nd meeting, the enclosed presentation by the NSA member, which supports his recommendation that "F" and "K" be considered technical Appendices is forwarded for consideration by vote sheet.

2. It is requested that vote sheet replies on the NSA Member's recommendation be forwarded to this office not later than 1200, Wednesday, 15 December 1954.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

TOP SECRET
BACKGROUND

1. USCIB 14.1/24 contains a proposal by the Director whereby a note would be added to the introduction to the UKUSA Appendices. According to the note, the Directors, NSA and GCHQ, would be authorized to change or interpret by mutual agreement certain "technical" Appendices (C, D, E, F, K, L, and M).

2. As indicated in USCIB 14.1/28 USCIBEC considered the proposal, and recommended to USCIB that Appendices C, D, E, L, and M be considered technical appendices, with the understanding that all members of USCIB will be informed in writing through the Executive Secretary, USCIB, of every change in these appendices that may be agreed between NSA and GCHQ. USCIBEC recommended, further, that Appendices F and K tentatively be considered policy appendices subject to further consideration at the next meeting of USCIBEC.

3. The USCIBEC recommendations contained in 14.1/28 were approved by USCIB on 5 November 1954 (as indicated by 14.1/30).

4. Notification of the actions summarized above has been sent from NSA to GCHQ, and the Director, GCHQ, has commented that he is unaware of any reasons why F and K should not be grouped with the technical appendices.

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

5. Appendix F governs the exchange of COMINT and coordination in translation. The provisions of Appendix F cover three general areas:
b. Guidance on how

(1) Exchange channels are specified in Appendix F. Use of the specified channels would not be entirely consistent with current UKUSA policy. NSA and GCHQ should be enabled to make the necessary corrections for USCIB and ISIB, and by doing so, NSA and GCHQ would be implementing the policy, instead of formulating the policy.

(2) Additional guidance is flexible and broadly stated, with the net effect that exchanges will be continuous, current, and without request unless otherwise arranged in specific instances. Such flexible guidance implies that USCIB and ISIB recognize that the conduct of exchanges between NSA and GCHQ is a technical matter which may be regulated by NSA and GCHQ in accordance with existing UKUSA policy, the intelligence requirements of the consumers, and the technical requirements of the producers.

(3) Appendix F refers to Appendix K for guidance on

c. Standardization.

The policy decision to standardize on technical terminology is stated in the Introduction to the Appendices. The selection of terms, such as those mentioned above, should not be considered a matter of policy, but instead should be regarded as a technical implementation of policy. According to Appendix F, other matters of standardization affecting the exchange of COMINT, and ___________________________ are left up to NSA and GCHQ.
7. It should be noted that all changes of F and K would be in accordance with established UKUSA policy; that notification of all such changes would be furnished to the members of USCIB.

8. The reasons for regarding F and K as "policy" appendices are not known.