MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:  COMINT Arrangements for SACLANT

Reference:  USCIB 14/268 dated 7 January 1953

1. Following USCIB approval of the Final Report and Recommendations of the US/UK/Canadian Planning Conference (SACLANT) of November 1952, with amendments indicated in the reference, the Director, NSA, informed British and Canadian authorities of USCIB views.

2. As stated in the enclosure herewith, LSIB has accepted the amendments agreed to by USCIB and has proposed certain further changes to the Conference papers. These proposals, contained in paragraphs 2b, c, d, and e, are scheduled for consideration at the Eighty-second USCIB meeting.

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
LSIB/26/53 dated 21 January 1953
Chairman,
United States Communications Intelligence Board.

COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT

1. The London Signal Intelligence Board has considered the final Report and Recommendations of the U.S./U.K./Canadian Planning Conference of November 1952 which met to discuss "Comint arrangements for SACLANT".

2. The Board agrees with the report and recommendations, with the following comments:

(a) Reference SAC/E/R/7, Annexure "Comint arrangements for SACLANT", paras. 11 and 12. L.S.I.B. agrees with U.S.C.I.B. that these paragraphs are ambiguous, and accepts U.S.C.I.B.'s proposed redraft, namely:

Para. 11(a) "Co-ordinated shore-based direction finder operations by National nets and stations organized and controlled as mutually agreed among the participating nations."

Para. 12 Delete word "direct" in title, and reword paragraph:

"Each nation with forces serving under SACLANT may individually arrange to operate in SACLANT's area National Comint Units not provided specifically or exclusively for support of the forces under SACLANT. These Units will not operate as part of the SACLANT "Y" structure, and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-Allied cooperation unless agreed by the nations providing them."

Consequential amendments are similarly required in paras. 14 and 15 of SAC/E/R/(6), "Communication Intelligence (Y) Arrangements for SACLANT."

(b) Reference SAC/E/R/7, Annexure "Comint arrangements for SACLANT", paragraph 27(b). The L.S.I.B. considers that it is acceptable for the fully evaluated results of shore-based D/F operations, during NATO or other Allied exercises or manoeuvres, to be passed to the nationals of those nations participating in the D/F operations; and, by implication,
for D/F fixes made during those exercises or manoeuvres to be received by nationals of all nations participating in the exercises whether or not those nations contribute to the D/F operations. The Board would go further than this. It does not regard the employment of shipborne interception or D/F facilities during NATO or other Allied exercises or manoeuvres, and the subsequent analysis of the results, to be governed by Comint security regulations except insofar as the analysis of results may reveal special Comint techniques. The Board considers that the analysed results of such interception and D/F operations in peace should therefore be made available, in post-exercise conference, to all nations which have participated in the Allied exercise in order to assist in the improvement of Allied communications security, provided only that such analysed results do not:

(i) reveal the location of U.S., U.K., or Canadian interception or D/F facilities;

(ii) reveal special Comint techniques.


(c) Reference SAC/E/R/5, "arrangements for exchange and dissemination within SACLANT's Command of Comint beyond the scope of Third Party collaboration", paragraph 5(c). The L.S.I.B. considers that the definition of the second category of intelligence to be disseminated by OIG's contravenes the provisions of Appendix B to the BRUSA Agreement, paragraph 15, and of "IRSIG", paragraph 80, which is based thereon. The Board therefore proposes an amendment to this sub-paragraph, and the addition of a new paragraph 6, as in the Annexure to this letter (with the existing paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of SAC/E/R/5 being re-numbered 7, 8 and 9).

(d) Reference SAC/E/R/5, paragraph 5(b). The L.S.I.B. accepts that, in peace and war, there should be an exchange between the proposed OIG's of specially important but not all Comint items received by the three OIG's. It would however suggest that, in peace and war, all appreciations and discussions of plots should be exchanged between the three OIG's, and that the wording of this sub-paragraph should therefore be clarified to read:

"Between the OIG's there will be exchange of specially important individual Comint items,"
and of all appreciations and discussions of plots based thereon."

(e) The L.S.I.B. notes that the Conference did not discuss or make any recommendation concerning the appointment of the SACLANT "Y" Officer. The Board would suggest that this appointment be made by SACLANT in consultation with Navy Department, the Canadian Naval Board and Admiralty.

(Signed)

Copy to: Chairman, Communications Research Committee.
Re-draft of SAC/E/R/5 para 5(c) and new para 6
(existing paras 6, 7 and 8 to be re-numbered 7, 8 and 9)

5(c) Out of OIC's Two categories of intelligence will be disseminated by OIC’s:

(i) The first will be at Comint level and will be sent only to subordinate commanders cleared to receive Comint, who must be U.K., U.S. or Canadian nationals. Such consumers will be served by the appropriate OIC through Comint channels.

(ii) The second category will be at non-Comint level and will be sent to all commanders concerned through non-Comint channels, normally in the form of intelligence summaries. Comint may be used as background in the selection and formulation of these summaries, but items of information derived solely from Comint must be rigorously excluded from them, and in addition care must be taken to ensure that nothing in the summaries as issued could be traced back to Comint in general.

(iii) These arrangements will apply in peacetime. Any modification to meet emergency or wartime conditions will be in accordance with the policy of U.S.G.I.E., L.S.I.B. and C.R.G.

6. Responsibility for maintaining Comint security

(a) Should it be necessary to take action in the light of Comint made available under para 5(c)(i) above, the utmost care must be taken by commanders responsible for issuing operational orders to ensure that neither the enemy, nor Allied Third Party nationals and un-indoctrinated U.K., U.S. or Canadian nationals involved, become aware of the existence of the Comint information.

(b) In the case of the intelligence summaries disseminated as in para 5(c)(ii) above, it is the responsibility of OIC’s to ensure that the principles stated are followed in their preparation. Commanders will then be at liberty to use them in any way that their classification (SECRET or TOP SECRET) allows.