

USCIB: 13.5/108

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~~~TOP SECRET~~

26 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Compromise of COMINT Information (Physical).

Reference: CIBD #9 (Revised) dated 4 February 1955.

1. In accordance with the reference the Army member of USCIB, on 14 January 1955, reported to the Director, NSA a situation involving a compromise of fourteen (14) COMINT file cards (reproduced and attached as enclosure).

2. The Army report contained the following statements:

These cards were found by Mr. Earl E. Le Doyn, Alexander Park Junior High School, Portsmouth, Virginia, in a desk which had been recently acquired from surplus government stocks. On 20 July 1954, Mr. Le Doyn advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation of his discovery.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation contacted the Office of Security, Department of State, who advised that the attached cards had never been the property of the Department of State. The Office of Investigations, National Security Agency, on 20 September 1954, advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation that although they had assisted in gathering the information contained on the cards, the cards appeared to be property of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army.

Records check within the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, indicates that the 3 x 5 TOP SECRET cards may have been part of the Who's Who file of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), War Department. It is further indicated that the TOP SECRET-ULTRA cards were apparently part of a reference file of subjects of articles published in the DIPSUM during February - April 1946, and could have been prepared by any department or agency, including MIS, which received the DIPSUM.

Due to the long period of time that has since elapsed, it is felt that this office cannot justly identify the department, agency, or individual responsible for this codeword compromise, therefore no further action is contemplated by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Subject cards are forwarded herewith for any action that you may deem appropriate in this case.

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3. On 5 April 1955 the Director, NSA reported the incident to the Executive Secretary, USCIB as a compromise of codeword material. A portion of the comments by the Director, NSA are as follows:

Cards of this nature during this period were prepared by the Army Security Agency and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of Army. Duplicate copies were made by each and given to the other for filing. Since the date of preparation of these cards, the Army Security Agency's files have been transferred to the Armed Forces Security Agency, and are currently the possession of the National Security Agency. A check of the National Security Agency's files reveals duplicate copies of these compromised cards still held intact.

4. Further investigation by this office failed to reveal the person responsible for the security inspection of the desk in the first instance.

5. The investigation did reveal, however, that the cards had been circulating outside of COMINT channels, except for one brief interval, for a period of about three months after Mr. Le Doyn contacted the FBI. The cards were finally placed in COMINT channels by COMINT cleared CIA security personnel who subsequently received the cards as possible OSS material. With the exception of Mr. Le Doyn himself, all persons known to have viewed the cards were cleared for TOP SECRET.

6. There is no doubt that the incident involved compromise of COMINT information under the terms of the reference. Fortunately no technical information was involved. In view of the informational content of the cards it is believed likely that no unauthorized person viewing them was aware of the true source of the information.

7. The incident emphasizes two main points:

a. The need for strict adherence to the security double-check system presently in force by each USCIB member department or agency, and

b. The need for some assurance that COMINT material once outside COMINT channels will be expeditiously returned.

The first is considered to be a matter of concern to the individual member agencies of USCIB; the second I plan to refer to the Security Committee for study and recommendation.

Acting Exe



USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

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
EO 3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



~~TOP SECRET~~




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


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~~TOP SECRET - CODEWORD~~



~~TOP SECRET - CODEWORD~~



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