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FINAL

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 13.5/60      Item 3 of the Agenda for the Fourteenth Meeting of USCIBEC, held on 29 April 1954.

Subject:            Possible compromise of COMINT Information (USCIB 13.5/43).

THE CHAIRMAN (Captain Taylor) asked if there were any objections to considering Item 3 before Item 2 in order to permit the technical advisors brought to the meeting by the NSA Member to leave the meeting.

There were no objections.

THE CHAIRMAN introduced Item 3 by briefly reviewing its background and pointing out that Major Culmer who conducted the investigation was available to answer any questions which the members might have. He then drew attention to Section I of USCIB Directive Number 9 which contains a definition of compromise for COMINT purposes. Captain Taylor continued by offering his opinion that it was reasonable to assume that some of the COMINT material could have found its way into unauthorized hands and concluded by inviting comments from the members.

MR. ZANDER suggested that the conclusions and recommendations contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 be approved.

CAPTAIN AGNEW then recommended approval of a statement, which he read, as follows:

"USCIB considers that there is no firm evidence that a compromise of cryptologic material occurred. Reasonably sufficient evidence is at hand to conclude that all COMSEC material not recovered was destroyed. However, there exists a bare possibility that COMINT material was exposed to unauthorized persons and therefore technically it must be considered compromised. We would recommend that USCIB agree that no further direct countermeasures to off-set adverse effects of the possible compromise are feasible; that NSA agree that this investigation be continued by the office of the Executive Secretary with a view to recommending ways and means for providing more efficient tracer and casualty control procedures for COMINT material transported by air, and for the prompt dispatch of a COMINT security authority to the scene of any aircraft accident involving COMINT material."

THE CHAIRMAN asked the members if they would like to discuss the item in terms of the remarks of the NSA Member or would each prefer to express individual opinions.

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The Members agreed to continue with individual opinions.

CAPTAIN McCORMICK stated that the Navy concurred with the conclusions and recommendations of the Executive Secretary.

COLONEL TOWNSEND also agreed with the recommendations and conclusions of the Executive Secretary and added that he would like to recommend that the Security Committee study the administrative action necessary to provide for dispatch of a COMINT security authority to the scene of any aircraft accident involving COMINT material.

The State, CIA and Army Members also agreed with the recommendations and conclusions of USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954.

In a brief discussion following the Chairman's summary of the NSA and Air Force recommendations, it was agreed that the problem of formulating proposals for better accountability and security control procedures in cases such as this should be left in the hands of the Executive Secretariat for the time being with the idea of ultimately having the Security Committee consider the substance of the proposals that may be expected to be forthcoming.

CAPTAIN AGNEW continued the discussion by saying that with respect to the particular airplane accident, NSA had a dual interest: COMSEC material and COMINT material. There were three types of COMSEC material involved, he stated: non-burnable, semi-burnable, and completely burnable. He went on to explain that all of the rotors were recovered. The 2500 degree fire in the compartment, Captain Agnew pointed out, left the rotors recognizable but not identifiable. Remnants of the one-time pads were recognizable but individual papers were not. The National Security Agency, he concluded, ruled there had been no compromise of COMSEC material, but recognized the technicality of possible compromise of COMINT material under the terms of the definition of "Compromise" contained in USCIB Directive Number 9.

Referring to the NSA Member's discussion of COMSEC material, MR. POLYZOIDES suggested that a decision be confined to COMINT material as the former is not a matter of USCIB cognizance.

CAPTAIN AGNEW agreed but pointed out that the evaluation made in the use of the COMSEC material is pertinent to the consideration of compromise of COMINT material as both were carried in the same compartment of the plane.

The Members then considered oral reports by Major Astor of NSA and Major Culmer, Chairman of the Security Committee. Pictures of the

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airplane crash taken while the plane was burning and others taken afterwards during the salvage operation were examined. Captain Agnew, Major Astor, Major Culmer, and Mr. Corry (of NSA) advised the members of the condition of the recovered material that each had inspected.

During the general discussion which followed it developed that: (1) A good possibility exists that all COMINT material was destroyed during the fire which occurred at the time of the crash, however there is no definite proof. (2) If COMINT material survived the fire there were several chances for this material to have fallen into unauthorized hands. (3) The conclusions and recommendations of the Executive Secretary contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 are correct and acceptable. (4) The opening remark of the NSA Member in which he recommended approval of the following statement, "USCIB considers that there is no firm evidence that a compromise of cryptologic material occurred. Reasonably sufficient evidence...", etc., is also acceptable but does not alter or change the recommendations contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 insofar as COMINT is concerned.

DECISION: (29 April 1954) USCIBEC agreed:

(1) That the report and recommendations contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 are accepted without change.

(2) That the NSA Member's statement as follows, "USCIB considers that there is no firm evidence...", etc., is agreed to be a correct one but does not alter or change the recommendations contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 insofar as COMINT is concerned.

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