MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Compromises of COMINT Information


Attached for your information is a summary of eighteen cases evaluated by NSA as compromises of COMINT information. Sixteen of these compromises were due to ineffective communications security practices, one was due to removal of a COMINT document from COMINT channels, and one was due to a combination of the above causes.

H. E. JONES
Deputy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure -
NSA Serial 000289-S
dated 18 June 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: Compromises of COMINT Information

Reference: NSA ltr, Serial 000142-S, Subject: Reporting of Compromises of COMINT Information, dated 25 Mar 54

1. A summary of previously unreported compromises of COMINT information occurring before or during the first quarter of 1954 is inclosed for forwarding by you to the members of USCIB.

2. Copies of the inclosure have been forwarded to SUSLO, London, for distribution to GCHQ authorities.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

(signed)
L. H. FROST
Captain, US Navy
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTS CONTAIN
CODENWORTH MATERIAL

TOP SECRET
COMPROMISES OF COMINT INFORMATION

1. The following reports of compromises of COMINT information cover the period between 9 November 1953 and 31 March 1954.

   a. On 9 November 1953, a portion of a message classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from the 10th Radio Squadron Mobile, Chicksands, Priory, England, to the 6910th Security Group, Darmstadt, Germany. The subject violation, if intercepted would compromise the TOP SECRET CODEWORD used with communications intelligence material and result in the association of this codeword with Air Defense Technical Summaries. Also, it would compromise such technical information on one Russian case notation as; time on the air, frequency, and the actual case notation itself.

   b. On 27 November 1953, portions of three messages, one classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD and two classified SECRET CODEWORD, were enciphered in depth and transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from the 34th Radio Squadron Mobile, Wheelus Air Force Base, Tripoli. The material compromised consisted entirely of raw traffic and if intercepted and read would indicate US ability to intercept and catalog certain Russian transmissions. The association of the codeword with this type material is involved.

   c. On 9 December 1953, a portion of a message, classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over communications circuits composed of landline teletype links from the 10th Radio Squadron Mobile, Chicksands, Priory, England, to the 37th Radio Squadron Mobile, Kirknewton, Scotland. The subject violation if intercepted would result in the association of the codeword with the classification TOP SECRET.

   d. On 20 December 1953, a communications security violation occurred at the 333rd Communications Reconnaissance Company, Nome, Alaska. On that date two messages classified SECRET CODEWORD were inadvertently enciphered in depth, and transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links vulnerable to interception. There is a good probability that the messages can be read if the depths are located. The subject violation, if intercepted and deciphered, would indicate US interest in, and ability to intercept Russian transmissions. No association of the codeword with this type material is involved.
e. On 1 January 1954, two complete messages and portions of fifteen additional messages, classified CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET were enciphered in depth and transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from the 327th Communications Reconnaissance Group, Kyoto, Japan, to the Director, National Security Agency. The subject violation if intercepted and read, would divulge various COMINT successes realized by the US.

f. On 4 January 1954, one message classified, SECRET was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over communications circuits composed of radio and landline links from The Army Security Agency Europe, Frankfurt, Germany, to the United States Army Primary Relay Station, New Ostein, Germany. In addition to the possibility of successful interception, the plain text information was viewed by at least


g. On 11 January 1954, portions of four messages, classified CONFIDENTIAL, were inadvertently enciphered in depth and transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from the Naval Communications Station, Wahiawa, Oahu, T.H., to the Director, National Security Agency. The subject violation consisted of raw traffic throughout and if intercepted and read, would result in the compromise of several


h. On 21 January 1954, portions of thirteen multiple address messages; two classified CONFIDENTIAL and eleven classified SECRET CODEWORD, were enciphered in depth and transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links by the 37th Radio Squadron Mobile, Kirknewton Royal Air Force Station, Scotland. Association of the codeword with the material compromised is involved. The subject violation, if intercepted and read, would result in the substantial compromise of the


i. On 30 January 1954, a portion of a message, classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over landline circuits from the communications center, SSO, 3rd Air Force, South Ruislip, England, to the 10th Radio Squadron Mobile, Chicksands, Priory, England. Association of the codeword with the material compromised is involved. The subject violation provides a cross-section
of US COMINT success insofar as knowledge of

j. On 1 February 1954, a portion of a message, classified CONFIDENTIAL, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from USN-39, Kami Seya, Japan to the United States Naval Radio Station, Guam, Mariana Islands. The subject violation if intercepted and read, would tend to indicate US ability to intercept and catalog certain Russian transmissions.

k. On 4 February 1954, a portion of a message, classified CONFIDENTIAL, was transmitted in mono-alphabetic substitution cipher over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from the 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, to The Director, National Security Agency. The subject violation consisted entirely of raw traffic and would tend to indicate US ability to intercept and catalog certain Russian transmissions.

l. On 14 February 1954, a portion of a message, classified SECRET CODEWORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over landline circuits from the 331st Communications Reconnaissance Group, Giessen, Germany, to the 502nd Communications Reconnaissance Group, Heilbronn, Germany. Association of the codeword with this type material is not involved. The subject violation if intercepted would

m. On 14 February 1954, a portion of three messages, two classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD, and one classified SECRET CODEWORD, were enciphered in depth and transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from the 12th Radio Squadron Mobile, Landsberg, Germany, to The Director, National Security Agency. Association of the codewords with the material compromised is not involved. The subject violation, if intercepted and read, would indicate US ability to intercept and catalog certain Russian transmissions.

n. On 20 February 1954, a portion of a message classified. SECRET CODEWORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over landline circuits from The Army Security Agency, Austria, to the 502nd Communications Reconnaissance Group, Heilbronn, Germany. Association of the codeword with this type material is not involved. The subject violation, if intercepted would reveal the ability of the
On 3 March 1954, two messages, classified SECRET CODEWORD, were mistakenly transmitted in clear text over an Army Command and Administration Network by the 502nd Communications Reconnaissance Group, Heilbronn, Germany. This particular circuit is composed of German commercial landline links and as such are vulnerable to interception. Association of the codeword with this type material is involved. The subject violation would result in the substantial compromise of the fact that collaboration between the US and the...

On 7 March 1954, a portion of a message, classified SECRET CODEWORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over communications circuits composed of landline links from the Army Security Agency Pacific, Tokyo, Japan, to the 8612th Army Administrative Unit, Chitose, Japan. Association of the codeword with this type material is involved. The subject violation, if intercepted, would compromise the salient features of our case notation system.

On 11 March 1954, a communications security violation occurred at the 696lst Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Texas. On that date, a portion of a message classified SECRET CODEWORD was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over a communications circuit composed of radio and wire links to the 6920th Security Group, Johnson AFB, Japan. Since the information was vulnerable to intercept, it is considered compromised. The subject violation, if intercepted, would indicate US interest in, and ability to intercept Russian transmissions.

On 23 March 1954, a communications security violation occurred at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. On that date, a message classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD was inadvertently accepted from the Air Force Security Service Office of Production for relay, and subsequently transmitted by the National Security Agency, Special Weather Communications Center, Arlington Hall Station, to the U.S. Air Force Weather Control (Special Weather Intelligence Section), Washington, D. C. Consequently, the codeword and the associated information was viewed by four persons not authorized access to TOP SECRET CODEWORD information. Aside from the compromise of the TOP SECRET CODEWORD, it is considered that the subject violation did not, however, result in any compromise of COMINT information.
2. In each of the particular cases involved, the circuits over which the violation occurred are vulnerable to interception, consequently, successful interception must be presumed and the information exposed considered compromised.

3. Appropriate instructions have been issued in each of these cases to prevent a recurrence of violations of this type.