MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Compromises and Possible Compromises of COMINT Information and COMINT Codewords Due to Communication Insecurities.

Reference: USCIB Directive Number 9 (Revised), dated 4 Feb 54

1. The Director, NSA, in accordance with Section III, paragraph 2d of the reference, has established certain procedures for reporting instances of possible compromise of COMINT information involving ineffective communications security occurring outside the technical or operational jurisdiction of NSA.

2. A copy of these procedures is enclosed herewith for your information and compliance.

Enclosure

NSA Serial 00143 S
dated 6 May 54,
subject as above.

USCIB: 13.5/61
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: Compromises and Possible Compromises of COMINT Information and COMINT Codewords Due to Communication Insecurities

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2 d, Section III, of CIBD #9 Revised, 4 Feb 54, which provides that each member department or agency of USCIB will report as expeditiously as possible all instances of possible compromise of COMINT information involving ineffective communications security to the Director, NSA, in accordance with procedures established by him, for evaluation.

2. The procedures described herein accordingly are set forth by the Director, NSA, for guidance of all activities which are engaged in electrical transmission of COMINT information, but which are not under his technical or operational control. A similar procedure for units under the technical or operational control of Director, NSA, has been established.

3. The term "communication insecurities", as used herein, refers to those occurrences involving communications which may result in compromises of COMINT information. Communication insecurities include:
   a. Unauthorized transmissions of classified information in plain language or in improperly encrypted forms.
   b. Violations of the physical security of cryptographic material used for encrypting COMINT information; this includes loss, theft, capture, recovery by salvage, defection of individuals, or unauthorized viewing of the cryptomaterial.
   c. Use of unauthorized cryptosystems for transmitting COMINT information.
   d. Violations of rules concerning encryption or decryption processes.

4. Immediately upon detection of known or suspected compromise involving communication insecurities, a message report should be forwarded to the Director, NSA, ATTN: COMSEC. All such reports should be classified SECRET unless TOP SECRET information is contained therein and should be encrypted in an authorized COMINT cryptosystem other than that involved in the violation. If an alternate authorized COMINT cryptosystem is not available, the message report should be encrypted in the general purpose cryptosystem having the least number of holders; in such cases, reports should be so worded as not to reveal COMINT information (including code-words). NSA may request a supplementary report if necessary for evaluation.

5. Message reports should contain the following information:

   a. A brief description of the violation and the circumstances or factors contributing to the occurrence.

   b. An identification of the activities directly concerned with the violation.

   c. Specific identification of all cryptomaterial involved in the violation.

   d. Where applicable, an exact quote of the information which has been endangered due to the violation. In the event such information is considered too lengthy to include in a message report, a brief description or summary should be included in the message report and an exact copy of the information forwarded to the Director, NSA, by the most expeditious physical means available. In the latter event, the message report should state what material is being forwarded to the Director, NSA.

   e. A brief statement of remedial actions taken locally, specifically those designed to prevent or reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

   f. Any other information which, in the opinion of the reporting authority, will assist in evaluating the likelihood or extent of the compromise and in determining remedial action to be taken.

6. Upon being advised by the Director, NSA, that a case has been evaluated as a compromise, a final report will be submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 e, Section III of the reference. Two copies of the final report should be forwarded by mail to the Director, NSA, one copy of which will be forwarded to the Executive Secretary, USCIB, as prescribed in paragraph 2 f, Section III of the reference.

7. It is requested that the foregoing information be furnished to the members of USCIB, with a request that each member provide for these procedures to become effective as soon as possible within the department or agency he represents.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

/s/
L. H. FROST
Captain, US Navy
Chief of Staff