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USCIB: 13/303

12 January 1953

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Preparations and Exchange of Reports on
Possible Compromises of COMINT Successes.

1. The Director, NSA, has requested that the draft memorandum and message, Enclosures 1 and 2, which reply to SUSLO's memorandum (Enclosure 3), be submitted to USCIB members for approval by vote sheet.

2. It is requested that your views be forwarded to the Secretary by 16 January 1953.


H. D. JONES

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures - 3

1. Draft Message to SUSLO.
2. Draft Letter to SUSLO.
3. SUSLO Serial 000321 dtd
17 Nov 52.

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~~REF ID: A59714~~
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FROM: DIRNSA

DRAFT/24 December 1952

TO: SUSLO, LONDON

WL _____.

REUR SERIAL ~~000~~321 DATED 17 NOVEMBER 1952, USCIB CONSIDERS LSIB PROPOSALS TO BE REASONABLE BASIS FOR EVENTUAL AGREEMENT IN FORM OF ANNEXURE TO BRUSA APPENDIX B. LSIB PROPOSALS, AS INTERPRETED BY USCIB, WOULD NOT REQUIRE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION REGARDING BREACHES OF NATIONAL COMINT SECURITY REGULATIONS WHEN SUCH BREACHES CANNOT BE PRESUMED TO HAVE COMPROMISED COMINT CODEWORDS OR TO HAVE REVEALED COMINT SUCCESSSES. TO AVOID POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT, USCIB PROPOSES REVISIONS TO DRAFT OF THE ANNEXURE. THESE PROPOSALS ARE BEING FORWARDED BY BAG.

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 13/303 dated 12 January 1953.

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DRAFT/Serial:

TO: Senior U.S. Liaison Officer
London

1. Reference is made to WL_____. USCIB proposes that if the following statement is acceptable to LSIB, it should be annexed to Appendix B to the BRUSA Agreement:

(a) When it becomes known to either party that any breach of national COMINT security regulations has occurred and the breach can be presumed to have compromised COMINT codewords or to have revealed COMINT successes, the circumstances will be made known to the other party.

(b) When any other factor which can be presumed to have compromised COMINT codewords or to have revealed COMINT successes becomes known to either party, it shall inform the other of the circumstances.

(c) When evidence becomes available to either party that COMINT codewords, material, or successes have in fact been compromised, that party shall fully inform the other.

(d) When a significant change occurs in foreign cryptographic or signals security and either party suspects with reason that it be due to compromise of any kind, that party shall report to the other, stating reasons for its suspicion; and each party shall then keep the other fully informed of any information that may confirm or disprove such suspicion.

2. USCIB assumes that if LSIB agrees to the foregoing, LSIB will arrange for the production and distribution of the annexure.

(Draft)
RALPH J. CANINE
Major General, US Army
Director

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 13/303 dated 12 January 1953.

17 November 1952

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~~Security Information~~

Memorandum for: Director, National Security Agency

Subj: Preparations and Exchange of Reports on Possible Compromises of Comint Successes

Ref: (a) USCIB Memo UC #000319, subject as above, of 27 August 1952
(b) SUSLO Message LW-291 of 15 October 1952
(c) SUSLO Message LW-347 of 14 November 1952

1. The following response to reference (a) has been received from the Director, GCHQ:

"1. LSIB has taken note of USCIB Directive No. 9 'Instructions for handling possible compromises of Comint successes', and of the arguments which supported its promulgation. The Board agrees that every effort should be made to detect and investigate, at the earliest, any definite or possible compromise of Comint success; and that formal arrangements for an exchange of reports between the U.S. and U.K. on such compromises, actual or suspected, would be of mutual advantage.

2. The 'Instructions and Regulations for the Security of Signal Intelligence' issued by LSIB in accordance with Appendix B to the BRUSA Agreement state explicitly that any breaches of those regulations must be reported to the Board, whose agent in this respect is the Director, GCHQ. This practice has been well observed by U.K. producers and recipients of Comint for some time past. Furthermore, any incidents which might be expected to have compromised the Comint codewords or to have revealed Comint successes have been reported to the U.S. authorities on behalf of LSIB. But LSIB accepts that these precautions are not sufficient in themselves and do not explicitly cover those cases to which USCIB has drawn attention; when a significant change occurs in foreign cryptographic or signals security, when no immediate reason is evident for the loss, and when the possibility of compromise must be suspected and fully investigated.

3. LSIB therefore proposes the following as a basis of agreement between the two Boards:

(a) When any breach of national Comint security regulations or any other factor which can be presumed to have compromised Comint codewords or to have revealed Comint successes, becomes known to either party it shall inform the other;

(b) When evidence becomes available to either party that Comint codewords, material, or successes have in fact been compromised, that party shall inform the other;

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Serial 000321EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

17 November 1952

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Comint Successes
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4. LSIB would suggest that, if the above be acceptable to USCIB as a reasonable basis for agreement between the two Boards and for subsequent exchanges, it should be appended as an annexure to Appendix B to the BRUSA Agreement."

/s/ B. Pulling
B. PULLING
Colonel, USAF
Senior U.S. Liaison Officer

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